Playing both Sides: What the 2024 China-Arab States Cooperation Forum Tells about the Multipolarisation of the Middle East
Thomas Graham | 10 July 2024
Summary
The 10th China-Arab States Cooperation Forum Summit saw representatives and heads of state from China and the Arab League discuss cooperation on economy, energy, and technology.
China’s economic and diplomatic interest in the region has been on the rise due to the United States’ receding influence and the advent of geopolitical multipolarity in the Middle East.
Arab states are content to benefit politically and economically from their position as intermediate nations between the East and the West.
The 10th China-Arab States Cooperation Forum (CASCF) Summit, which sees representatives from Beijing meet the nations of the Arab League, was hosted on May 20th by Chinese President Xi Jinping and attended by the heads of state from Bahrain, Egypt, Tunisia and the United Arab Emirates. Discussions produced an execution plan for the 2024 to 2026 period – the Beijing Declaration – and a joint statement calling for recognising a Palestinian state. Members have lauded the conference as an important step in tackling regional and international challenges in a relationship publicly described by Xi Jinping as a “fine example of high-quality Belt and Road cooperation”.
Even though China and the most influential nations of the Arab League can relate on a number of matters, mainly on fossil-fuel reliance, the prevalence of autocratic regimes, and the occasional Western condemnation of human rights abuse, Arab leaders are not oblivious to Beijing’s ventures to expand its influence in the Middle East. Arab nations have progressively sought to benefit politically and economically from their strategic position between the East and the West, driving the US, China, and, to a lesser extent, Russia to compete for their favour.
Saudi Arabia’s recent geopolitical manoeuvres best highlight the complexities of Middle Eastern multipolarisation. Through extensive trade with the United States and China, respectively totalling USD 46.6 billion and USD 45.7 billion in 2022, and maintaining relative neutrality over geopolitical points of contention, such as the Israel-Hamas War, the Russo-Ukrainian War, and China’s claims on Taiwan, it is on the verge of signing defence partnerships with both parties. Such a feat would demonstrably raise Saudi Arabia’s ability to exert influence in the Middle East and posit Riyadh as the principal regional power.
Besides serving as a good indicator of China’s increasing interest in the Middle East, the CASCF Summit also pointed to participant’s areas of interest for cooperation. The Beijing Declaration encompassed several bilateral and multilateral agreements in digital economy, technology, finance, infrastructure, and clean energy while calling for future cooperation on space exploration. Pundits have recognised that China’s interests in the region focus on economic power and in presenting itself as an alternative to the West, although it remains to be seen if a convincing enough case can be found for some nations of the Arab League to dispense the liberal institutional order over a Chinese-led one.
European External Action Service (edited)
Forecast
Short-term
Chinese foreign investment in the Middle East is likely to significantly increase over the next two years, sustaining the success of its Belt and Road Initiative across the Middle East, Southeast Asia, Central Asia, and Africa.
Long-term
There is a realistic possibility that Saudi Arabia will attain its desired status as the most influential Middle Eastern country in the next five years, conditional on obtaining defence pacts with both the United States and China.
