Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s Successful Gambit: Implications of Assad’s Deposition
Thomas Graham | 2O December 2024
Summary
Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), leading a coalition of rebel forces opposed to the government, have deposed Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in a rapid victory.
The fast capture of Aleppo, Homs, and Damascus was enabled by well-executed manoeuvre warfare, making use of roadways, such as the M5 Motorway, to isolate Assad’s forces, make gains in the countryside and encircle population centres.
HTS’ gambit rightly calculated that Iran and Russia, caught in their own regional conflicts, would not be able to support the Syrian government as they had earlier in the civil war.
Who are Hayat Tahrir al-Sham?
The Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), translating to ‘The Liberation of the Levant’, are a Syrian insurgent group led by Abu Mohammed al-Golani. These Islamic militants were originally formed as ‘Jabhat al-Nusra’ in 2011 as an affiliate of Al-Qaeda, considered one of the deadliest and most effective forces throughout the Syrian Civil War. HTS broke with its patron in 2016 and has since focused on establishing a caliphate within Syria. It has recently formed the “Military Operations Command” coalition with multiple rebel forces within the country, some of which are more moderate, displaying a wider shift toward pragmatism and drawing wider condemnation from other Jihadist groups. Whether this moderation of ideology was employed merely as a tool to maintain cohesion within the coalition during the war, or represents a fundamental change in the group’s methods, remains to be seen.
The Takeover of Syria - Why now?
HTS claim that the renewed offensive, dubbed “Operation Deterrence of Aggression”, was a response to the Syrian government’s consistent attacks in the Governorate of Idlib, the bastion of the rebel group. HTS’ opportunity to strike likely emerged as a result of the prolonged Russo-Ukrainian War and Israel’s recent strikes on Hezbollah, which has resulted in weakened support from Russia and Iran to Assad’s regime. The Syrian government relied significantly on military assistance from Russia and Iran, the latter through its proxy militia Hezbollah in Lebanon, both of which are currently engaged in their own regional conflicts. While Russian airstrikes in Idlib, Hama, and Aleppo in early December 2024 indicated that President Putin may possess the resources to support the Syrian Government, HTS’ operational gambit proved correct, as these were widely insufficient to stall the insurgent’s advances on the population centres of Hama and Homs, and the capital Damascus. In similar fashion, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps’ attempts to bolster Assad’s forces with Hezbollah and Afghani Shia militias were insufficient and tardy.
How did the HTS achieve rapid success?
The rate at which HTS expanded its operations in Northwest Syria, assumed leadership over other rebel groups, and executed a true ‘lightning war’ against Assad points to a capable and effective organisation. The group had previously managed to take control of the northern portion of the M5 motorway linking Aleppo and Hama, which allowed for rapid logistical deployment and offensive operations in these governorates while cutting off support for Assad’s forces. HTS’ mobility also allowed for rapid gains across the countryside, outmanoeuvring the government’s military and forcing their retreat into the cities. Once surrounded and attacked from multiple entry-points, most of them mass surrendered and were captured. Key to the rebel’s success in Damascus was also the resurgence of large insurgent groups in the South of the country, which, seeing an opportunity to act, joined forces with HTS and complemented their offensive from the south. In this supposedly convenient takeover, it is conceivable that Turkey provided support to the rebel coalition, aiming to weaken Kurdish and government forces in Syria - a question remains on how the HTS has managed to deploy advanced ‘Shaheen’ suicide drones against President Assad’s forces.
Strategic Outlook for a Syria Without Assad
Given HTS’ recent ideological shift, it is difficult to estimate the form of governance they will assume. If the Taliban takeover in Afghanistan is any indication, we can expect a government which appears moderate internationally, but slowly and progressively enacts the more radical elements of Sharia Law domestically. Unlike Afghanistan, this new Syria is beset by influential neighbours on all sides. The Arab League has expressed strong opposition to the resurgence of terrorism in the region, while Israel and Turkey are unlikely to tolerate an Islamic extremist government which could potentially align with Iran in the long-term. Given these constraints, the HTS’ government will have to remain somewhat pragmatic in its foreign policy and curtail the jihadist elements of its coalition, lest it incurs intervention from its neighbours once more.
On the regional stage, the fall of Assad marks a significant blow to Russia and Iran’s influence in the Middle East. While Putin’s influence in the country has been reduced to two naval bases off the Mediterranean coast, the Ayatollah has lost important logistical land supply routes linking Iran to its proxy Hezbollah, in Lebanon. The latter consequence will certainly have momentarily pleased Israel, who despite a ceasefire with the militants, is very likely to renew hostilities in the near future to eliminate Hezbollah completely. While the HTS and Iran have discussed a potential resumption of land access through Syria, this certainly will not prove as generous as the one provided by Assad. Lastly, given Turkey’s likely involvement in HTS’ success, President Erdogan will capitalise on the fall of Assad by attacking the Kurdish-led groups which still hold in Northeast Syria, transferring the lands to their preferred Sunni militants.
Map of Syria’s Zones of Control - Green: HTS & Turkish militias / Yellow: Kurdish-led Forces. Source: Liveuamap 09/12/2024
Forecast
Short-term
The new government formed by HTS is likely to initially appear as a domestically and internationally pragmatic actor in the region, looking to stabilise relationships with its neighbours and Kurdish militants in the Northwest.
Medium-term
The new Syria will likely geopolitically align with Turkey. In the event of domestic stabilisation and a transitional government, refugees previously displaced in the civil war to European and Middle Eastern countries are anticipated to return.