Strategic Independence or Crisis? How Trump’s Return Is Reshaping EU Defence
Milica Starinac | 11 March 2025
Summary
Trump's re-election has prompted Europe to seek greater defence autonomy due to the US warning against security guarantees. In response, the European Commission introduced the “ReArm Europe” plan, which includes financial mechanisms to boost defence spending and cooperation.
France and Germany are expected to take leading roles in shaping Europe’s defence landscape, with the French nuclear deterrence proposal and the German push for increased military spending gaining traction.
EU states will likely initiate joint defence procurements under the EUR 150 billion (GBP 127 billion) loan plan, but the plan’s effectiveness will ultimately depend on national political will.
US President Donald Trump’s re-election threatened the United States’ (US) security guarantees for Europe, for the first time since the end of World War II. Trump’s disengagement from Ukraine and warning that the US will not come to Europe’s defence in the event of an attack from Russia if the countries don’t ramp up their defence spending left the European leaders seeking ways to strengthen and coordinate their defence capabilities. These attempts have materialised in the “ReArm Europe” plan, put forward by the European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen on the 6 March 2025 summit in Brussels. The EU is facing the hard task of rapidly and sustainably increasing defence expenditures, while maintaining support for Ukraine and covering the gap left by the US military aid suspension.
Despite a significant increase in defence spending demonstrated by European NATO members following the Russian aggression on Ukraine, Europe still heavily relies on NATO — and thereby, the US — for defence and deterrence. However, increasing security concerns and perceived unpredictability in US foreign policy under Trump stressed the need for increased defence independence and stronger cooperation between countries of the Old Continent. Von der Leyen’s plan promised to provide up to EUR 800 billion (GBP 676 billion) for member states to boost their defence spending. The first part of the plan allows countries to increase their defence spending by 1.5% of GDP. This will be made possible by the activation of the national escape clause of the Stability and Growth Pact, loosening the fiscal restrictions on member states for more public funding going into defence projects. The second part, which is expected to yield short-term results, consists of EUR 150 billion (GBP 127 billion) worth of loans which will be offered to member states for defence investments sanctioned by the Commission. This instrument will particularly enable joint procurements of artillery systems, missiles, drones, and other defence capabilities, allowing the bloc to keep up with their military support towards Ukraine in the immediate aftermath of the cut of US military aid.
While the bloc is likely to agree on the bulk of the “ReArm Europe” plan, it is unclear whether boosting defence spending through said instruments will deliver the necessary security guarantees to the member states and Ukraine. Hence, the European powers will likely take extra initiatives beyond financial commitment to increase Europe’s defence standing, as demonstrated by French President Emmanuel Macron’s repeated offer to extend nuclear deterrence to its neighbours, which remains a distant possibility. Germany is also likely to take a bolder role, with likely chancellor Friedrich Merz stressing the importance of boosting military spending and cooperation with European allies in terms of defence. Moreover, Merz intends to loosen Germany’s debt rules to allow for an increase in defence spending, which would be crucial in influencing the success of the “ReArm Europe” plan, as its largest part depends on public funding. It remains to be seen what role the UK will play in the new security landscape, and closer security cooperation with the EU might be on the table.
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Forecast
Short-term
EU countries are very likely to initiate joint defence procurements under the EUR 150 billion “ReArm Europe” loan plan following its approval by the member states. However, the impact of this instrument alone on boosting Europe’s defence will be moderate, as a portion is likely to be passed on to Ukraine.
Medium-term
Defence budgets of EU member states are likely to increase up to 1,5% in line with “ReArm Europe” plan which will allow countries to increase national debt to boost defence spending. The impact of this measure will depend on domestic political support, as defence spending remains a prerogative of Member States.
Countries with lower levels of national debt, such as Germany, are likely to carry the bulk of the increase in the first year.
Long-term
France and Germany will likely take a stronger role within Europe’s security landscape, particularly if Macron successfully pushes his proposal of extending France’s nuclear deterrence to EU partners.
EU is unlikely to achieve full strategic independence from the US over the course of the upcoming two years, therefore EU leaders will very likely employ significant diplomatic efforts to prevent further erosion of its relationship with the US under NATO.