New Minsk Aspirations: Belarus's Role amid US-Russia Talks on Ukraine
Andrea Stauder | 2 May 2025
Summary
Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko presented himself as a mediator for the Ukrainian War, ease Western sanctions, and slow the integration with Moscow under the Union State framework.
Easing Russia’s grip on Belarus is in the interests of both Minsk and the West. Greater Russian influence would increase the threat to NATO and Ukraine.
Although peace talks in Minsk and a Western opening remain unlikely, Belarus should not be seen as a lost cause. Dismissing Lukashenko entirely risks driving Minsk further into the Kremlin’s orbit.
Lukashenko sees an opportunity to elevate his international standing in the Ukraine peace talks. Positing himself as a mediator—he recalled the Trilateral Contact Group and the Minsk agreements between 2014 and 2020. Moscow has intensified efforts since 2022 to deepen the Union State, established in 1999. Lukashenko sees involvement in peace talks as a means to safeguard Belarus’s security and sovereign interests, ease Western sanctions, and slow Russia’s drive for integration.
Since October 2024, Lukashenko has offered to host peace talks involving Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, Russian President Vladimir Putin, and US representatives. He reiterated the proposal on 27 February 2025 in an interview with American blogger Mario Nawfal, and again on 19 April 2025. However, these overtures have produced no tangible outcomes. Since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the Minsk agreements have become synonymous with a diplomatic failure. Moreover, Belarus’s de facto co-belligerence and Moscow’s growing grip on Minsk have led the West to view Belarus as a non-neutral actor, lacking full sovereignty.
Moscow aims to complete the Union State integration with Belarus by 2030, focusing on three key areas: military, economic, and political. The first is the most advanced, with Russia exerting near-total operational control over Belarusian forces during wartime and significant influence during peacetime. Russia has also bolstered its military presence in Belarus through training facilities and air bases. Additionally, since 2023, Belarus has hosted Russia's tactical nuclear weapons, effectively ending Belarus’s status as a non-nuclear state. Economically, a customs union and single market are already in place. Still, Moscow seeks to establish a unified economic space with a single currency and full control over Belarus's macroeconomic and fiscal policies. Politically, the integration remains less developed. Some joint institutions outlined in the 1999 Union State Treaty have been created but are largely inactive.
Belarus’s primary objective is to secure a ceasefire, as the current status quo grants Minsk some manoeuvre. Russia’s military focus on Ukraine has limited its capacity to accelerate Union State integration, while Trump’s push for a deal with Putin has opened diplomatic space for Minsk. As previously noted, a major escalation would be Minsk’s worst-case scenario. However, a Russian victory could prove destabilising, potentially emboldening the Kremlin to press for deeper political or military control over Belarus. Conversely, a Ukrainian victory could severely undermine Moscow’s legitimacy, weakening its backing for Lukashenko’s regime.
Although it is nearly impossible for Lukashenko to claim the role of neutral mediator, a window remains to loosen Moscow’s grip and extract concessions from the West. Moscow’s military presence in Belarus already poses a threat to NATO and Ukraine. Still, in the case of further integration, more resources will have to be diverted to protect the Ukrainian border and the Suwalki Corridor. While the West currently treats Belarus as a part of Russia—aligning sanctions accordingly—a different approach could engage Lukashenko on shared interests, namely reducing Russian influence. Political isolation and intensified sanctions have narrowed Minsk’s options, pushing it further into Russia’s orbit. Lukashenko has always rejected the Kremlin’s “Russkiy Mir” ideology, but his regime’s survival and Belarus’s economic resilience now rely heavily on Russian support. To regain autonomy, Belarus should be offered credible political and economic alternatives to dependence on Moscow.
kremlin.ru, CC-BY 3.0
Forecast
Short-term (Now - 3 months)
It is highly unlikely that peace talks will be held in Minsk.
Medium-term (3-12 months)
It is unlikely that meaningful Belarusian-Euroepan talks will occur despite Lukashenko’s efforts.
Following his 26 January 2025 re-election, Lukashenko is highly unlikely to alter Belarus’s Russia-aligned foreign policy amid sustained isolation.
Long-term (>1 year)
It is highly unlikely that Belarus will achieve full political and economic integration into the Union State by 2030. However, Russia’s military leverage over Belarus will likely grow.
It is unlikely that Belarus will gain room for autonomous foreign policy manoeuvre. However, the state of current Belarus-Russia ties strongly depends on the personal leadership of Putin and Lukashenko, and on the evolution of the war in Ukraine.
