Will Trump’s Second Term Push Pakistan Further into China’s Shadow?

Sen Chanu | 27 February 2025


 

Summary

  • After Pakistan adopted its first nuclear program during the 1970s, the factor of trust deficit made its presence in the US-Pakistani relationship ever since. 

  • Further straining Pakistan’s relationship with the US was the threat of the US's increasing defence relationship with India. 

  • Pakistan's future policy shift depends on how Trump will accommodate Pakistan militarily and financially in his new policy. 


Natilyn Hicks Photography/Unsplash

Revisiting Pakistan’s Relationship with the US

The relationship between the United States (US) and Pakistan started out as an ally. However, it suffered a setback when Washington first learned about Islamabad’s nuclear power plant in 1978. During the Soviet-Afghan War (1979-1989), their relationship was marked by a combination of cooperation and tension. In fact, the US sanctioned Pakistan in violation of the Symington Amendment in 1979. The sanction was then lifted in 1981 because Washington required Pakistan’s assistance to use its territory to train the Mujahideen and supply arms to the Afghan fighters. The makeshift alliance broke down after the Mujahideen victory, marked by the embargo on the delivery of 71 F-16A/B aircraft in 1990 under the influence of Pressler Amendment. The consequence of this embargo was Pakistan’s shift to China as its primary arms supplier. 

However, cooperation resumed during the US invasion of Afghanistan (2001-2021). President George W. Bush’s administration lifted sanctions related to Pakistan’s nuclear program and announced Islamabad as a major non-NATO ally for its logistical support during the invasion. However, the relationship soured again in 2011 when Pakistan’s intelligence agency was accused of supporting the Haqqani network, an Afghanistan-based Sunni Islamist militant group that fought against the Soviets (1979-1989) with the help of the US and Pakistan. The row was followed by a series of US drone attacks in Pakistan that killed thousands including civilians. Following this, the 2011 US secretive operation in Pakistan that killed Osama Bin Laden and the suspension of the Coalition Support Fund by President Donald Trump in 2018 made China an attractive defence partner for Pakistan. 

India in the Equation

As Pakistan further intensifies its ties with China, India-US relationship has also soared in the past few years. India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi signed multiple investment and defence deals during President Joe Biden’s term, including the co-production of General Electric’s F-414 jet engines and US investment of approximately USD 800 million to boost India’s semiconductor research. The Biden-Modi joint statement also called for Pakistan to take action to prevent its territory from being used as a base for terrorist attacks. Pakistan denounced the statement as misleading and one-sided, while expressing concern over the defence deal and its potential impact on peace in South Asia. This was followed by a US sanction on Pakistan’s ballistic missile program in 2024, citing nuclear proliferation threat.

This ongoing tension was further amplified after President Donald Trump returned to office and announced the launch of US-India defence and trade initiatives with Modi on 13 February 2025. Their joint statement targeted Pakistan again by demanding justice against the perpetrators of 26/11 and Pathankot attacks. In response, Pakistan condemned the statement as contrary to diplomatic norms, citing its counterterrorism cooperation with the US as justification. Moreover, Pakistan added that the planned transfer of advanced military technologies to India will increase military imbalances in South Asia. 

Impact on Regional Cooperation

Given the contentious relationship between India and Pakistan, the recent US pivot to India will contribute to the existing Indo-Pakistan security dilemma. The trajectory of this development will only strengthen China-Pakistan military partnership. As evident from the tables below, Pakistan’s military dependence on China increased progressively over time, while its defence reliance on the US saw a gradual decline during the same timelines. Recent reports suggest that Pakistan Air Force (PAF) will be equipped with stealth fighter J-35s from China in the next two years, which are expected to replace the old F-16s imported from the US. In addition, China-Pakistan submarine deals and transfers of missile technologies are aimed at increasing Pakistan’s naval and air power. Similarly, the US is helping India to enhance its defence powers through the recent security deals which include the possible transfer of US Air Force’s F-35 stealth fighters. 

These recent developments directly influence the rising military expenditure of India and Pakistan, making it unlikely for any arms control agreement between them. This further deepened policy and alliance divisions between the two South Asian countries with the US and China as indirect stakeholders in the security of the region. Furthermore, it reduces space for regional multilateral cooperation through organisations such as South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), since Indo-Pakistan rivalry has overshadowed the organisation’s agenda from the late 1990s. Overall, China is a quick alternative for a reliant arms supplier to Islamabad. As a result, the US’s effort to contain China’s influence in the Indo-Pacific by striking military deals with India, while isolating Pakistan, only serve to invite a stronger Chinese presence in the region. Although Pakistan could not afford to sever ties with the US to maintain its economic stability, how Trump plays his card in the next four years will decide Pakistan’s future between the US and China.

The data in the tables above are sourced from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). For more information on how SIPRI calculate their trend-indicator values, see https://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers/sources-and-methods


Forecast

  • Short-term

    • Since Trump assumed office in January 2025, he immediately implemented stringent policies, one of which is the sharp cut of US Foreign Aid that also affected Pakistan out of many countries. Moreover, the announcement of defence initiatives with India and a joint condemnation of Islamabad’s terrorist issues indicate that Pakistan is unlikely to receive much policy relief from Trump’s second term. It is likely that Pakistan will turn to other countries and international organisations to bridge the financial gap left by the US, preferably China. 

  • Long-term

    • Given that Pakistan sees India’s military advancement and Washington's preference for India as its defence partner in South Asia as a threat to its national security, it is highly likely that Pakistan will continue to bolster its strategic relationship with China. However, the degree of leniency from Washington in the next four years will determine whether Pakistan will balance between the US and China or whether an intensified Sino-Pakistani defence relationship will unveil. 

Previous
Previous

Hong Kong’s WTO Dispute: Implications of US Tariffs and the Future of Trade

Next
Next

Uganda’s Ebola Management: Successes, Challenges, and the Global Outlook