Domestic Actors Fuel Russian Disinformation in the Western Balkans
By Mejreme Asllani | 22 August 2025
Summary
Russian disinformation operations intensified in the Western Balkans, deliberately amplified by local actors and pro-Russian media, exploiting underlying social and historical grievances to disseminate anti-Western and anti-EU narratives.
These operations systematically jeopardise democratic processes by influencing elections, eroding public trust, exacerbating ethnic tensions, which obstruct the region's Euro-Atlantic integration and contribute to persistent instability.
The sustained amplification of Russian disinformation by domestic actors is highly likely to intensify political polarisation and ethnic tensions, ultimately risking prolonged regional instability and stalled Euro-Atlantic integration in the long term.
The Western Balkans remains a significant battleground between Russia and Western democracies, which has only intensified since Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Russia leverages deep historical ties, shared Slavic heritage, and Orthodox religious bonds with the Serb population, particularly in Serbia, Republika Srpska (RS) entity in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and Montenegro. This is often achieved through the manipulation of shared historical narratives, the engagement of pro-Russian cultural and religious figures, and the dissemination of content that selectively highlights past grievances. Disinformation operations have exploited instability in the region, particularly the complex post-war political structures, simmering ethnic tensions, persistent economic challenges, and increased euroscepticism as a consequence of the slow EU accession process. Russia leverages these ties to assert its position as a significant regional player, aiming to counterbalance Western influence amidst European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) expansion into the region.
Russian disinformation is disseminated through a sophisticated interplay of traditional and digital channels, which domestic actors further amplify. Russian state media, such as Sputnik Serbia and RT Balkan, produce pro-Kremlin content in Serbian, which spreads across the region’s Serbian-speaking population due to linguistic and cultural proximity. A notable method involves the large-scale adoption of foreign disinformation by local media outlets, which are often characterised by their tabloidisation and a lack of investigative journalism. These local outlets frequently republish content directly from Sputnik and RT, often at no charge, serving as multipliers for Russian narratives. Moscow also outsources disinformation operations by cultivating loose relationships with domestic actors who are willing to promote Russia’s interests. High-ranking politicians, including presidents, prime ministers, party leaders, and influential editors-in-chief, are identified as primary sources and key amplifiers of disinformation within the region. A key tactic is the deliberate blurring of facts and opinions, eroding trust in public discourse and promoting an environment where anti-Western or pro-Russian polarisation thrives, ultimately undermining Western influence and democratic processes. This systematically hinders critical thinking, creates echo chambers, particularly in social media, and makes populations more susceptible to manipulative narratives.
Serbia has been identified as the launchpad for Russian disinformation operations, facilitated by its media landscape, which is prone to pervasive political influence. Pro-government outlets in Serbia consistently portray Russia in a highly positive light, presenting it as a protector and historical ally, and frequently disseminate content directly from Russian state media. Serbian political leaders, notably President Aleksandar Vučić, and President of the RS entity, Milorad Dodik, utilise this pro-Russian sentiment to consolidate domestic power, deflect Western criticism regarding democratic backsliding, and maintain a controversial foreign policy balancing act. This leverage is exercised through Russia's veto power in the United Nations (UN) Security Council, which aligns with Serbia's stance of non-recognition of Kosovo, providing diplomatic cover and reinforcing a shared strategic outlook. For instance, Dodik has frequently travelled to Moscow for high-profile meetings, where he reaffirmed his pro-Russian stance, openly called for the secession of RS, and actively obstructed state-level reforms aimed at closer EU integration, all actions tacitly or openly endorsed by the Kremlin. Similarly, Serbian political leaders, such as President Vucic, former Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandar Vulin, and religious clerics, have maintained close ties with Moscow, frequently travelling to Russia to meet with senior officials for consultations on national, diplomatic, and security matters, underscoring a sustained strategic alignment. In Montenegro, pro-Russian and pro-Serbian parties, which have campaigned against NATO integration, have also been funded by Moscow. Since 2020, the growing influence of the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) has further facilitated increased Russian and Serbian influence in domestic and national political affairs. In 2024, Montenegro faced significant political instability, marked by external interference from both Serbia and Russia. This was exacerbated by intra-coalition conflicts and a controversial legislative initiative that deepened domestic tensions and deteriorated diplomatic relations with Croatia.
Narratives
Common narratives spread throughout the region include claims that the war in Ukraine is a Western-provoked conflict, that the EU is weak and on the verge of collapse, or that the United States (US) is a hostile imperial power seeking to destabilise the Western Balkans. For example, specific disinformation campaigns have disseminated false stories about Ukrainian atrocities or portrayed the EU’s enlargement process as a cynical ploy. The Serbian government and affiliated parties have accused Western powers of supporting ongoing domestic protests against corruption by framing them as an attempt to stage a “colour revolution” to undermine their legitimacy. Pro-Russian narratives glorify Russia and its military might, while also promoting BRICS (an intergovernmental organisation consisting of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), as a viable alternative to Western integration. This dynamic has been exemplified during the EU-facilitated dialogue for normalisation of relations between Kosovo and Serbia, which resulted in the Ohrid Agreement in 2023. Although both parties verbally accepted the terms of the agreement, President Vucic subsequently refused to formally sign the document. Consequently, its implementation has seen no progress and the entire process has stalled. This deal has been leveraged by Russian and domestic pro-Russian media, along with political figures such as Aleksandar Vulin, frequently promoting narratives asserting that the EU was pressuring Serbia to give up Kosovo in exchange for empty promises of EU membership, instead portraying BRICS as a stronger partner, given its purported respect for sovereignty.
