The 2027 PLA Centenary Celebration: What Can be Expected?
By Sen Chanu and Elliott Clark | 26 November 2025
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Summary
Although the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has a pattern of justifying nationalistic moves during major CCP anniversaries, our assessment suggests that China currently lacks the incentive to conduct a full-scale kinetic operation against Taiwan in 2027. The argument around the 2027 PLA centenary requires further observation for potential ‘trigger points’ before we could alert to a likely military move against Taiwan.
The ‘trigger points’ that would change our current assessment include, but are not limited to, internal political crisis within the CCP (President Xi Jinping’s weakening control over the party); 2028 Taiwan election campaign with pro-independence movement; and Taiwan decides to join AUKUS.
While an invasion by 2027 is unlikely, a quarantine followed by a closed blockade is a likely scenario. In the series of these events, the global semiconductor supply chain will get severely disrupted, and fabless companies will face production delays.
The series will be followed by a heightened targeted US export controls against Chinese entities for dual-use technologies and semiconductor manufacturing equipment. Unless China launches a full-scale military invasion, the current Trump administration’s involvement would likely be restricted to coercive but non-kinetic responses.
Developments
Unification with Taiwan has been Beijing's objective since the end of the Chinese Civil War. China has engaged in sustained hybrid warfare to weaken Taiwan in view of advancing unification. Despite this, a full-scale invasion of Taiwan remains a realistic possibility. China significantly modernised its military in line with its centenary goals, which are to dramatically strengthen its capabilities by 2027, as a stepping stone to completing the modernisation of their military by 2035. China now has almost 1,000,000 more troops than the U.S.,1,000 more tanks, and its air force boasts nearly 2,000 fighter jets. Simultaneously, China is now building the equivalent of the French Navy every 4 years, demonstrating its earnest commitment to these goals.
2027 could coincide with an invasion of Taiwan, given that China generally marks major anniversaries with significant acts. Past anniversaries have included military parades in Beijing and increased military exercises. For instance, China, on 3 September 2025, the 80th anniversary of the Chinese victory over Japan, a large military parade took place, whilst incursions into Taiwanese waters increased significantly. This is not an isolated occurrence. In 2024, the 75th anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party’s victory in the Chinese Civil War, China sent 90 warships near Taiwan, the largest naval exercise in decades. This indicates that an escalation of Chinese-Taiwanese relations is highly likely during the PLA’s centenary, but not necessarily an invasion.
If support for the Kuomintang, the pro-Beijing party, were to rise ahead of Taiwan’s 2028 elections, China’s incentive to invade or conduct military actions towards Taiwan would be diminished. This is because the probability of a peaceful reunification of Taiwan and China will increase if the Kuomintang wins the 2028 elections, serving Beijing’s goals.
In the event that Xi’s grip over the Chinese Communist Party weakens, the likelihood of military action on Taiwan increases, given that an invasion may support his political survival. However, should Xi be replaced by another leader during the 15th National People’s Congress in 2028, the probability of military action will decrease significantly, as a new leader would be much more interested in securing their own power than in making major geopolitical moves.
Whether the current Chinese military could successfully invade Taiwan is dubious. It has not engaged in sustained, active conflict since 1979, and so its personnel are strikingly inexperienced. Moreover, the Congressional Research Service categorised an invasion as the ‘riskiest and most challenging option} for the PLA’’, given Taiwan's mountainous geography and the expected level of Taiwanese resistance to an invasion. Furthermore, Beijing would likely want to avoid unnecessary military action. Therefore, China might prefer an economic blockade of Taiwan instead.
A closed blockade is more feasible than a full-scale invasion of Taiwan since China has been prosperous in nearly surrounding Taiwan with warships and jets in May 2024. A naval quarantine on shipments to Taiwan could be one indicator that the blockade is manifesting. This sudden pressure is highly likely to mean that Taiwan's commerce would become detached from the wider world, a particularly disastrous situation given that just below a third of Taiwan’s annual calories come from domestic sources. This means that Taiwan has good reason to quickly capitulate to Beijing if a blockade were launched. However, it should be noted that Taiwan’s allies would act to alleviate this blockade. Whether Taiwan capitulates depends on the effectiveness of these allies. However, given the high risk of a military operation, a full blockade would still be Beijing's preferred option.
Implications
Lack of Energy Supply and Undermined Sovereignty (Domestic)
Quarantine – Since Taiwan imports more than 97% of its energy needs, a quarantine will impact the country’s manufacturing industry. The industry is responsible for more than 35% of the country’s GDP and semiconductor export is one of the main contributors. Facilities in this industry are sensitive to energy rationing because their operations are electricity-intensive. Therefore, a quarantine will disrupt their daily production capacity, which will propagate into domestic economic disruption.
Blockade – As per Taiwan’s Ministry of Economic Affairs in 2022, the country has “approximately 146 days of safe oil reserves, 10 to 11 days of safe natural gas reserves, and 39 days of safe coal reserves”. This means a blockade lasting more than a month will severely cripple the island’s energy reserves, since it is highly likely that fuel imports will be halted after the blockade begins. Many energy-intensive industries will likely shutdown, leading to a likely collapse of the country’s GDP followed by a huge unemployment rate.
