Hungarian Border Revisionism in Light of the Ukraine War
Jakub Gazda | 23 April 2024
Summary
The disruption of territorial sovereignty on the European continent since the Russian invasion of Ukraine has once again highlighted the revisionist tendencies of Victor Orbán's government, with the countries’ neighbours issuing diplomatic protests.
A weakened Ukraine, either through military defeat or an unfavourable peace settlement, could result in further changes to the European border, if Hungarian pursues its agenda for a Greater Hungary”.
The phenomenon of territorial revisionism, wherein states seek to alter borders based on ethnic linkages has sparked some of the world’s bloodiest conflicts. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is a recent example of this territorial revisionism, where ethnic-based border revisionism has resulted in violent conflict.
Historical Context
Similarly to the German Empire, the Kingdom of Hungary was stripped of its territory and population in the fallout of its defeat in the First World War (WW1). This included 75% of land and 31% of ethnic Hungarians becoming minorities in newly formed states. Therefore, for many years that followed WW1, and similarly to the rhetoric accompanying Hitler's rise, Hungarian domestic and foreign policy, echoing the rhetoric accompanying Adolf Hitler’s ascent, was primarily focused on revising its new borders. This is when a “Greater Hungary” was restored, reuniting the states with all the lands where ethnic Hungarians lived. This process came to fruition at the start of the Second World War alongside its alliance with Nazi Germany. This allowed Hungary to annex large segments of its former territories from neighbouring states, many of which were its allies. Nonetheless, the defeat of Nazi Germany in the Second World War would result in Hungary, similarly to its German ally, losing all its conquered territory. Furthermore, like other Central and Eastern European states, the country would find itself under Moscow (USSR) imposed Communist Rule until the late 1980s, during which ethnic and territorial disputes were fiercely eradicated and replaced with communist internationalism.
Post-Communist Nationalism and the Resurgence of Greater Hungary
The abrupt collapse of Communist rule in the former Eastern Bloc accompanied a steep rise in nationalist rhetoric across the region. However, there were varying effects. For example, there was the peaceful separation of Czechoslovakia, but also the bloody conflicts in former Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, hardline conservative and nationalist rhetoric would only enter the Hungarian mainstream and government politics in the 2010 national elections, which saw the victory of the Fidesz party and its leader, Victor Orban. Since the 2010 election, the rhetoric that had re-catapulted Orbán and Fidesz into a two-thirds majority in parliament would only grow in its radical nature. It is under the leadership of Orbán, that Hungary has since experienced democratic backsliding. This includes the manipulation of the electoral system and the elimination of government critique by the media. This is alongside an increased use of nationalist and xenophobic rhetoric towards both the LGBTQ+ community and Middle Eastern refugees. Furthermore, a vital part of the nationalist rhetoric used by the Orban regime has been state support to the Hungarian diaspora in neighbouring states (thus arguably increasing its influence) by engaging in political and economic activity in Hungarian-majority regions. These have included buying landmarks by state-affiliated investment groups and large-scale business investments by Fidesz-affiliated oligarchs. This has included acquiring and investing in football clubs in Hungarian majority regions and outright political campaigning by Orban and his ministers in those regions.
Orbán’s revisionim since the 2022 invasion
Even before the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, states bordering Hungary have been critical of the actions and rhetoric pursued by the Orbán government. These have included acquiring agricultural land and historical landmarks in neighbouring states by state-funded agencies. While underpinned by escalating revisionists, including the declaration of national mourning on the anniversary of the Trianon Treaty signing, to which most neighbouring states owe their existence, the leaders of states which neighbour with Hungary had critiqued Orbán the activities outlined above. This is alongside messaging, which can be interpreted as questioning the territorial integrity of those states, including commemorating the anniversary of the Trianon treaty as a national day of mourning (based on which Hungary lost a large section of its land to its neighbours) as well as the use of the flag of Greater Hungary in government buildings, including Orbán’s office.
However, since the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, which hosts a sizeable Hungarian diaspora, the concern of renewed Hungarian revisionism has intensified amongst its neighbours. This included the official summoning of Hungarian diplomats in Romania and Ukraine in November 2022 after Orbán was seen wearing a scarf with the map of “Greater Hungary”. The scarf was seen to have territories of both countries illustrated on it. A similar case, whereby Orbán was seen wearing a scarf with the map of “Greater Hungary” on it, occurred in Slovakia after he referred to the country as a “breakaway territory”. Furthermore, unlike Slovakia or Romania, which are Hungarian allies in the European Union and NATO, Ukraine’s relationship with Budapest is strained. Ukraine can only rely on the eroded international law to guarantee sovereignty over its Westernmost region with a large Hungarian population. Therefore, given the rhetoric and the economic and political pursuits of Budapest in Hungarian diaspora territories, coupled with historical revisionist precedent, the prospect of Hungarian territorial claims has become increasingly concerning, particularly amid ongoing disruptions to the territorial status quo in Europe.
Presidential Press and Information Office/Wikimedia
Forecast
It is highly likely Ukraine’s successful defence against Russian forces prevented the Hungarian government from exercising increased influence and control over the state’s Hungarian-majority territories, with the claim of protecting its diaspora.
Although it is unlikely that Hungary will assert any territorial claims against its European Union and Nato partners in the event of a Ukrainian defeat, Budapest's covert methods of increasing its influence in Hungarian-majority regions can only be expected to continue and intensify.
While Victor Orbán has, for the time being, secured an ally in the Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico, continued revisionist rhetoric undercutting the sovereignty of its allies and anti-Ukrainian posturing, is likely to isolate Budapest from European and Transatlantic structures further.
