2024 Azerbaijan Parliament Elections
Lily Donahue | 26 September 2024
Summary
Though hosting COP29 may have made Azerbaijan more conciliatory towards international voting and election standards, September’s parliamentary elections remained restrictive and devoid of legitimate political competition.
President Ilham Aliyev’s ruling YAP party secured another majority, continuing its three-decade run. There are unlikely to be significant changes in the quality of elections or in government direction under YAP’s continued leadership.
YA’s continued rule is unlikely to change the direction of Azerbaijan’s politics, and Baku’s focus on repopulating Nagorno-Karabakh with Azerbaijanis after more than 100,000 ethnic Armenians fled the region will continue.
Country Profile
Economy
GDP: 78.72 billion USD (2022)
GDP per capita: 7,762.07 USD (2022)
HDI: 0.76 (2022)
Official currency: Azerbaijani Manat
Demography
Population: 10,650,239 (2024 est.)
Ethnic composition
Azerbaijani 91.6%, Lezghin 2%, Russian 1.3%, Armenian 1.3%, Talysh 1.3% (2009 est.)
Religious composition
Muslim 97.3% (predominantly Shia), Christian 2.6%
Electoral System
Nominally functioning under a majoritarian, first past the post system, Azerbaijan is widely viewed to be an authoritarian regime, with power concentrated in the Aliyev family, headed by President Ilham Aliyev.
The National Assembly (Azərbaycan Respublikasının Milli Məclisi), a unicameral body of 125 seats, elects constituencies for a five-year term. It has not, however, guaranteed political pluralism: no legitimate opposition members have gained a seat for over a decade. This was exacerbated by 2016 constitutional reforms, which granted the President the power to dissolve the Assembly.
Major Political Parties & Candidates
New Azerbaijan Party (Yeni Azərbaycan Partiyası, YAP)
Won 68 seats.
Founded in 1992 by former President Heydar Aliyev - and father of current President Ilham Aliyev - YAP has been the predominant voice in Azerbaijani politics and its ruling party for three decades.
A conservative party, YAP promotes Azerbaijani nationalism, and is considered eurosceptic. Inflammatory towards the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Aliyev - and by extension, YAP - frequently peppers his speeches with anti-Armenian rhetoric.
Azerbaijani Popular Front Party (APFP)
The predominant opposition party in Azerbaijan, APFP was founded in 1989 by former President - and only diplomatically elected President in post-Soviet Azerbaijan - Abulfaz Elchibey.
After the 1993 military coup led by commander Surat Huseynov saw Elchibey ousted, APFP cemented itself as the main opposition party to the Aliyev regime. Citing a lack of free and legitimate political competition, APFP called for a boycott to the elections.
Civic Solidarity Party (Vətəndaş Həmrəyliyi Partiyası, VHP)
The second largest of the sanctioned parties in Azerbaijan, VHP won 3 seats.
Founded in 1992 by former poet Sabir Rustamkhanli, VHP is a conservative, nationalist party, with a small showing in the Assembly.
Justice, Law, Democracy Party (Ədalət, Hüquq, Demokratiya Partiyası, ƏHD)
Gained one seat, coming to a total of 2 seats.
Originating in 2004 after splitting from the Popular Front Party, ƏHD was a member of the European Conservatives and Reformists Party until 2022, and aligns with socially conservative and economically liberal policies.
The New Azerbaijan Party (YAP), maintained its majority after snap parliamentary elections on the first of the month. Out of the 125 parliamentary seats, YAP won 68, down by one from the previous election. With a meagre 37% turnout, the elections see President Ilham Aliyev remain the unsurprising dominant force in Azerbaijani politics.
Despite the multiple parties involved, elections in Azerbaijan are considered fundamentally performative, with opposition parties only ostensibly rivals. After multiple journalists were arrested in the lead-up to February’s presidential elections, criticism has been muffled, as is typical. This lack of censure is parroted by opposition candidates themselves, who largely publicly support the incumbent administration both in policy and message.
Concessions to international observers were deemed fraudulent: while Azerbaijani law allows both citizen and international observers, most citizen observers were assigned by YAP, raising questions about potential voter intimidation. Further, several known and legitimate citizen election observer groups were deprived of funding, making independent observation nearly impossible. Though women remain underrepresented and initiatives to increase their political involvement are absent, women accounted for 30 per cent of candidates, from 21 per cent in the previous election. This positive pattern has not bled over to other minority groups, and there remain voting restrictions on citizens with intellectual disabilities or mental ill-health.
Under YAP’s continued control, it is unlikely Azerbaijan will see significant policy shifts related to Nagorno-Karabakh or its proposed clean energy initiatives. Indeed, the two are becoming surprisingly entwined, possibly in a clumsy attempt to soften allegations of ethnic cleansing. In line with Aliyev’s proposed clean energy objectives, the Azerbaijani government in Nagorno-Karabakh is purporting the region to be a “green-energy zone”. The government has repudiated reports of ethnic cleansing, and has claimed the environmental turn is unrelated to the conflict. While Aliyev is likely to tone down irredentist rhetoric in the lead-up to COP29, YAP’s history of fixating on the concept of “Western Azerbaijan” - the belief that further regions in Armenia are historically Azeri - may reignite tensions between the two countries. Should Azerbaijan expand its repopulation programme beyond Nagorno-Karabakh - which would most likely begin in the southern Armenian province of Syunik - efforts to stabilise the region will be undermined. In such a case, Armenia may - as advocated by the European Parliament - seek out new security alliances, allowing for new powers to gain a foothold in the Caucasus.
David Davidson/Flickr
Forecast
Short-term
An oil-rich country heavily reliant on fossil fuels, Azerbaijan will likely come under some fire in the lead-up to COP29, scheduled for early November. Largely energy self-sufficient, Aliyev will continue promoting gas exports to Europe, as the country pivots from Russian gas.
Despite lip service to climate-friendly initiatives, Azerbaijan is likely to continue extracting gas, necessary for contracts with BP and ADNOC. Natural energy potentials remain largely untapped. Aliyev, however, remains - at least publicly - committed to increasing renewable energy usage to 30% by 2030, despite maintaining oil is Azerbaijan’s “gift from God”.
Under the direction of Aliyev and YAP, Azerbaijan will continue to encourage Azerbaijani citizens to repopulate the Nagorno-Karabakh region after the lightning offensive in September 2023.
Long-term
Under YAP, Azerbaijan will likely continue its push towards being a bridge between Europe and Central Asia, especially as it is no longer subsumed by Nagorno-Karabakh. While Aliyev’s increased military expenditures and anti-Armenian, nationalist diatribes will likely trigger slight concern in Europe, Azerbaijan’s energy deposits may be enough to soften such anxiety.
