Pyongyang Parlays: Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong Un Meet
Lily Donahue | 11 July 2024
Summary
Russian President Vladimir Putin journeyed to North Korea for the first time since 2000 to meet with Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un.
Russia and North Korea seek to position their partnership in opposition to Western pacts.
Whilst the U.S. is undoubtedly concerned about the meeting, the coming election will heavily impact how it responds.
Despite friendships with Russia and North Korea, China is likely unhappy at this turn of events.
Russian President Vladimir Putin met with Supreme Leader of North Korea Kim Jong Un earlier this month, marking the first Russian presidential visit to North Korea in over two decades. The purpose of the visit was the signing–supposedly confined to a two-hour maximum– of a partnership agreement which includes a mutual defence pact, aiming to counter equivalent Western agreements.
The pact is significant primarily for its ushering in of collaboration in the event of attacks on Russian or North Korean territory. Kim was characteristically bombastic, announcing that there would be “no differences in interpretation, or hesitation, or wavering in carrying out the duty” in response to a potential attack.
The current pact replaces the 2000 Friendship, Cooperation and Good Neighbourliness Treaty—signed between an early-regime Putin and former North Korean leader Kim Jong II. A previous treaty signed during the height of the Soviet Union, 1961’s Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, echoes this current pact. It is notable that though the pact says both countries will come to the other’s aid in the event of an attack, “attack” has not been explicitly defined. This ambiguity will likely increase tensions amongst wary neighbours and conflictual states, who cannot know what would invoke the “attack” agreement. Whether this would be confined to physical strikes, or whether it could include financial aid to Ukraine is unclear.
Beyond the signing of the pact, the summit—lasting two days— was largely composed of performative moments: a frankly bizarre car ride with both leaders taking turns behind the wheel, singing children, a Pungsan dog petting zoo, and Russian concerts.
Bathed in a purple neon glow, Putin and Kim listened to a performance of a Russian song, memorialising war heroes. “We’ll Stand” (Встанем) is thought to have been originally written for the millions killed in World War II, but has been repurposed to commemorate soldiers killed in Ukraine. World War II—Russia’s Great Patriotic War—features heavily in the country’s collective imagination; Stalin has been voted amongst the population as the most predominant figure in modern history. It is not unfathomable that Putin is trying to present himself in a similar vein: the second coming of a perceived primary figure.
Putin thanked North Korea for hosting the children of slain Russian soldiers, calling it a “genuine act of […] friendship.” This comment will likely raise hackles amongst Ukrainians: Russia has been justifiably accused of illegally transferring thousands of Ukrainian children across the border. Still, the Ukrainian presidential office has refrained from commenting on the visit, attempting instead to muzzle news of Putin.
China, too, is likely unhappy at this turn. Despite relatively steady alliances with both states, China may see the pact as an attempt by Kim to reduce its dependence on China. Should Pyongyang become emboldened by this pact, for example, engaging in further missile testing, China will likely be smart at what it may interpret as this potential weakening of the regional order.
A pessimistic reading of this pact is that it could place China into a de-facto defence pact with Russia. China and North Korea also have an ongoing defence pact (signed into agreement in 1961), the terms of which could mean that in the event that North Korea is drawn into a war to defend Russia, China would be required to come to enter the conflict on North Korea’s side This is likely overly bleak. The pact, over fifty years old, has been subject to changing interpretations throughout the decades. To see China become unequivocally involved in a Russian-North Korean-perpetrated conflict is unlikely.
Presidential Executive Office of Russia / Wikimedia
Forecast
Short-term
China is unlikely to publicly voice complaints regarding the pact, but may be slightly more tentative regarding involvement with North Korea.
China, too, has a history of being less approving of the war in Ukraine than Putin would like. Though China and Russia will remain allies, Russia may feel abandoned over Chinese hesitation regarding further support, and may come to see North Korea as their primary regional ally.
Though South Korea had previously voiced a desire to keep relations friendly with Moscow–including tip-toeing over financial aid to Ukraine– this meeting may change that sentiment; Seoul is likely to be angered by the agreement.
The U.S. will likely seek to strengthen partnerships within Asia to counter Russian maneuvering. The coming November election, however, will impact this, especially if former President Donald Trump is elected.
