The Significant Economic and Military Impacts of Ukraine’s Strikes on Russia’s Oil Refineries
By Elliott Clark | 11 November 2025
Figure 1: Map of Ukrainian Strikes on Russian Oil Facilities between January to October 2025
Summary
Ukraine has mounted a series of strikes aimed at diminishing Russia’s oil producing capabilities. The first strike on a Russian oil refinery occurred on June 22, 2022, but strikes have increased significantly in recent months.
This has resulted in approximately 55% of Russian oil refineries being targeted, leading to a substantial decrease in revenue.
Ukraine will be almost certain to continue these operations in the months to come, given that these operations have been highly successful. Russia’s recent decision to halt exports of gasoline illustrates this.
Context
Eager to reduce Russia’s oil revenues, Ukraine has subjected Russian oil refineries to intense missile and drone bombardments as the weakening of the Russian oil industry has become a core strategic objective of the Ukrainian military. As of 2 October 2025, 21 of the nation’s 38 large refineries have been hit since January 2025, indicating the widespread effectiveness of Ukraine’s operations. Furthermore, successful attacks have increased by 48% compared to the whole of 2024, ultimately resulting in around 20% of Russia’s refining capacity being at least temporarily dismantled, severely undermining the Russian oil industry. Testament to this, Russia has introduced gasoline and diesel fuel export restrictions until the end of this year.
Around 30% of Russia’s budget in 2024 is derived from oil and gas, meaning that anything that compromises the Russian oil industry in turn reduces Russia’s capacity to make war, given Russia’s overreliance upon the industry. It is therefore logical for Ukraine to target this sector intensely.
Implications
Given the success of these operations in disrupting Russian oil infrastructure, the Ukrainian Armed Forces are highly likely to continue these operations. This is only made more likely by Ukraine becoming sufficient in making the technology necessary for these attacks domestically. 60% of the deep strikes on deep Russian territory are carried out by Ukrainian Fire Point FP-1 drones, which have a range of 1,600km. In comparison, the Batyar drones have a range of 800km, highlighting the development of Ukraine’s weaponry. Domestic production of long-range weaponry ultimately means that other states do not limit Ukraine for permission to use them, allowing it to use them at will in a sustained campaign against Russia.
Both the U.S. and Europe have been sharing intelligence with Ukrainian forces to facilitate these attacks. This is not to say that the U.S. is supporting these strikes solely to ensure a Ukrainian victory. Instead, they are doing so to bring Putin to the negotiating table. Given the regime’s political and financial investment in the war, it is unlikely that negotiations will bring about lasting peace.
Russia will be highly likely to strengthen its air defences, considering the strategic importance of its oil industry. Significantly, Russia’s current air defences are primed for taking down missile threats, rather than drones. This means that the state’s air defences are in need of a thorough overhaul. Russia's ability to reliably export oil will have significant ramifications for its international standing in the global oil market. Governments and businesses globally are likely to seek alternative oil supplies. Any reduction in the dominance of the prevalence of the Russian oil industry would have a significant impact on its capacity to finance its invasion of Ukraine readily.
If Ukraine is able to sustain the effectiveness of these operations, Russia’s revenues and wider economy are likely to suffer significantly. Having said this, military spending is highly likely to continue at this rate or rise, given Putin’s focus on seizing Ukraine. Putin is highly likely to move resources from areas like welfare to military spending in order to ensure that military spending is unaffected by this projected fall in revenue. Notably, a decrease of resources for spending on civilians could underpin further dissatisfaction with Putin. The impact of Russian support for Putin remains dubious. Some Russians might see Ukraine’s strikes on their territory as indicative of the idea that Ukraine is a threat to Russian security. At the same time, the subsequent spike in oil prices will likely stoke public dissatisfaction with Putin.
Tasos Mansour/Unsplash
Forecast
Short-term (Now - 3 months)
The effectiveness of these operations is almost certain to continue. Ukraine has the capability, and will to do so.
Russia is highly likely to retaliate for Ukraine’s actions. They are likely to target energy infrastructure, and civilians in order to deter these strikes.
Rising oil prices will almost certainly irk ordinary Russian citizens, although it is highly unlikely that this will translate into something more significant.
Medium-term (3-12 months)
Businesses and governments will likely seek alternative oil suppliers as the reliability of Russian oil exports has been compromised.
Russia will likely look to upgrade its air defences given their high level of vulnerability, and the significant consequences of these operations.
Long-term (>1 year)
Ukraine is almost certain to sustain these operations over the long term.
Importers of Russian oil are highly likely to look elsewhere for supply, since the supply of Russian oil is uncertain.
