Greece Bans Asylum Rights
Anna Toso | 28 July 2025
Summary
Greece has implemented a 3-month-long ban on asylum requests for migrants who irregularly reach its coasts from North Africa due to rising pressure on the reception capabilities of its Southern islands.
Migration from Libya creates socio-economic challenges for Greece and other Mediterranean countries, while intertwining with security threats due to the Russian influence in North Africa.
It is highly likely that Greece’s ban will increase irregular arrivals to Italy and Malta, making diplomatic talks between the European Union (EU) and Libya an urgent priority for these Mediterranean countries.
On 11 July 2025, the Greek Parliament approved a 3-month ban on asylum requests for irregular migrants arriving from North Africa through the Mediterranean, with a 60% majority, regardless of their nationality. In the first half of the year, the migratory inflow to the Greek islands of Crete and Gavdos sharply increased, with over 7,300 incoming irregular migrants since January 2025, 46% more than 2024’s yearly total.
The decision received condemnation from the UNHCR, the EU Commissioner for Human Rights, and the Greek Council for Refugees due to potential unlawful refoulement practices and legally unjustified suspension of the right to asylum. In 2019, similar pushbacks, excessive police violence, and human rights restrictions were registered when the same administration of Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitzotakis established patrols and closed borders between Greece and Turkey to block the entrance of Syrian migrants.
During Mitzotakis’ administration, welfare services to refugees diminished, and the official language regarding immigration became increasingly polarising, with references to “hybrid war” and “emergency.” Specifically, the Greek Minister of Migration and Asylum, Thanos Plevris, warned against an “invasion from Africa” and condemned providing public support to immigrants “at the expense of the Greek and European taxpayer.” Plevris took office in June 2025, following his predecessor’s resignation due to a corruption scandal about the alleged misappropriation of EU agricultural subsidies. Both the current minister and his predecessor are former members of the right-wing populist Popular Orthodox Rally party (LAOS), which promotes a hard-line anti-immigration programme.
Such an agenda resonates with and fuels the growing “fatigue” and xenophobia among the Greek population. Aggravating the protracted mismanagement of incoming migrants, civil solidarity networks are shrinking. The number of independent international NGOs in Athens decreased significantly in recent years. Citizens’ dissatisfaction emerged especially in Crete, where residents protested against the temporary shelter for approximately 500 migrants set up in the stadium in Rethymno in June 2025. Being the peak of the tourist season, the rising arrivals and social unrest damage the economic activities of tourist operators. Crete is overwhelmed due to insufficient infrastructural capabilities. Systemic underinvestment has hindered the scale-up of reception facilities, despite the lessons learned from the 2015-16 “migration crisis”.
Alongside the domestic dimension, the Greek migration challenge has international implications and links to EU strategic interests and security. Most migrants coming to Greece depart from Libya, whose diplomatic relations with Greece and the EU are deteriorating. In June, Khalifa Haftar, the warlord controlling the East of the country without international recognition, signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Turkey regarding offshore areas' jurisdiction and maritime zone delimitation, which was rejected by Athens. Moreover, in July 2025, an EU delegation – Commissioner Magnus Brunner and representatives of Greece, Italy, and Malta – received a “persona non grata” warning and an order of immediate expulsion from the Libyan Benghazi-based unofficial administration. They were pursuing talks with local authorities concerning the rising irregular departures from the city of Tobruk. The Eastern Libyan coastal city is of interest to Russia as well, with geopolitical implications for NATO and the EU.
Constructing a naval base near the Suez Canal, in Tobruk, would be a strategic asset for Russia. From there, it could provide weapons to Sudan and the Sahel region. Additionally, it would grant Moscow direct access to the Central Mediterranean migratory route, with heightened risks of Russian involvement in the regional human smuggling network and consequent threats of irregular migration weaponisation, similar to its practices at the EU Eastern land border. Although Haftar and the parallel administration in Benghazi demonstrate pro-Russian stances, approving a Russian base in their controlled territories is politically challenging as it would intensify the contrast with the United States, which supports the rival Government of National Unity in Tripoli.
Badseed/Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA 3.0
Forecast
Short-term (Now - 3 months)
As a consequence of Greece’s ban on asylum applications, irregular arrivals from North Africa to the Italian coasts and Malta are highly likely to increase in the next three months.
The EU will likely send a second delegation to Libya by the end of July to engage in talks with the unrecognised administration in Benghazi in an attempt to mitigate the surging irregular departures from Tobruk.
Medium-term (3-12 months)
There is a realistic possibility that, by the end of 2025, Russia will intensify pressure on Haftar and the Benghazi-based Government of National Stability to construct a military base on the Libyan eastern coast.
The increasing attention to irregular arrivals from the Mediterranean will likely move the focus of the Greek administration towards its relations with Libya. However, this shift is unlikely to relieve the tensions with Turkey due to the decreasing but still present pressure at the land border and the maritime jurisdiction disagreements in the Aegean.
Long-term (>1 year)
Domestic and international civil solidarity networks are likely to continue diminishing their presence in Greece due to the anti-immigration sentiments of the general public and the hostile policies of the central administration, at least until the end of the current term in 2027.
