Mishaps, Mayhem, Munich: Security, Populism and the Future of Ukraine
Lily Donahue | 3 March 2025
Summary
The 2025 Munich Security Conference, intended as a platform to discuss Ukraine, quickly turned into a lecture on free speech and populist values, as evidenced by U.S. Vice President JD Vance’s speech.
U.S. officials remain unable to sing from the same hymn sheet, flip-flopping on their approach to Ukraine and Russia.
While negotiations are unlikely to see Moscow “take” Ukraine, they offer a prime opportunity for Putin to win other concessions—humiliating the United States and easing sanctions.
The 2025 Munich Security Conference, conceived as a platform to focus solely on the war in Ukraine and the need for increased European defence spending, turned into a seminar on populist values: more free-speech diatribe than security summit. Running for two days in mid-February, U.S. Vice President JD Vance, decrying a perceived shift away from European and American values, harangued on disinformation and accused European governments of disregarding voter concerns over migration. The speech was not well-received. (Chairman Christoph Heusgen’s emotional goodbye after a three-year tenure at the Conference has been widely misread as “tears of frustration” by critics and supporters alike.)
Still, the goings-on reflect a broader trend towards ally alienation by a newly-minted cohort of American politicians. Pete Hegseth, current U.S. Secretary of Defense and former television presenter was similarly bombastic at a meeting with the Ukraine Defense Contact Group a week before, declaring that NATO membership was unrealistic, a return to pre-2014 borders unlikely, and that the U.S. would begin to take a backseat in European-Ukrainian security affairs. Though other allies may well agree with some of the statements - it is indeed improbable that Ukraine will see Crimea returned - that Hegseth’s comments may have given Russia undue political leverage was a concern.
A day later, Hegseth had reined in his remarks. While possible that this was a response to European frustration at an American blunder, it is not definitive, especially considering a Trump-led tendency to sideline allies. Vance, never a pro-Ukraine voice, was seemingly reading from the same about-face script, threatening sanctions if Russia didn’t commit to a peace deal that guaranteed Ukrainian sovereignty. Even more unusually, Vance hinted towards sending American troops to Ukraine if Moscow proved unwilling to negotiate. (This is a near-impossible proposition, but remains an out-of-character assertion for Vance.)
The Munich Security Conference, where Vance would have likely promoted American efforts to end the war as a uniquely Trumpian accomplishment, thus took a turn. Eschewing Ukraine, Vance instead promoted European far-right voices. The vice president - who shunned German Chancellor Olaf Scholz in favour of a private meeting with AfD right-winger Alice Weidel - focused on free speech and perceived dangers of censorship and elite takeover, the “danger from within”.
These about-faces are not limited to Trump’s cabinet alone—the American President has recently backtracked concerning some of his inflammatory comments. Trump first engaged Putin in an hour-and-a-half-long call, during which negotiations were proposed. (Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, who was not privy to the call, was to be informed subsequently.) A subsequent social media post written by Trump echoed some of Vance’s remarks, criticising Europe for a perceived lack of help: “The United States has spent USD 200 Billion Dollars more than Europe, and Europe’s money is guaranteed, while the United States will get nothing back”. The war in Ukraine, Trump posited, was “far more important to Europe” than to the United States, especially as the U.S. is not on the continent, having a “big, beautiful Ocean as separation”. Trump slammed Zelensky as a “Dictator without Elections” and later, answering questions in Florida, said that Ukraine should “never have started it [the war]”. Keith Kellogg, the U.S. envoy for Kyiv and Moscow, simultaneously, assured that the U.S. was “with” Ukraine. The ensuing backlash to Trump was broad, leading the President to walk back his claims, acknowledging that “Russia attacked” but that Ukraine “shouldn’t have let him [Putin] attack”.
Still, the lack of consistency signals confusion amongst the Trump administration over how best to approach the war. Indeed, the only winner here is Russia.
Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office/Wikimedia, CC BY 2.0
Forecast
Long-term
Russia has violated previous ceasefire agreements (one can look to the current Russian presence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia as evidence) leading spectators to question whether any concessions made by Moscow can be accepted in good faith.
While it is unlikely negotiations will see Putin take Ukraine, they may see Russia make headway on other aims—loosening sanctions and undermining NATO.
Still, Europe has a legitimate opportunity to take the lead, compensate for U.S. uncertainty and confusion, and help develop a security framework with Ukraine.