Will the UK-EU Defence Pact Escape the Fishing Net?
Milica Starinac | 24 April 2025
Summary
The UK and EU are moving towards formalising a long-anticipated defence and security pact, with a political declaration expected at the May 2025 summit as both sides seek to reset relations and address shared security concerns.
The pact carries significant stakes for the British defence industry, currently excluded from the EU’s EUR 150b ReArm Europe plan, and is complicated by political bargaining from member states like France linking security cooperation to other issues such as fishing rights.
While an initial agreement is likely, securing a more comprehensive UK access to EU defence frameworks will require complex negotiations and trade-offs, with long-term cooperation depending on EU institutional flexibility and potential British concessions in a broader post-Brexit reset.
Defence cooperation between the European Union (EU) and United Kingdom (UK) has been under the spotlight since Brexit. UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer made it clear that a security pact with the EU is one of the Labour government’s priorities, while the EU reaffirmed their commitment to a closer security partnership in a recent White Paper published by the European Commission. Facing common threats and sharing similar concerns about American commitment to European security, the EU and the UK are expected to formalise their defence partnership at their summit in May 2025. However, the obstacles standing in the way of a bold defence pact are numerous and surprisingly diverse, ranging from intellectual property to fishing rights.
Following Brexit, EU-UK defence cooperation was limited to support for Ukraine, as previous Conservative governments showed no intention of reestablishing a formal security partnership. On the other hand, Starmer’s government saw it as an issue of high salience and a crucial part of the agenda to reset Brexit. EU leadership welcomed and reciprocated the call for intensified defence cooperation, as emphasised by High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy Kaja Kallas during her visit to London in March 2025. Besides the geopolitical landscape, cooperation with the EU is important for the British defence industry, which strongly advocates for their government to sign the pacty, as the British defence industry is currently excluded from the EU’s EUR 150b (USD 170.6b) ReArm Europe plan for defence procurements. Signing of a security pact would enable UK defence manufacturers to participate in procurements under the plan, but only up to 35% of the total value — the rest would have to be supplied by companies from the EU, EEA/EFTA countries (such as Norway, Switzerland and Iceland) or Ukraine.
However, not all member states are equally enthusiastic about the upcoming defence agreement. France — which is eager to protect its own defence industry from potential competition — spearheads the effort of demanding a favourable fishing rights agreement with the UK before any security deal. The EU remains divided on the issue: Kallas expressed “surprise at how important the fish are, considering the security situation”, while Sweden’s EU minister Jessica Rosencrantz recently suggested that solving such issues — including both defence and fisheries — should go hand in hand.
Even when political quid-pro-quo objections are disregarded, any defence pact between the UK and the EU will have to navigate a complex web of EU institutional architecture, challenging London’s post-Brexit red lines — no customs union or single market arrangements. As a third country, the UK could instead participate in certain projects under the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) such as the Military Mobility or Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions with limited decision-making powers. The crucial part, boosting the military-industrial complex cooperation, including research and development of new technologies, would be challenging due to the EU approach that prefers establishing a strategically independent military industry. The differences in approach and EU’s stricter funding rules and licensing and intellectual property rights regulations will also likely disincentivise British corporations from participating. These obstacles, if left unresolved, risk stalling progress toward a comprehensive defence pact and may further weaken the coherence of European collective defence efforts, at a time when unity is most needed.
Franz Wender/Unsplash
Forecast
Short-term (Now - 3 months)
The EU and the UK are highly likely to sign some form of a defence agreement at the May summit, however it is more likely to take the form of a declaration rather than a legally-binding and comprehensive defence pact.
There is a realistic possibility that the upcoming defence pact will include a special status clause and timeline regulating how the British defence industry could participate in the upcoming procurements under the ReArm Europe plan.
Medium-term (3-12 months)
The UK and the EU are likely to set up a structured foreign policy and defence coordination mechanism, which would see more regular meetings between the UK leadership and their European counterparts, as well as the EU executive.
The UK is likely to seek more participation under the existing EU defence landscape, such as in PESCO projects and CSDP missions, as means of building trust and enhancing partnership.
Long-term (>1 year)
The EU has a realistic possibility of altering rules regarding participation of partner countries outside EEA in defence cooperation, particularly research and development, while the UK will likely have to offer some counter-concessions in the wider post-Brexit reset deal.
