The Weaponisation of Commercial Drones by Insurgent Groups
By Carlotta Kozlowskyj | 2 October 2025
IrenWriter25/Wikimedia Commons, CC0 1.0
Summary
Insurgent groups are increasingly weaponising commercial drones for surveillance and simultaneous attacks at an extremely low cost.
The commercialisation of drones makes conflict more accessible and asymmetric, as drones are relatively inexpensive to operate but can have a high impact.
Governments face growing challenges in detecting and countering small drones with existing air defence systems.
Context
Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) or drones refer to any vehicle that is piloted remotely, generally operating without significant autonomous decision-making capabilities. Over the last 5years, the development of cheaper and smaller commercial drones, costing less than USD 1,000, has reshaped the strategy and logic of violent non-state actors. Commercial drones were first deployed on a large scale in military operations during the Russia-Ukraine War in 2022, where they helped narrow the air force gap between the two sides. Until recently, due to high costs, armed drones were exclusively used by states such as the United States. Today, insurgent groups are also able to acquire drones that weigh only 9-14 kg and can be operated via cell phones.
These new drones have higher battery capacity, reduced motor size and enhanced motor efficiency, allowing drones to be less than 0.6 m in size and to be produced commercially at a low cost. They allow insurgent groups to launch attacks which are even difficult for advanced defence missile systems to counter, as smaller drones are harder to detect. On 7 October 2024, Hamas conducted a surprise attack that went undetected by Israel's air defence systems, deploying small, inexpensive commercial drones to disable surveillance towers and communication systems as part of a larger assault that killed over 1400 people.
The first successful armed drone attack by a militant group was in 2006, when Hezbollah attacked an Israeli warship using a fixed-wing drone model carrying explosives. Militant groups rely on drones for 3 primary purposes: reconnaissance to support ground operations, propaganda to showcase technological advancements and pilot-to-target attacks to disrupt opponents’ command and logistics. For surveillance, Hezbollah relies on small drones capable of gathering intelligence and filming videos. For propaganda, insurgent groups, such as Hamas, release online camera footage of drone surveillance missions and attacks, to symbolise resistance and technological parity with states. For targeted attacks, from April 2018 to October 2019, among the 115 Houthis’ drone attacks, 62 were conducted against critical infrastructure, and only 27 were conducted against military bases or troops. Each organisation uses drones for its own set of political and strategic goals, using different tactics and development programmes.
Transfer of knowledge and network affiliation are also crucial for insurgent groups to develop drones and acquire expertise. This is why Hezbollah shares its drone innovation and expertise with Iran-aligned groups, like the Houthis. Most drones are received through direct transfers, accompanied by technical assistance and training provided by the sponsor. Insurgent groups also likely communicate instructions via encrypted messaging platforms, such as Telegram, to share instructions on drones. The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) also relies on Chinese drone models such as the commercial X-UAV Talon, equipped with a GPS, to perform reconnaissance and monitoring missions.
Implications
Recent small commercial drones are increasingly difficult to detect by state air defence systems. They can be launched from hidden locations, allowing insurgent groups to conduct targeted attacks at a low cost over a significant distance. Governments such as the United States are unable to identify these smaller, low-technology, and cheaper drones with their detection systems. Drones can be deployed with limited human intervention and resources at a low cost, resulting in high impact. This is why, since June 2025, there has been a significant shift in investment towards UAVs as insurgent groups, such as Hezbollah, focus on drone production as a cheaper and easier alternative to rockets and missiles. For example, Hezbollah now utilises Iranian Shahed-136 drones, which have a production cost of approximately USD 20,000 per unit. In contrast, the cost of intercepting these drones is approximately USD 3m per missile, making it a cost-effective option.
One of the major innovations enabled by recent developments in drone technology is their ability to conduct and coordinate multiple attacks simultaneously. This allows insurgent groups to magnify their overall effects and overwhelm defensive capacities with drones’ “swarms”. This technique was used on 17 January 2022 by the Houthis, who claimed responsibility for an attack on Abu Dhabi’s airport, which combined ballistic missiles alongside Sammad-3 drones. It is necessary to understand a specific group’s goal with drones to assess the specific threat and the challenges posed by its drone innovation programme, as non-state entities use drones according to their political and strategic objectives. Drones are also used by insurgent groups as cultural tools to enhance their credibility and legitimacy with the local population, framing themselves as advanced technological actors.
Forecast
Short-term (Now - 3 months)
It is highly likely that armed commercial drones will continue to proliferate among insurgent groups even outside of the Middle East, such as the Taliban or Al-Shabaab, and will increasingly be used for combined attacks.
It is unlikely that insurgent groups will rely on drone technology to target military commands or engage in widespread civilian attacks, as this requires strong logistical organisation and support.
The recent proliferation of drone technology within insurgent groups will likely worsen the capabilities to defend airspace.
Long-term (>1 year)
It is unlikely that commercial drones will be banned, despite the security risks posed by their use by insurgent groups, because of the economic interests of private actors in drone manufacturing.
It is likely that the drones used by insurgent groups will be increasingly autonomous, relying on AI to make their own decisions and for more precise targeting.
There is a realistic possibility that insurgent groups will diversify their use of armed commercial drones, for instance, to employ.
