The Central African Republic and Russian Logistics
Hugo Folliss | 22 January 2025
Summary
After the fall of the Assad regime, Russian effectiveness could be in doubt amongst allies who benefit from the regime survival package such as the Central African Republic.
The Central African Republic and Russia’s relationship could be strained by the perceived weakness of Russia in supporting Syria and lead to increased rebel activity in the country.
The potential loss of Syrian bases in the short term will have a high impact on Russia’s ability to support its African allies as it moves materials to Libya.
The Central African Republic (C.A.R) is a mineral-rich former French colony that has battled civil war since 2012. In 2018, the C.A.R government signed an official security pact with Russia allowing the Wagner Group to enter the country. The security pact was part of the ‘regime survival package’ developed in Syria that Russia offers to autocratic powers supporting military and population control whilst shielding them from international pressure. The subsequent departure of Western powers has left Russia and the peacekeeping force MINUSCA as the key players in C.A.R. By 2021, the rebel forces became an insurgency having been pushed out of major cities. However, the collapse of the Syrian regime in late 2024 poses problems for Russia’s involvement in C.A.R.
For Russia, losing Assad has undermined its logistical programmes. Bases in Syria have operated as Russia’s hub for sending equipment and organising troop rotations. Although negotiations between Russia and the new regime over the bases are ongoing, Russia increased shipments to Libya to either mitigate or replace its reliance on Syria. Russia has already upgraded three airstrips and is reportedly upgrading the Tobruk naval base in Libya. Moving to Libya limits the volume of cargo one can transfer in one flight, and Russia’s Libyan allies are predominantly supported by the United Arab Emirates which could obstruct Russia’s plans. As such, Russia’s ability to supply ongoing operations in Africa would likely be undermined if they were not able to successfully negotiate an agreement with Syria.
The C.A.R may now be questioning whether Wagner group troops that remain in the country can still support them against the rebels. More pressingly, rebels may perceive the Assad government’s capitulation as proof of the vulnerability of government forces threatening the regime’s survival. Removing Russia from C.A.R seems unlikely though. Wagner troops are well established in the country benefiting financially from the exploitation of the minerals there and act as the C.A.R president’s bodyguards. Russia has put a great effort into swaying public opinion towards them, releasing movies that glorify the mercenaries and erecting statues that paint themselves as partners to C.A.R troops. Unlike Western powers who focus on the human rights abuses attributed to Wagner forces; some C.A.R citizens see the partnership as a win-win. As such, it is highly unlucky that in the short-term C.A.R would rethink their security ties unless the rebels took advantage of the perceived weakness of Russia.
Russia is not the only foreign power present in the country. Rwanda, a significant contributor to the MINUSCA peacekeeping mission, has expanded its involvement following agreements signed with the country in 2019 and 2021. The Rwandans have set up businesses in C.A.R, pushed for security reforms and played a part in historic peace agreements. Unlike Western countries which are often viewed poorly due to their colonial past, Rwanda pushes for ‘African Solutions to African Problems’. Rwanda could potentially serve as a future partner to replace Wagner troops. However, under the current MINUSCA mandate they would be unable to participate in any advances. They have also been criticised for the anti-competitive nature of their businesses. Rwanda likely remains a secondary partner to C.A.R in the short term, which may take advantage of the long-term weakness of a stretched Russia.
Mikhail Metzel/Wikimedia CC BY 4.0
Forecast
Short-term
Russia will likely continue to move its logistical centres to Libya. This will have a high impact on the ability of Russia to support its African allies as it deals with the implications of the move.
Medium-term
Within the next year, it is likely that rebels in the Central African Republic will step up operations in the country. The potential severity is low as whilst Russia may be weaker, MINUSCA is still present in the country and will support its defence.
Long-term
Russia will likely continue to move its logistical centres to Libya. This will have a high impact on the ability of Russia to support its African allies as it deals with the implications of the move.
Within the next year, it is likely that rebels in the Central African Republic will step up operations in the country. The potential severity is low as whilst Russia may be weaker, MINUSCA is still present in the country and will support its defence.