US-Led Tech Supply Chain Alignment ‘Pax Silica’
By Ipek Kara | 26 January 2026
Summary
In early January 2026, the United States (US) expanded its new technology supply chain alliance, referred to as “Pax Silica”, bringing in partners from the Gulf, such as Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), to improve AI and semiconductor supply chains.
This marks the start of a new and broader geopolitical coalition on an alliance-based technology governance system that combines geopolitical and economic alignment, security, and industrial policy.
The developments highlight growing tensions between openness and control in global technology markets, with implications for Europe, emerging economies, and multinational firms as they are not included parties of the Pax Silica for the moment.
Context
Global technology supply chains have become central for economic security and geopolitical competition over the past decade. As of mid-January 2026, the US expanded its new supply chain initiative to Qatar and the UAE. The new initiative aims to strengthen the cooperation on semiconductors, AI hardware, critical minerals and supporting infrastructures. The inclusion of Middle Eastern partners reflects the US’s effort to diversify cooperation beyond the existing transatlantic frameworks.
Alongside the new alliance, US authorities formally codified revised control measures on the governance of advanced AI chips. The measures clarify the sale and transfer of high-performance computing components, particularly regarding China, while setting the ground for expectations of allied states.
Core members (signed and participated):
US, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Australia, United Kingdom, Israel, Netherlands, Qatar (joined early January 2026) and UAE (joined mid-January 2026)
Others involved as invited or participating observers:
Canada, The European Union (EU) (as a guest at discussions, not a signatory yet) and Taiwan (present as a special guest in some discussions)
Potential future participants:
India is actively engaged in talks and may be invited formally to join later.
Implications
The expansion of a US-led supply chain cooperation signals a move away from the US-China race towards strategic alliance coalitions. Integrating partners such as Qatar, the UAE, and South Korea strengthens logistical resilience and access to investment capital while strengthening the US’s presence in the Middle East and Asia.
At the same time, the codification of export controls signals fragmentation in the existing global technology ecosystem. States and firms increasingly face choices between regulatory regimes, access conditions, and alliance commitments. This situation is likely to accelerate the emergence of new parallel technology blocs with differing standards, compliance expectations, and innovation pathways. While the EU remains a major regulatory actor in global technology governance, the expansion of the US-led framework represents strategic risks for them due to their absence in the framework as a full member.
Recent strains in transatlantic trust highlighted by the tensions over Greenland and US unilateral strategic actions are likely to complicate the EU’s future engagements with US-led frameworks. Unpredictability and lack of clear institutional guarantees from the US risks losing the political willingness of the EU for further economic and regulatory cooperation mechanisms.
These developments place additional pressure on the EU’s open strategic autonomy. Although there have been efforts to improve autonomy throughout 2025, the EU remains highly reliant on transatlantic cooperation in security, economy, and innovation capabilities. The consolidation of the U.S.-led supply chain coalition raises questions about whether autonomy for the EU can be pursued independently or whether closer alignment with a framework will be necessary to maintain access to the critical technologies market.
Overall, these developments suggest that the EU’s role in global technology governance is likely to become increasingly constrained if its prior regulatory leadership cannot be matched with active engagement in supply chain coordination. Without clearer strategic positioning, the EU risks losing their influential role in standard setting in AI and advanced technology systems.
Forecast
Short-term (Now - 3 months)
Pax Silica is likely to remain a non-binding coordination framework, with early activity focused on political signalling, working-level dialogues, and mapping supply chain vulnerabilities rather than concrete joint projects. Initial cooperation is expected to centre on information sharing, investment facilitation, and alignment of policy expectations, particularly around AI infrastructure and advanced semiconductor supply.
The US is likely to use Pax Silica as a reference framework when engaging allies on export controls, investment screening, and technology cooperation, without formally requiring adherence. This may increase informal pressure on partners to align with US-defined notions of “trusted” supply chains.
China is likely to respond rhetorically by criticising Pax Silica as a fragmentation of global technology markets, while simultaneously accelerating domestic capacity-building in AI hardware, critical minerals processing, and alternative supply routes with non-aligned states.
Medium-term (3-12 months)
Pax Silica is likely to evolve into a project-based coordination mechanism, where member states cooperate on specific initiatives such as AI data centres, semiconductor manufacturing capacity, or critical mineral processing, which would deepen their functional interdependence.
The EU is highly likely to face increasing pressure from the US to clarify its strategic positioning.
China is likely to increase efforts to consolidate parallel technology ecosystems, strengthen ties with countries outside US-led frameworks and use its current role in supply chains, particularly in rare earths and manufacturing inputs.
Long-term (>1 year)
Pax Silica is likely to become an essential reference point in global technology governance. While ii is highly likely not develop binding norms, its influence will determine the conceptualisation of “trusted” supply chains,
The EU’s long-term influence is highly likely to depend on whether it can translate regulatory power into supply chain coordination and industrial capacity.
Global technology governance is likely to stabilise into a multi-bloc structure, with Pax Silica-aligned and Chinese-centred ecosystems coexisting together. This fragmentation is likely to reduce efficiency and openness of the market.
