Kazakhstan's Nuclear Power Vote
Dominic F | 25 October 2024
Summary
In a recent referendum, Kazakhstanis voted to build their first nuclear power plant—a controversial decision given the country's history as a Soviet nuclear testing site, despite being the world's largest uranium producer and currently depending on aging coal plants for power.
The construction of a nuclear power plant could transform Kazakhstan's energy sector by reducing its reliance on coal and enhancing energy security, making it the second country in Central Asia and joining several other Asian nations with nuclear power capabilities.
Kazakhstan is likely to proceed with its nuclear plant plans despite public protests, with key decisions ahead on whether to partner with Russia's Rosatom (risking sanctions exposure) or South Korea's Doosan Enerbility, though the project will ultimately boost energy independence.
On 6 October, Kazakhstan held a national referendum to decide whether to construct its first nuclear power plant. The Central Election Commission announced on 8 October that 71% of voters backed the proposal, with a turnout of 63.66% of eligible voters. The government, led by President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, has advocated for the nuclear power plant to ensure energy security and meet the country's net-zero targets by 2060. Despite Kazakhstan's position as the world's largest producer of uranium—producing 43% of the world's uranium in 2023—the Central Asian nation relies heavily on ageing coal-fired plants for electricity, which generate 70% of its power. The nuclear power plant could diversify its energy supply, reduce reliance on fossil fuels, and address severe deficits exacerbated by climate change.
However, the issue remains divisive due to Kazakhstan's history as a Soviet nuclear testing ground. The Semipalatinsk Test Site, the primary nuclear testing ground of the USSR from 1949 to 1989, has caused long-term environmental and health damage to over 1.5 million people. Public concerns about the economic feasibility, potential environmental risks, and long-term nuclear waste storage associated with the project have been raised.
Critics argued that alternative energy options, such as expanding renewables and utilising gas-powered plants, could meet the country's needs over the use of nuclear energy. There are also questions about the government's involvement in both promoting campaigning in favour of the referendum through the suppression of opposition voices and barring anti-nuclear activists from holding rallies, alongside varying accounts of activists being detained in the run-up to the vote.
Internationally, several countries—including Russia, China, South Korea, and France—have expressed interest in constructing the plant. President Tokayev has stated that he prefers to be involved in an international consortium comprising global companies with advanced technologies, indicating that no single country or company is favoured at this stage. According to a public hearing in the third quarter of 2023, the proposed plant—estimated to cost between USD 10-12 b—is likely to be built in the village of Ulken on the shores of Lake Balkhash, where declining water levels are already raising concerns.
If Kazakhstan decides to involve Western companies—such as the French firm Framatome or EDF—to build a nuclear reactor, it could be perceived by Russia and China, its two largest import partners in 2022, as a shift towards the West, potentially unsettling the delicate balance that has underpinned Kazakhstan's foreign policy. Russia and China have historically been sensitive to allies' engagements with Western nations, such as Georgia and Ukraine's aspirations to join NATO for Russia and Kyrgyzstan's hosting of a U.S. military base concerning China, respectively.
Russia may respond by exerting political and economic pressure, leveraging soft power influence within Kazakhstan, possibly including media control and relying on the ethnic Russian minority (23.7%) to create internal discord. Similarly, China might perceive increased Western involvement as challenging its strategic interests in Central Asia, where it has substantial investments through the Belt and Road Initiative, including the Khorgos Gateway dry port. Tensions could further escalate given pre-existing strains over the treatment of ethnic Kazakhs in Xinjiang, which has already led to increased anti-Chinese sentiment within Kazakhstan.
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Forecast
Short-term
Continued public dissent and potential protests against the nuclear project are expected. However, these are very likely to be counteracted by government suppression.
The government will almost certainly proceed with the initial planning stages, engaging in negotiations with multiple international partners.
There is a remote chance that a decision may have already been made to select Russia's Rosatom as the main contractor, given Kazakhstan's close ties with Russia and previous engagements with the company.
Medium-term
It is possible that Kazakhstan will choose Russia over other international partners, such as France, to construct the nuclear power plant. However, it is equally possible that Kazakhstan may select Doosan Enerbility—having signed a vague MOU with them on 23 October—to build the plant.
Environmental and community groups are likely to continue their activism. However, due to government suppression and limited avenues for public dissent, this is unlikely to lead to heightened domestic unrest.
If a partnership with Rosatom arises, there is a realistic possibility that Kazakhstan will become more vulnerable to secondary sanctions aimed at Russia, affecting its economy and international trade relations.
Long-term
Completion of the nuclear power plant will very likely enhance Kazakhstan's energy independence. However, the country is unlikely to meet its net-zero targets purely through this project.