Overview of the Arctic Security
By Dorota Vandakova | 5 February 2026
Summary
Arctic security has shifted from cooperation to competition following the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, with climate change and increased access amplifying the region’s geopolitical significance.
Russia’s military consolidation and China’s infrastructure-focused engagement have increased strategic ambiguity, particularly through dual-use assets that complicate monitoring and assessments of intent.
Reduced regional cooperation and growing reliance on limited infrastructure increase the risk of miscalculation, placing additional pressure on Arctic states and NATO members involved in transatlantic security planning.
Context
The Arctic region is a region of increasing global competition, bordered by Russia and the United States on either side of the North Pole and attracting interest from China. China has recently designated itself as a ‘near-Arctic’ state. The situation has escalated since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, changing the geopolitical landscape from cooperation to competition. The Arctic Council, composed of 8 countries including Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the US, have paused its activities since March 2022. This signals a clear shift in geopolitical cooperation and challenges the ‘Arctic exceptionalism’.
A combination of factors, including global warming, geopolitical competition and strategic infrastructure development, shapes the Arctic security context. Rapid warming in the region has opened new maritime access and exposed offshore resources, increasing its economic and strategic significance. These physical changes have coincided with heightened geopolitical interest from both Arctic and non-Arctic states.
Russia is the primary security actor in the Arctic due to its geography and concentration of strategic military assets in the High North. The Kola Peninsula remains central to Russia’s deterrence posture, including Northern Fleet capabilities and infrastructure that support early warning, air defence, and maritime operations. Today, Moscow has more than 40 military stations. These facilities include airfields, radar stations, ports, and logistics hubs that support both conventional and strategic forces. Much of this infrastructure is located along the Northern Sea Route, which Russia views as a critical economic and security corridor. Although Russia’s military capacity has been affected by the war in Ukraine, Arctic infrastructure continues to receive priority due to its role in protecting nuclear deterrence assets and maintaining situational awareness in the High North. This has reinforced the Arctic’s function as a defensive buffer rather than a zone of expansion, increasing the sensitivity of military activity in the region.
China’s involvement in Arctic security is less direct but has increased steadily over the past decade. Beijing’s designation of itself as a “near-Arctic state” reflects long-term strategic interest rather than immediate military intent. Chinese engagement has focused on scientific research, commercial shipping, satellite activity, and infrastructure investment. While these activities are presented as civilian, several retain potential dual-use applications, particularly for data collection, communications, and logistics. This approach allows China to expand its Arctic presence without crossing formal military thresholds.
Implications
The shift from cooperative governance to strategic competition has increased security risks in the Arctic. Reduced engagement through the Arctic Council limits opportunities for confidence-building and information exchange, making it more difficult to manage incidents or clarify intent. In this environment, even routine military or surveillance activity carries a higher risk of misinterpretation.
From a US and NATO perspective, the Arctic, especially Greenland and the High North, has regained strategic importance as a critical node in early warning and missile defence. Greenland plays a central role in monitoring activity across the GIUK Gap and the wider North Atlantic, which are essential for detecting and tracking Russian air and maritime movements between the Arctic and the Atlantic theatre. The primary function of Thule Air Base, now Pituffik Space Base, underscores this role, as its missile detection and space surveillance capabilities are integral to US homeland defence and NATO early-warning architectures. As a result, developments in the Arctic increasingly feed directly into broader deterrence and reinforcement planning, rather than remaining a peripheral security concern.
Besides its economic potential, China sees the Arctic region as a security issue. This multi-layered approach creates ambiguity and dual-use potential, which complicates assessments of intent. China’s strategy does not explicitly prioritise military confrontation in the Arctic, but the integration of economic, scientific, and infrastructure elements within a security-oriented conceptual framework increases the strategic relevance of Chinese activity.
The interaction of Russian military consolidation and China’s infrastructure-focused engagement further complicates monitoring and risk assessment. While neither dynamic alone indicates a high likelihood of direct conflict, their combined effect increases strategic ambiguity. Limited transparency around dual-use activities and infrastructure investment reduces clarity regarding intent, placing additional pressure on intelligence and early-warning systems.
For NATO members and partners, the Arctic’s growing relevance to transatlantic security planning increases operational demands. The region’s role in surveillance, early warning, and reinforcement routes requires greater coordination and resilience planning. At the same time, the absence of regional dialogue mechanisms limits options for de-escalation during periods of heightened tension, increasing the risk that localised incidents could have wider security consequences.
At the same time, the gradual opening of Arctic maritime routes introduces economic dynamics that increasingly intersect with these security challenges. Shorter shipping distances between Asia and Europe increase the long-term commercial attractiveness of Arctic sea routes, creating incentives to invest in ports, logistics hubs, digital connectivity, and transport corridors in northern Scandinavia. In the post-Ukraine war environment, such infrastructure development is increasingly framed through a resilience and security lens, as enhanced port and rail capacity can support both civilian supply chains and military mobility. This convergence further blurs the line between economic and security infrastructure, increasing the strategic significance of investment decisions in Arctic-adjacent regions.
The interaction between Russian and Chinese interests adds complexity to the Arctic security environment. While their strategic objectives are not fully aligned, both states share an interest in expanding access to Arctic routes and limiting Western influence. Limited coordination, including joint exercises and maritime activity, increases the number of actors operating near critical sea lanes and infrastructure. This raises the burden on monitoring and risk management for Arctic states and contributes to uncertainty in crises.
Forecast
Short-term (Now - 3 months)
Arctic states are highly likely to increase monitoring and intelligence activity around military movements and critical infrastructure, while opportunities for cooperation will remain low.
Medium-term (3-12 months)
As seasonal Arctic maritime routes become more viable, early-stage investment in ports and transport infrastructure in northern Scandinavia is highly likely to emerge alongside increased NATO emphasis on reinforcement routes, host-nation support, and the protection of dual-use infrastructure.
Long-term (>1 year)
Expanded commercial use of Arctic routes and infrastructure development is likely to become increasingly intertwined with NATO deterrence and reinforcement planning, raising both the economic value and strategic sensitivity of Arctic-adjacent infrastructure amid persistent competition and limited dialogue mechanisms.
