Tehreek-e-Taliban (TTP) Attacks: The Events that Led to Pakistan-Afghanistan Escalation
By Chongtham Sen Chanu | 25 October 2025
Summary
TTP is an Islamist militant group formed in 2007, whose main objective is to overthrow the Pakistani government and establish a strict Islamic rule based on Sharia law.
Pakistan launched multiple airstrikes in Afghanistan targeting TTP hideouts as a retaliatory act against TTP’s increasing organised attacks on Pakistani government personnel.
The Doha agreement will likely fall through due to the Afghan Taliban's inability to monitor and control TTP activities as a result of poor infrastructure and lack of resources.
The strengthening bilateral relationship between Kabul and New Delhi will reinforce Islamabad’s motivation to act more hostile towards the Taliban regime.
The October Escalation Timeline
On 11 October 2025, Afghan Taliban opened fire on Pakistani troops along the Afghanistan-Pakistan northern border as a “retaliatory” attack for the alleged airstrikes by Pakistan. The deadly row continued until a 48-hour ceasefire was agreed on 15 October 2025, which both parties decided to extend after it expires. However, Afghanistan accused Pakistan of violating the truce after Islamabad airstruck the hideouts of Hafiz Gul Bahadur group—a faction of TTP—on 17 October 2025. The two countries agreed to an “immediate ceasefire” mediated by Qatar and Türkiye at Doha on 19 October 2025.
The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED) recorded over 630 TTP attacks against Pakistani government personnel and civilians from January 2021 to September 2025. In 2024, TTP was responsible for 558 deaths, a 90% increase compared to 2023. On 7 and 8 October 2025, the Pakistani Security Forces conducted an operation in Orakzai district targeting TTP members. The security forces were ambushed during the operation by TTP militants, resulting in the death of 11 security forces. Following the ambush, the security forces conducted a series of operations against TTP’s hideouts in Orakzai district on 9 October 2025. On the same day, the Pakistani Defence Minister called to retaliate against the “supporters” of the TTP, including Afghanistan. Hours after this warning, multiple airstrikes in Kabul were reported, allegedly carried out by Islamabad.
After the Ceasefire: What to Expect?
Following the ceasefire agreement, Zabihullah Mujahid, the spokesperson of the Afghan Taliban regime, posted on X that Afghanistan will not “support groups carrying out attacks against the Government of Pakistan”. Islamabad signed the agreement with the hope that the Afghan Taliban would establish mechanisms to control TTP activities on their soil. The motive of the Pakistani government is counterterrorism and dismantling TTP networks operating from Afghanistan. Notably, TTP attacks surged after it unilaterally ended the ceasefire agreement with the Pakistani government on 28 November 2022. Given that TTP is not bound by any agreement with either the Afghan Taliban or Islamabad, the Doha agreement lacks the ability to withstand pressures from future TTP attacks. Besides the fact that TTP operates independently, Kabul lacks sufficient resources to monitor its operatives, especially in remote provinces such as Nangarhar and Kunar. Moreover, the Taliban regime is wary of TTP defecting to Islamic State in Iraq and Syria-Khorasan (ISIS-K), a rival jihadi group responsible for attacks against the regime. Hence, it is not in Kabul’s interest to exert much pressure on TTP. Moreover, the porous Afghan-Pakistan border poses additional challenges in preventing cross-border terrorism.
According to a United Nations report, there are approximately 6,000-6,500 TTP members present in Afghanistan. The lack of proper infrastructure to track their movements and whereabouts by the Afghan Taliban threatens the durability of the Doha agreement. The country’s unstable economy is unable to fund infrastructure projects, and the regime heavily relies on international aid to meet domestic needs. On the other hand, the Pakistani government has intensified its crackdown against the Afghan refugees in Pakistan since the Taliban took over Afghanistan in 2021. Therefore, if TTP attacks persist, more Afghan refugees could be forced out—creating more instability in Afghanistan. Tensions between the two countries will soar, and another airstrike episode is on the cards due to TTP violence. There will be less room for negotiation to establish a long-lasting peace. Additionally, Islamabad contested the recent India-Afghanistan joint statement that referred to “Jammu and Kashmir as part of India”. Kabul’s friendly ties with India are another trigger point for Pakistan, apart from the regime’s lack of motivation to undermine TTP’s aspirations.
USAID
Forecast
Short-term (Now - 3 months)
TTP will likely continue attacking Pakistani government personnel and infrastructure. Consequently, it is highly likely that diplomatic strain will continue as it is between Pakistan and Afghanistan despite the scheduled talk on 25 October 2025.
It is likely that the Taliban regime will attempt to establish an agreed mechanism to curb TTP activities. However, it is almost certain that numerous challenges—owing to a lack of resources and incentives—will make it difficult to implement the mechanism effectively.
Medium-term (3-12 months)
It is highly likely that Pakistani security forces will continue counter-terrorism operations against TTP hideouts in Pakistan. As a retaliatory act, if TTP targets high-profile assets, the Afghan-Pakistan relationship will likely deteriorate increasingly, and countries like Qatar and Türkiye will likely get involved again.