Another common narrative includes historical revisionism of Yugoslav wars and specific framing of contemporary ethnic tensions, such as narratives around 1999 NATO bombing to stop ethnic cleansing in Kosovo and the Srebrenica genocide. For instance, Kosovo is often compared to the annexation of Crimea and the ongoing war in Ukraine. Another common narrative involves the specific framing of security incidents. For instance, following the September 2023 terrorist attack in Banjska, where Serb militants attacked and killed one Kosovo police officer, pro-Russian and Serbian nationalist media immediately used it to spread disinformation and propaganda. These narratives portrayed the militants as local heroes defending their community and claimed that the event was a provocation orchestrated by the Kosovo government with Western support. Similarly, disinformation has been spread regarding an alleged terrorist attack which targeted the critical infrastructure “Ibër Lepenci” water canal in November 2024, the Kosovo Post Office in Zvecan in April 2025, again falsely portraying them as organised by the Kosovo government and supported by European intelligence services in order to blame local Serbs. These narratives are purposely propagated by certain politicians and pro-government media outlets, particularly in Serbia, as well as by pro-Russian sources.
Implications
Russian disinformation spread by domestic actors carries profound political and security implications for the region. Domestic actors, through the dissemination of disinformation, actively undermine EU and NATO accession prospects and use this to justify resistance to democratic reforms that would threaten their hold on power. This is particularly evident in Serbia, where the government controls the media environment to promote pro-Russian narratives and deflect criticism regarding democratic backsliding. In BiH, leaders such as Milorad Dodik continue to leverage close ties with Russia to advance secessionist goals within the RS entity and actively rewrite contemporary history, fuelling internal ethnic and political dysfunctionality and tensions. In Kosovo, it has a harmful impact on the normalisation process, deepening negative attitudes towards its citizens and fuelling ethnic tensions in the north, contributing to continued instability. In Montenegro, disinformation campaigns challenge the country's Euro-Atlantic alignment and foster anti-NATO sentiments among certain segments of the population. Across all countries, disinformation fuels anti-West/pro-Russia polarisation, leaving little room for nuanced debate and creating political fragmentation.
Disinformation campaigns also continue to erode public trust in institutions, international organisations, and national media. Ethnically polarised media perpetuate "parallel realities," hindering reconciliation and the ability of governments to address shared challenges effectively. With the development of technology and the introduction of advanced, sophisticated AI platforms, such as those seen in recent disinformation campaigns, countering the spread of disinformation and propaganda effectively poses persistent challenges. Disinformation actively discourages interethnic cooperation by creating a hostile environment for dialogue, exploiting unresolved historical grievances, and reinforcing negative stereotypes. This fragmentation inherently impacts the ability of governments to address shared regional challenges effectively, hindering genuine democratic progress and EU integration.
Moreover, disinformation not only destabilises politics, but it also systematically dismantles already weak governance institutions, reducing state capacity and legitimacy. In BiH where state institutions are fragile and contested, this is particularly evident. For instance, Dodik, emboldened by Russian and Serbian support, openly defies state-level institutions, such as the Constitutional Court, using disinformation and narratives to justify non-compliance. Similarly, in Serbia, the government promotes narratives that shield political elites and divert attention from their own domestic issues.
Consequently, civil society and international organisations face increasingly hostile operational environments. Russian-backed narratives often frame Western NGOs as ‘foreign agents’ or ‘mercenaries’, thereby eroding public trust and creating pretexts for official harassment, and increasing bureaucratic barriers. For example, in Serbia, and the RS entity,civil society and independent media have been targeted as "foreign mercenaries", undermining their credibility and limiting civic engagement. This creates a vicious cycle where disinformation not only stalls democratic progress and Euro-Atlantic integration but also undermines societal cohesion and institutional capacity to counter it, thereby exacerbating instability and conflicts in the region.
Kristina Alexanderson/eunews, CC BY-SA 4.0
Forecast
Short-term (Now - 3 months)
It is highly likely that there will be continued political polarisation and heightened ethnic tensions, particularly around sensitive historical anniversaries, election cycles or political developments in Kosovo (e.g., local elections scheduled for October 2025), BiH (constitutional reforms) and Montenegro (institutional crisis, legislative blockage and EU reforms).
Medium-term (3-12 months)
It is likely that there will be further erosion of public trust in democratic institutions. The consistent exposure to anti-Western narratives and "parallel realities" will deepen public scepticism and insecurities towards Euro-Atlantic integration.
It is likely that there will be attempts for secession of the RS entity, driven by nationalist rhetoric and external influences.
Long-term (>1 year)
It is highly likely that Russian disinformation campaigns will continue to challenge the democratic resilience and Euro-Atlantic path of Western Balkans states by deepening their exploitation of local societal divisions, significantly impacting the region's long-term stability and integration prospects.
It is highly likely that the dissemination of Russian disinformation by domestic actors will continue, deepening political and social polarisation.
It is highly likely that the Trump Administration’s stance towards the Western Balkans could considerably influence the role of domestic amplifiers. This could be through perceived shifts in commitment to Euro-Atlantic integration, leading domestic actors to feel emboldened or abandoned.
It is likely that US administration's stances towards Ukraine, and a possible cooperation with Russia could impact the region. Such developments could be presented by domestic actors as a validation of anti-Western narratives, weakening the pro-European reform agenda and providing ideological cover for aligning with Russia.
It is likely that the conflicts in the Middle East and the US's involvement divert attention from the Western Balkans, thereby increasing uncertainties and leaving the region vulnerable to external malign influence and internal divisions.
