Haiti in Crisis: Gangs, Migration, and Organised Crime
Tim Gros | 9 December 2024
Summary
Gang violence has escalated in the last few months in Haiti, with organised crime groups (OCGs) now controlling most of the Caribbean nation’s capital, Port-au-Prince. Since January 2024, over 3,600 people have died.
Kenya is spearheading the international response, having already sent 400 police officers this summer, however more support is needed. Blocked entry points have prevented humanitarian aid from flowing.
The humanitarian crisis is likely to persist, given the current state of Haitian institutions. Former Prime Minister Ariel Henry has resigned, but elections are only planned for February 2026.
The Caribbean island of Haiti has plunged into a crisis since the assassination of former president Jovenel Moïse in 2021. Over 200 gangs now have an established presence in the country, with half of them controlling most of the capital, Port-au-Prince. Gang activity has directly translated to increased kidnappings, murders, rapes, and destruction of critical infrastructure. As of September 2024, there were over 700,000 internally displaced peoples (IDP) across the country.
Various gangs had requested the resignation of Ariel Henry, who became Prime Minister after Moïse’s death. The former had agreed on the condition the country be stable enough to hold elections. While Henry has officially left his position, violence continues to prevent central institutions from functioning adequately. Last September, a council was formed, with the aim of organising elections by February 2026.
Other than a United Nations (UN) weapons embargo, whose extension was adopted unanimously last month, Kenya has been spearheading the international response. Having already deployed 400 police officers to assist with the crackdown of gangs this summer, 600 more are expected once their training is complete. Nonetheless, Kenya’s President William Ruto has called for enhanced financial and material support if the island is to see tangible progress. It is estimated that the mission requires $600m annually.
Two main risks emerge from this crisis. First, the Caribbean regional organisation, CARICOM, must manage the flows of migration that may ensue. While some choose simply to flee the capital to more rural parts of the country, others may be tempted to look elsewhere. The Dominican Republic has already closed off its shared border and airspace with Haiti, while The Bahamas have launched a naval blockade to stop those attempting to flee the crisis by boat. The United States (US), a common destination choice for Haitian immigrants, may have to monitor the evolution of this crisis. There is a realistic probability that Donald Trump’s recent re-election will restrict the number of Haitians allowed into the country.
The second threat involves the potential for transnational OCGs to increase their operations in Haiti. The nation is already known for being a transit point for South American cocaine heading to the US. Such groups may see the current weakening of institutions as an opening for a safer, reliable access point into the US. With more OCGs competing for control over Haiti’s ports and airfields, violence is likely to rise in these locations. In fact, Haiti’s main seaport is still closed due to recurrent attacks by gang members on vessels. The airport was also closed off earlier this year but reopened in May. These temporary neutralisations of strategic access points have slowed down the rate of humanitarian aid flowing into the country.
Forecast
Short-term
Depending on the efficiency of international support, the humanitarian crisis is likely to persist, which means any scope for institutional rebuilding is compromised. Until relative order is restored, transnational crime groups are likely to continue using Haiti as a transit point for their smuggling activities, exploiting the openings left by weak local governance.
Long-term
As US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken underlined in his last visit to Haiti, legitimate elections are the cornerstone of Haiti’s rebuilding. Until free, fair and accessible elections are organised, the country is unlikely to address the root causes of insecurity. Consequently, while gang activity may be managed, it is likely to resurface again.