South Sudan Heading Towards a Renewed Civil War
Hugo Folliss | 23 June 2025
Summary
South Sudan risks a second civil war as violence between opposition groups and the government have increased.
The violence has already led to the leader of the opposition being arrested and threatens to upend the 2018 peace deal completely.
Looking forward, it is likely that unless the leader of the opposition is released, ethnic tensions will continue to rise, leading to violence.
South Sudan is the youngest country in the world, having gaining independence from Sudan in 2011. Independence was hard fought, spanning decades of conflict and eventually being triggered by an overwhelming 98.8% ‘yes’ referendum vote. Two of the key leaders of the original conflict, Salva Kiir and Riek Machar, formed a unity government on independence, taking the roles of President and Vice President, respectively. They had both originally been a part of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA); however, Machar fell out with the group’s leader in 1991 and subsequently formed the SPLA-Nasir group. The SPLA and SPLA-Nasir represented the two major ethnic groups in South Sudan, with the former backed by the Dinka and the latter by the Nuer. Just two years after independence, a civil war engulfed the nation when Machar was sacked by Kiir, who accused him of plotting a coup. The conflict was characterised by ethnic divisions along the lines of the original rebel groups. The civil war led to an estimated 400,000 deaths and displaced 2.5m people.
In 2018, a peace deal was negotiated that established a Unity Government with Machar reinstated in his role as Vice President and Kiir remaining as President. The deal also included the establishment of a national army made up of the former militias, the creation of a court to try perpetrators of violence during the civil war, the creation of a new constitution, and new elections that were supposed to be held in 2022. However, other than the establishment of the unity government, most of the 2018 peace deal has not been implemented, with elections being delayed until 2026. The rivalry between Kiir and Machar seems to be the key impediment to peace, with neither willing to give up their militia forces, thus delaying the implementation of the 2018 peace deal. Since the start of the year, civil war has threatened to engulf South Sudan once more, with the White Army militia group overrunning an army base in Nasir on March 4th and Machar being placed under house arrest along with several other opposition leaders.
Internally, the spectre of civil war has never been larger, with Kiir being accused by Machar’s opposition groups of ‘persistent violations’ of the 2018 peace deal. The Machar-aligned Sudan People’s Liberation Army in Opposition (SPLA-IO) has accused the South Sudan People’s Defence Forces (SSPDF) of conducting air strikes on their military installations, such as on their base in Wunaliet west of the capital Juba. Clashes have also been reported between the SSPDF and SPLA-IO since January, starting in the Western Equatoria state. Alongside the arrest of Machar, Kiir is pushing to consolidate power for himself, finally removing his key rivals from power. Since February, 22 political and military personnel have been imprisoned, and the governor of Upper Nile State, who was allied to Machar, has been replaced.
The White Army’s attack on Nasir has allowed Kiir the opportunity to crack down harder on Machar and his faction. However, the reality is that the White Army is primarily an independent militia group who have reacted due to increased provocations rather than a political directive delivered by Machar. The crackdown may be motivated instead by reports of Kiir’s declining health and his choice of successor, businessman Benjamin Bol Mel. By sidelining the opposition, Kiir can more effectively establish Bol Mel’s base of power, something that he lacks in the region. Bol Mel was appointed as Vice President and the deputy chair of Kiir’s party this year. This coincided with a trip to the UAE, where Bol Mel had been the main negotiator for Kiir.
The improvement of the relationship between the UAE and South Sudan could also be a reason for the crackdown on Machar and his allies. The ongoing civil war in Sudan has led to people, mainly South Sudanese returnees, and weapons to enter South Sudan, whilst both factions in Sudan have recruited South Sudanese fighters. Further reports of clashes between the SPLA-IO and the UAE-aligned Rapid Support Forces (RSF), alongside suspicions of ties between Nuer Militias and the Sudanese Armed Forces, would suggest the importance for Kiir to stifle the opposition to support the UAE. Moreover, the importance of Sudan for its southern neighbours’ oil exports cannot be understated, as a critical pipeline burst cut nearly two-thirds of the state’s revenue. The country needs to attract new loans to keep core state functions operational, whose repayments are dependent on oil production. Loan agreements with the UAE could potentially hinge on support for the RSF, necessitating a crackdown on opposition elements threatening their allies.
The March 2025 capture of the Nasir army base, coupled with a failed evacuation attempt leading to the deaths of 27 soldiers, was an embarrassing failure for the army, which reacted with lethal intent. Much of the Upper Nile Region has been subjected to a barrel bombing campaign that the United Nations (UN) has reported to contain a highly flammable liquid. Participating in these airstrikes has been the Ugandan military, who claim to have been brought into the country as part of a pre-existing security pact. Ethnic tensions are being stoked online with a campaign of misinformation, disinformation and hate speech. Other factors, such as the civil war in neighbouring Sudan, the outbreak of cholera, and increased food insecurity due to flooding, have pushed civilian and refugee populations closer to the edge. In total, 130,000 people have already fled their homes, with many crossing the border into Ethiopia. The UN envoy to South Sudan has suggested that the campaigns online are reminiscent of the conditions of 2013 and 2016 during the first civil war. The deteriorating security environment has the potential to cause widespread civilian casualties and risks escalating ethnic violence if there is no cessation of attacks.
Jason Patinkin (VOA)
Forecast
Short-term (Now - 3 months)
It is highly likely that, as the rainy season begins in June that refugee populations will be put in very severe situations regarding healthcare if the South Sudanese government continues to attack civilian populations.
It is unlikely that the conflict will be de-escalated as the government has shown that it intends to concentrate power, which will have a severe effect on the opposition’s ability to respond.
Medium-term (3-12 months)
It is unlikely that the South Sudanese government will actively support the RSF in Sudan, as it relies on both sides in the Sudanese civil war for its pipelines, and such support would have a very severe effect on South Sudan’s economy.
South Sudan will likely face sanctions if the government continues to attack the opposition; however, these may be curtailed if the government continues to accept US deportees.
South Sudan will likely continue to improve relations with the UAE to help support its economy.
Kiir will likely continue to restructure the government to support his successor, which may have a severe effect on peaceful existence and may lead to ethnic based violence.
Long-term (>1 year)
Bol Mel will likely replace Kiir, which has the potential to have a severe impact on South Sudan due to his lack of political capital
