The Domestic Situation in Post-Assad Syria: A New Era Under HTS Leadership
Kira Persson | 27 January 2025
Summary
Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the Sunni Islamist group that spearheaded the overthrow of the Assad regime in December 2024, has established a caretaker government in Syria until March 2025. Concerns loom about its ability to foster inclusive governance and whether it will extend its rule beyond March.
Western sanctions remain a major obstacle to Syria's recovery, though the US offered temporary relief in January 2025 to allow energy imports and humanitarian aid. There is a growing case for adjusting broader sanctions that affect the entire country in this new phase, subject to HTS's commitment to political reforms.
HTS's governance faces significant challenges, including rebuilding a fragmented economy, managing tensions with rival armed groups, and navigating the continued presence of Russian forces in Syria.
The ousting of Bashar al-Assad on 8 December 2024 marked an unexpected turn in Syria's tumultuous history. After five decades of oppressive rule, including 13 years of civil war, the Assad regime’s collapse was swifter and less violent than anticipated. The group spearheading this change, HTS, now finds itself at the helm of Syria’s transitional government. The Sunni Islamist faction, labelled a terrorist group by the US and UN, broke ties with al-Qaeda in 2016 and has since moderated its ideological position to gain local and regional support. Since 2017, it has held de facto control over the Idlib governorate in northwestern Syria, implementing controversial governance practices, including strict social controls and enforcement of conservative Islamic practices. Now, the international community’s recognition of HTS’s new government depends on its commitment to negotiating a political transition, ensuring inclusive governance despite significant domestic ethnic and sectarian divisions, and implementing fundamental reforms.
A top priority for HTS, and one of the largest hurdles to Syria’s recovery, is the lifting of long-standing Western sanctions inherited from the Assad regime. The US issued a temporary six-month license in January 2025, allowing certain energy sales and personal remittances. Following this, a Syrian official said the country will receive two electricity-generating ships from Qatar and Turkey, potentially boosting Syria’s electricity output by 50%. The EU is expected to follow suit with similar relief on critical sectors, including Syrian banks, the national airline, and energy. However, full sanctions removal remains a distant goal, contingent on substantive reforms.
Syria's economy faces significant challenges beyond sanctions. After years of conflict, the country's economic infrastructure is fragmented, with regions operating under competing factions and various economic systems. Kurdish-controlled areas still rely on the Turkish lira. The new central bank governor has pushed for economic liberalisation, including eliminating trade restrictions and relaxing foreign currency controls. However, rebuilding the shattered economy and infrastructure will require substantial foreign investment — this remains unlikely without guaranteed stability in sanctions policy.
Syria’s social fabric presents equally complex challenges, with deep sectarian and ethnic divisions. While Assad’s fall prompted hope for many Syrians, minority groups, including Alawites and Christians, worry about their representation in this new era – to them, a secular state provides a bulwark against religious extremism and is imperative to protect minority rights. Though HTS leader Ahmed al-Sharaa has met with minority leaders and ordered protection of religious sites and symbols, reports of forced conversions, violence against Alawite communities, and pressure on women to conform to conservative dress codes raises concerns about the group's true intentions. Proposed educational reforms, which include downplaying scientific theories, also suggest a shift toward more conservative Islamic values.
HTS has established a transitional government led by Mohammed al-Bashir, a technocrat who previously headed HTS's Syrian Salvation Government in Idlib. While this caretaker government is set to expire in March 2025, HTS has yet to outline a clear roadmap for a broader political transition. The presence of competing armed groups, including US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces and Turkey-backed Syrian National Army, will indeed complicate efforts to centralise power. HTS claims fighters will be brought under the defence ministry's authority, but resistance from rival factions—including hardline Sunni militants and groups with ISIS ties—remains likely, especially given HTS historical trajectory of moderation. Further, the group says it is open to cooperation with Russian forces, despite many Syrians wanting them to leave. Calls for inclusive governance, while well-intentioned, also raise complex questions. The experience of other post-conflict societies, like Lebanon, suggests that implementing inclusivity without genuine consensus—and under meddling foreign influences—may hinder effective governance rather than promote stability.
The post-Assad period in Syria is thus marked by both hope and uncertainty. HTS, while presenting itself as a force for stability, faces immense internal challenges—the economy is in tatters, and the question of how to integrate diverse ethnic and sectarian groups remains unresolved. The international community, especially the US and EU, will play a crucial role in shaping Syria’s trajectory. Whether they will offer the economic relief and diplomatic support needed to rebuild the country depends on HTS’s ability to prove its commitment to inclusive governance, human rights, and long-term peace.
Vyacheslav Argenberg/Wikimedia CC BY 4.0
Forecast
Short-term
As HTS consolidates power, protests are likely to increase—especially in urban areas where secular traditions are strongest—centred on educational reforms, social policies, and economic grievances.
Medium-term
The uncertainty over sanctions relief and security risks will likely deter private investment. Local businesses may resort to informal trade networks, with countries including Turkey and Iraq. The amphetamine trade, a legacy of Assad's era, may evolve as civilians seek economic alternatives. This shadow economy would complicate recovery efforts in the long-term. Without significant reforms, substantial sanction relief will remain distant, leaving Syria trapped in a cycle of external aid rather than achieving self-sustaining economic growth.
Ongoing factional divisions will remain a major source of instability. Kurdish forces will likely continue to leverage their control over oil resources to negotiate greater autonomy. ISIS-linked groups could exploit local Sunni grievances and instability to rebuild support. Religious tensions may escalate as some factions, including parts of HTS, push for a more religiously oriented state while others advocate for secularism. HTS's ability to manage these divergences will be critical to prevent renewed conflict.
