Terror in the city of the Tsar
Lily Donahue | 24 April 2024
Summary
A terrorist attack in Moscow resulted in the deaths of at least 139 people, with over 100 more injured.
While ISIS-K claimed responsibility for the attack, Putin has been seemingly loath to assign blame to the group, instead pointing to Kyiv.
At least 139 people were killed and over 100 injured after gunmen opened fire at a Moscow concert hall on Friday, March 22nd. Russian President Vladimir Putin, in a two-headed answer, blamed both “radical Islamists” as well the “neo-Nazi regime” in Kyiv. This reflection came after his initial statement the day after the attack, where he alleged that Kyiv had facilitated the terrorists’ border crossing.
Hours after the attack, ISIS-K (for Khorasan, a province in Afghanistan) claimed responsibility after having broadcast videos of the attack on Telegram channels. It was the group’s first apparent attack on Russia, though it has believed Russia to be relevant for years, pointing to Moscow’s involvement in Syrian airstrikes and its long history of war in the Caucasus. In September 2022, ISIS-K claimed responsibility for a suicide attack at Kabul’s Russian Embassy. Murmurs of an attack had allegedly been apparent: the US embassy claimed to be “monitoring reports” of potential extremism earlier in the month and claims to have shared this information with their Russian equivalents.
This is not Russia’s first experience with terrorism, nor indeed with attacks at performance venues. In 2002, Chechen separatists stormed Moscow’s Dubrovka Theatre, taking 912 people hostage. Demanding the end of the Second Chechen War, the gunmen sought the complete withdrawal of Russian troops. Despite hostage negotiations (journalist Anna Politkovskaya, who would be killed six years later, took part), the siege ultimately ended when Russian security services released sleeping gas into the building. Boris Nemtsov, a prominent opposition leader who would, like Politkovskaya, be killed, later stated that his efforts were all but rebuffed. Initially called in to negotiate, Nemtsov, en route to the theatre, was called by the Kremlin and told he was not needed. In what would become a terrible calling card, Russian forces were overly aggressive. 174 hostages would die, some choking on their own vomit. All 40 of the hostage takers were killed.
This happened again two years later, in the Ossetian town of Beslan, where terrorists seized a school, again taking more than 1,000 people hostage. Most of the hostages were crowded into the school gymnasium, which the hostage-takers rigged with explosives. Despite the hundreds of children stranded in the school, Russian forces used what the European Court of Human Rights would later claim to be “disproportionate force.” The military used “tank cannons, grenade launchers and flame-throwers”; it is widely believed that many of the children who died were victims of these specific weapons. 334 people would die; 186 were children.
These failures point to an inability—or indeed, disinterest—in protecting civilian life. Despite flamboyant conspiracies that suggest Putin was responsible, the likely reality is triter and, so, more tragic. There is little interest at the elite level in protecting others. Indeed, there is only protection of self.
The attack has two real potentials for Putin, one of which he would prefer (and is more likely). Public trust may erode if the answer to the attack is viewed as weak-handed. Putin, Russia’s forever strongman, could look inept and unable to protect his vast populace. Putin will probably use this attack to further cement his already entrenched power. Indeed, March 25th saw renewed Russian strikes on Ukrainian energy grids. Aerial bombs hit Kharkiv on the 27th; this had not happened in over a year.
Putin rose to prominence with his belligerence in Chechnya, and it is likely he will use this attack not as evidence that Russia does not need him but as proof that they do. After Beslan, Putin consolidated power in the presidency: gubernatorial elections were cancelled and replaced by direct Kremlin appointments. This attack will most probably result in the same renewed consolidation of power. What more Putin has to take is questionable.
Пресс-служба Губернатора Московской области/Wikimedia
Forecast
Short-term
Putin will likely continue to point at Kyiv (and, by extension, the US) for involvement, especially as American intelligence was apparently more robust than Russia’s at the time of the attack.
It is likely Russia’s Tajik populace will be a victim of renewed racist attacks; suppression will have an impact on remittance payments to Tajikistan.
Long-term
Putin will use the attack to shore up support at home and may use it to increase attacks on Ukraine. The Kremlin will continue to reach out to non-Western states to expand into a Russian-friendly BRICS. Within Russia, while murmurs of Putin’s possible inability to protect citizens may exist, they are unlikely to reach full pitch.
