What Europe's Fighter Jet Programmes reveal about Defence Coordination
By Patricia Preller | 28 April 2026
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Summary
A trilateral treaty has stabilised the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP), a multinational programme to develop a sixth-generation fighter, in the short term, though its long-term viability remains contingent on the UK securing sustainable defence funding beyond June 2026.
GCAP's structured multinational governance model between Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom contrasts with the internal disputes undermining FCAS, highlighting that effective industrial coordination rather than budget size alone will determine European potential for strategic autonomy.
Broader European defence coordination will likely remain constrained by fragmented procurement, diverging threat perceptions, and the absence of a politically empowered steering mechanism capable of aligning collective ambitions with deliverable outcomes.
Context
The multinational initiative by Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom, known as the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP), to develop a sixth-generation stealth fighter by 2035 has been secured by a trilateral treaty between the states and industrial partners. GCAP was announced in 2022 as a move by the three countries to produce an alternative to the American F35 fighter jets.
This comes after the UK had been slow to commit to a further budget, which had caused Japan to voice concerns over the future of the project. The contract empowers Edgewing, a joint venture between the industrial partners BAE, Leonardo, and Japan Aircraft Industrial Enhancement, to design and develop the project as its industrial lead.
The funding will last until June 2026 to give the United Kingdom more time for securing funding through its upcoming defence investment plan. The plan, which was originally planned to be published in autumn 2025, has yet to be released amid ongoing internal negotiations about funding. This comes as Canada is courting the three states to join the initiative as an ‘observer,’ due to concerns over its reliance on the U.S. for defence. The position would grant access to confidential project information, with the potential to become a buyer or joint development partner in the future.
Implications
The initiative stands in competition with the project led by Germany, France, and Spain – the Future Combat Air System (FCAS) - set to deliver a rival jet by 2040. The project had recently faltered, however, as French Dassault had pushed for dominance and alienated the Spanish and German-associated Airbus.
The competing programmes reveal a fragmented European defence industry where national industrial interests consistently override collective action. Both the GCAP and FCAS were initiatives to decrease dependence on foreign defence imports in a deteriorating European security environment. This is underscored by continuing tensions with the US and within the NATO alliance, and increasing aggressions from Russia, which has put pressure on Europe to improve its defence capabilities quickly.
Economically, separate programmes focusing on similar issues will replicate capabilities, leading to lower production and higher costs, which mitigates European potential for defence autonomy even with bolstered defence budgets. Thus, higher but fragmented European defence budgets in general are unlikely to produce a more capable Europe without coordinated and centralised leadership.
Beyond economics, the parallel programmes send a damaging political signal. The Belgian defence minister has publicly called the two competing sixth-generation programmes a "really bad example" of European integration. This frustration is shared among smaller NATO members who will ultimately have to choose between the two systems. Amid US scepticism toward European burden-sharing and as Russia is closely watching for signs of western disunity, a partial failure or fragmentation risks signalling that a strong European defence industry cannot emerge as long as incentive structures remain on a national basis.
The complex coordination process and consensus rules that dominate the European Union further complicate defence coordination, especially as member states are hesitant to subordinate decision-making on the issue to the EU based on concerns around national sovereignty. The EU has moved towards coordinated procurement with its 2024 defence industrial strategy and established a basis for coordinated procurement with its Security Action for Europe (SAFE), but these efforts largely focus on Brussels with limited potential for cooperation with the UK.
Still, GCAP shows that a centralised and balanced multinational steering group is possible; besides Edgewing driving industrial cooperation, Berlin and London have committed to pursuing export campaigns together for jointly produced military equipment. The Joint Expeditionary Force, a military coalition of ten like-minded states to protect the European High North from external threats, demonstrates that European military coordination is possible where states perceive common interests. Yet consolidation is not straightforward. Large-scale multilateral defence programmes have a poor historical track record, with projects such as the NATO Alliance Ground Surveillance programme and the Medium Extended Air Defence System facing internal disputes and delays from competing national requirements.
At a larger scale, effective coordination could play to the strengths of each state and mitigate shortfalls for a Europe that is greater than the sum of its parts, for example, combining German spending power with Britain's ideas for innovation, greatly increasing European defensive capabilities. But the broader European defence landscape remains fragmented. Although JEF shows cooperation is possible, it is almost entirely limited to states most directly exposed to Russian aggression, and there is little indication that countries with lower threat perceptions, such as Portugal, will show the same urgency. Without a dedicated and politically empowered steering mechanism, the gap between Europe's collective defence ambitions and its ability to deliver on them is likely to persist.
Forecast
Short-term (Now - 3 months)
It is highly likely that Italy and Japan, as well as their industrial partners will continue to push the UK to secure funding with an updated Defence Investment Plan beyond June 2026.
It is highly likely that Canada will formalise its observer status within the next three months. It is unlikely, however, that Canada will commit to a development partnership role before the UK's Defence Investment Plan is published.
Medium-term (3 - 12 months)
There is a realistic possibility that GCAP will stall indefinitely, further straining UK-Japan relations. This is heavily dependent on how quickly the British government can deliver the much-delayed Defence Investment Plan.
There is a realistic possibility that FCAS will experience further internal disputes between Dassault and its partner firms over workshare and technology transfer arrangements, which could prompt Germany or Spain to informally signal interest in closer industrial cooperation with GCAP partners.
Long-term (>1 year)
It is likely that GCAP will face further clashes between the three countries over expanding the partnership, funding, or timelines. The past stability of the partnership, however, shows that it is unlikely that this will seriously threaten the continuance of the project.
It is highly likely that GCAP's success or failure will serve as a test case for future multilateral defence procurement below EU-level with flexible defence industrial models.
