Nexperia Crisis: What Does It Mean for the Future of Global Technology Supply Chain?
By Ipek Kara | 12 November 2025
Summary
The Netherlands invoked the Goods Availability Act to take domestic control over Nexperia, a Chinese-owned semiconductor producer based in the Netherlands.
The act reflects growing worries about the Chinese state's influence on companies and marks a shift in the Netherlands’ liberal trade policy. Steering towards alignment with the United States (US) and European Union (EU) efforts.
Beijing denounced the act as an economic containment, thus signalling rising technology trade tensions between China and Europe. How this conflict is managed could set the groundwork for the future of foreign-controlled assets in strategic industries.
Context
On 30 September 2025, the Dutch government announced their invocation of the Goods Availability Act to take domestic control over Nexperia, a semiconductor manufacturer headquartered in Nijmegen, Netherlands. Although operating as a Dutch company, it is fully owned by the Chinese company Wingtech Technology, which is listed on the US government's Entity List, which includes several other companies that act against US national security interests. Although not an innovator, Nexperia is a vital player in the global semiconductor supply chain, specialising in power and analogue chips used in electric vehicles (EVs), telecommunications, and automation, which makes them essential for Europe’s industry.
Dutch officials have expressed concerns about Nexperia’s Chinese ownership. Wingtech Technology is considered closely aligned with the Made in China 2025 goals, which aim to establish self-sufficiency across various manufacturing sectors and have close ties to China’s state-backed semiconductor strategy. It therefore has the potential to redirect its products into China’s domestic market in response to political pressure.
Implication
The decision to activate the Goods Availability Act allows the Dutch government to compel Nexperia to prioritise Dutch and European customers, as continuity of supply in such critical industries is deemed important for national security. It also marks a shift in the Netherlands’ traditionally liberal international trade policy, mirroring the country’s priority to secure its technological assets within a broader transatlantic framework. This shift can be interpreted as a consequence of growing pressure from Washington to align the Dutch market with its semiconductor supply chain intentions, as well as to complement the 2023 EU Chips Act.
From Beijing’s standpoint, the Act represents a targeted act of economic containment. Chinese officials are warning that it “distorts market competition and politicises trade relations.” Given that the Netherlands is also home to ASML, the world’s sole lithography machine producer, the new Act may mark the start of tightening China’s access to key transatlantic technologies across a wider spectrum. Meanwhile, the delays in existing supply contracts of Nexperia products in Europe have caused production cuts and component shortages in ZF Friedrichshafen AG, BMW, Volkswagen and many of the main automotive producers.
The Dutch decision ultimately underlines the importance of the semiconductor industry as a proxy battleground for strategic influence. As the Netherlands balances its traditionally liberal market with external pressures from the US and Brussels, how it handles the Nexperia crisis in the coming weeks could set a precedent for how the EU manages foreign-controlled assets in sensitive sectors in the future.
Forecast
Short-term (Now - 3 months)
The Dutch government is likely to maintain its control over the company until Nexperia can guarantee strategic autonomy and compliance with the European security standards.
At the EU level, this case is likely to accelerate discussions on the screening of foreign-controlled assets in sensitive sectors, particularly including semiconductors, critical raw materials, and AI hardware.
Beijing is likely to view this as further Western alignment of the liberal Dutch market; therefore, it may follow with further export restrictions if it cannot find common ground in the coming weeks.
Long-term (>1 year)
The European automotive sector is likely to face long-term industrial disruptions if they do not make new sourcing agreements with alternative EU local companies. Furthermore, the EU is likely to introduce follow-up measures to the EU Chips Act to prevent similar crises in the future.
As the EU tries to restrict Chinese companies, it is a realistic possibility that Chinese capital may flow toward Southeast Asia and the Middle East, diversifying their manufacturing partnerships to keep their exports stable.
