US–Russia Espionage Dynamics amid the War in Ukraine
By Andrea Stuader | 21 August 2025
Summary
On 6 August 2025, United States (US) Army soldier Taylor Adam Lee was arrested for allegedly passing sensitive data on the M1A2 Abrams tank to a Russian official.
This incident highlights the growing espionage risks in the US from multiple actors, exacerbated by the revival of Russian diplomatic activity on American soil following US President Donald Trump’s restoration of diplomatic ties with Moscow, which places an increased strain on US counterintelligence capabilities amid the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) staffing shortage.
Espionage activity between the US and Russia is likely to intensify and evolve in parallel with developments in the war in Ukraine and shifting diplomatic dynamics, sustaining long-term pressure on US counterintelligence resources.
On 6 August 2025, US Army soldier Taylor Adam Lee, stationed at Fort Bliss, Texas, and holding a top secret clearance, was arrested and charged under the Espionage Act and the US Arms Export Control Act. He is accused of transmitting sensitive M1A2 Abrams tank data to a Russian official, via online channels and an SD card, in exchange for the promise of Russian citizenship. While the M1A1 variant is currently in use in Ukraine, the more advanced M1A2 is the US Army’s main battle tank, making the alleged compromise of its capabilities, components, and vulnerabilities a matter of high intelligence value to Russian military planners.
The case underscores the persistent threat to US national security from leaks of highly sensitive information, extending beyond relations with Russia. Chinese intelligence operatives have also sought to recruit US service members online, offering payment for classified data. Alongside such “virtual espionage”, other recent incidents include former Air National Guardsman Jack Teixeira receiving a 15-year sentence in 2024 for posting classified material on the Russia-Ukraine war to Discord, and a retired Army officer who pleaded guilty on 10 July 2025 to sharing Russia-Ukraine war intelligence via a dating app.
Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Western countries have seen a rise in covert Russian intelligence activity. However, the return of US President Donald Trump in January 2025, renewed dialogue with Moscow, and restored diplomatic relations have altered the landscape. Russia views the strengthening of its diplomatic presence in the US as an opportunity to rebuild its espionage network in the West. Russian spying capabilities have been weakened over the past decade, with over 100 suspected Russian spies expelled from the US since 2016 and at least 600 from Europe in response to the 2022 invasion. To offset their reduced presence in the US, Russian intelligence has expanded operations in Mexico, echoing Cold War tactics, and launched clandestine programmes in Brazil to produce deep-cover agents known as “illegals.” Increased Russian spies in Washington will demand greater US counterintelligence efforts, despite FBI staffing shortages.
US and Western espionage activities in Russia persist despite the lack of coverage. On 6 August 2025, a former Roscosmos employee was arrested in Kaliningrad and convicted of treason for passing satellite engine production data to US intelligence. On 1 August 2025, the FSB detained a Russian citizen in Sevastopol for photographing air defence sites under orders from Ukrainian intelligence. It is often difficult to distinguish Western espionage in Russia from cases in which Western journalists are arrested as a form of intimidation or leverage, presented by the regime as “espionage”. For instance, Wall Street Journal reporter Evan Gershkovich, arrested on 29 March 2023 for such political reasons, was charged with “espionage”, and released in 2024 as part of a prisoner swap. Between 2009 and mid-2022, over 100 convictions were recorded under Articles 275 (“treason”) and 276 (“espionage”) of the Russian Criminal Code.
Russia’s security and espionage apparatus comprises 3 main branches: the Federal Security Service (FSB), the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), and the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces (GRU). The FSB primarily manages counter-intelligence and domestic surveillance, the SVR focuses on political and economic intelligence abroad, while the GRU is associated with military intelligence and covert operations. The US also maintains a vast and sophisticated intelligence network, including agencies such as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the National Security Agency (NSA). As espionage intensifies in the context of the Ukraine war, its impact increasingly extends to strategic industries. Defence firms, aerospace companies, and advanced technology sectors are especially exposed, facing heightened risks of intellectual property theft, cyber intrusions, and strategic disruption. This type of espionage carries severe legal, economic, and national security consequences, ranging from substantial fines and imprisonment to lost innovation, revenue, and strategic advantage. Effective prevention of industrial espionage requires robust risk assessment, infrastructure and policy safeguards, employee oversight, prudent data management, and a clear incident response plan.
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Forecast
Short-term (Now - 3 months)
Espionage activity is likely to increase amid ongoing US–Russia negotiations over the war in Ukraine, driven by both political aims and the need for technical intelligence to gain battlefield advantages and strengthen negotiating positions.
Medium-term (3-12 months)
It is almost certain that the frequency, type, and objectives of US–Russia espionage will adapt to the course of the war in Ukraine, bilateral relations, and the West’s broader stance towards the Kremlin.
