Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić to visit Moscow’s Victory Day Parade
Mejreme Asllani | 30 April 2025
Summary
Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic confirmed his attendance, along with Serbian military units, at Russia's Victory Day parade in Moscow on 9 May 2025, challenging warnings from the European Union (EU).
The visit undermines Serbia's stalled EU accession by exacerbating concerns over its alignment with Russia.
Belgrade-Brussels diplomatic friction will highly likely increase in the short term, almost certainly stalling Serbia's EU accession progress in the medium term.
Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic plans to travel to Moscow for the Victory Day parade on 9 May 2025, marking the 80th anniversary of the Soviet Union's WWII victory over Nazi Germany. Significantly, the visit includes the participation of a Serbian military unit, and Vucic stated Serbia would be involved in the "joint" organisation of the parade for the first time, signalling a deeper engagement than mere attendance. This decision contradicts explicit warnings from high-level EU officials, including High Representative Kaja Kallas, who stated participation by an EU candidate country is unacceptable and would be a breach of EU membership and would "not be taken lightly". Vucic acknowledged the anticipated pressure but affirmed his commitment to participate. This development unfolds against the backdrop of Serbia's EU accession process stalled due to insufficient progress on deteriorating rule of law, normalisation of relations with Kosovo, and a consistent refusal to align with EU sanctions against Russia. Domestically, Vucic faces ongoing anti-corruption protests, and the parliament recently approved a new cabinet including ministers known for pro-Russia and anti-EU rhetoric. Along with Vucic, Slovakia Prime Minister Robert Fico and the Republika Srpska President Milorad Dodik also announced their participation.
The visit carries multifaceted implications. Politically, the decision jeopardises Serbia's EU integration prospects, making advancement highly unlikely in the near future. It reinforces doubts about Belgrade's strategic commitment to the EU and its foreign policy alignment with the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), particularly the persistent non-compliance with sanctions on Russia and continued close cooperation with the Kremlin. Relations with key Western partners (e.g., EU, US, NATO) will likely to deteriorate, potentially hindering diplomatic and security cooperation frameworks. Within the Western Balkans, the visit will embolden pro-Russian actors like Dodik and complicate further the EU-facilitated Kosovo-Serbia dialogue, where Serbia relies on Russia's UN Security Council veto power and international support regarding Kosovo's statehood, which remains a critical factor.
The visit occurs amidst large-scale, student-led anti-corruption protests that have persisted for months, presenting a real challenge to Vucic’s rule. Vucic has publicly claimed these protests are encouraged and financed by foreign countries and international organisations (e.g., USAID, NED) seeking to destabilise While the planned visit to Moscow might appeal and boost Vucic's nationalist support, potentially serving as a tool to consolidate support or distract attention, it risks deepening societal polarisation between pro-Russian and pro-European segments among the population. From a security perspective, the participation of Serbian military troops, signalling Serbia’s inclination towards Russia in defence and military matters, reinforces Serbia's image as a potential Russian ally and its implicit support for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Although Serbia has joined the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), it does not aspire to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).
Russia Ministry of Defence/Wikimedia Commons, CC-BY 4.0
Forecast
Short-term (Now - 3 months)
Increased diplomatic tensions between Serbia and the EU are likely, potentially manifesting in public reproaches and impacts on bilateral engagements.
Serbia’s EU accession will almost certainly remain static.
Medium-term (3-12 months)
Serbia's EU accession path faces sustained stagnation, with progress highly unlikely unless Belgrade significantly alters its stance on CFSP alignment.
If Serbia continues close cooperation with the Kremlin despite EU warnings, potential negative impacts on EU-related funding or investments are a realistic possibility with the current EU leadership.
Long-term (>1 year)
Prioritisation of Moscow over EU alignment will almost certainly diminish Serbia's EU membership prospects.