Additionally, a blockade might force the Taiwanese government into negotiating some terms with Beijing that would affect the island’s sovereignty. Taiwan losing control of its key ports and airspace is tantamount to choking its economic lifelines. To avoid long-term damage to its economy, Taiwan could settle to transfer some control of its key infrastructures (logistic hubs) by allowing Chinese State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) to exert some influence over them.
Semiconductor Supply Chain Disruption (Global)
Quarantine – Under quarantine, inbound shipments carrying critical raw materials (silicon wafers, photoresists, chemical gases etc.) into Taiwan for chip manufacturing could be delayed. Consequently, Taiwan’s largest semiconductor fabricator, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), could face reduced output (due to inspection or blocked deliveries) and higher operating costs (due to rerouting). TSMC’s clients like Apple, Nvidia, AMD, and Qualcomm’s production capacities will slow down, longer delivery times for existing orders, and highly likely face a slight/moderate revenue drop, depending on the quarantine length and chip inventories in stock.
Blockade – A blockade will prove fatal and have long-term industrial consequences for these clients. The production capabilities of TSMC factories outside Taiwan are far too limited to compensate the clients’ needs in case of a blockade. There could be an immediate halt of semiconductor exports leading to negative revenue shocks and in extreme cases, clients’ factories shutting down in several locations. According to the Boston Consulting Group and the Semiconductor Industry Association, it will require an investment of USD 350b and at least 3 years to replicate Taiwan’s semiconductor production capacity. Therefore, in a critical scenario, a blockade will cause irreparable damage towards some clients.
How will the U.S. and its regional allies react?
The U.S. is highly likely to respond to this blockade, given its interests in Taiwan’s semiconductor industry and geopolitical security. The U.S. has several options if a blockade were to occur. Engaging the Chinese directly is one. This would almost certainly make the Taiwan Strait and the wider South China Sea too unstable to trade or invest in, and potentially bring both powers to war.
As Asian and Oceanic states rely on America for security, they would almost certainly follow the U.S.’s response to the blockade rather than take their own action. Japan, for example, failed to manifest the ‘One Co-operative Effort Among Nations’ (OCEAN) this year, showing the inability of smaller powers to make significant geopolitical moves. Despite this, a blockade or an invasion would likely prompt these powers to increase defence spending, alongside regional security co-operation. OCEAN could realistically be revived due to a blockade. Such actions would likely deter China from advancing beyond Taiwan.
Scenario 1 (Quarantine) | Slowdown of TSMC Output
It is almost certain that a maritime quarantine by Beijing will impose restrictions against the shipping of critical raw materials for Taiwanese semiconductors. This will highly likely slowdown the output of TSMC and other Taiwanese chip manufacturers. Moreover, the attempt to export finished semiconductors will also face delays, disrupting global delivery schedules—especially for advanced 3nm chips.
Indicators:
Increased inspection of vessels passing through South China sea by China Coast Guard.
Increased military exercises by People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy as a show of naval strength around Taiwan Strait and the remaining north, south, and east Taiwan.
Maritime rerouting of inbound shipment carrying semiconductor materials meant for Taiwan.
Scenario 2 (Blockade) | Shutdown of Global Facilities Dependent on Taiwan Semiconductors
It is highly likely that, in an extreme circumstance, impacted electronic manufacturers will shutdown some of their operations temporarily since 90% of the advanced nodes are produced by Taiwan (especially by TSMC). It is almost certain that, following the blockade and immediate halt of chip exports, reliant companies cannot just switch to another supplier for the advanced nodes due to lack of alternative suppliers. Depleting inventories of advanced nodes is what will make this shutdown possible.
Indicators:
The PLA will increase their naval presence within the Taiwan Strait.
Beijing will communicate an official narrative which calls for a blockade of Taiwan.
TSMC and other Taiwanese manufacturers reported stoppage of chip exports
Global electronic companies like Apple, Nvidia, AMD issue notices of production line delay
Emergency notices issued by governments to support the affected companies
Scenario 3 (Blockade) | Targeted US Export Controls
It is highly likely that the US will target more Chinese semiconductor entities to include in the Entity List (EL)—a list of foreign entities believed to be involved in activities that would harm the US security—and broaden export controls on semiconductor manufacturing equipment. Additionally, secondary sanctions on third-country suppliers that facilitate Beijing’s advanced chip production are also highly likely.
In the commercial aviation industry, China’s Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China (COMAC) is dependent on countries like the US, France, and Germany for its airplanes’ (C919 and ARJ21) engines and control systems. In the event of a blockade, it is highly likely that US export controls will expand towards critical aircraft parts targeting COMAC.
Indicators:
Washington urging allies to restrict exports of semiconductor manufacturing equipment and dual-use technologies.
G7 meets to discuss the implementation of sanctions.
Leading Chinese aviation companies issue notices of production delay, alongside supply line shortages.
Increase in support for economic measures directed at China within the World Trade Organisation.
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