EU and Migration: Will the New Pact Hold at the Poland-Belarus Border?
Anna Toso | 21 March 2025
Summary
Belarus’ instrumentalisation of migration at its border with Poland prompted the Polish government to adopt operational and legislative countermeasures, including establishing a fenced buffer zone and proposing a bill limiting asylum rights.
Poland highlighted concerns about its national security due to the migratory pressure and announced its impossibility to respect the solidarity mechanism of the new EU Pact on Migration and Asylum.
Due to the Polish political environment and the long-standing tensions between the EU and Belarus, the current instrumentalisation of migration and the tightening legislation restricting the rights of asylum seekers will likely continue.
Since June 2021, Russia and Belarus have been accused of facilitating migrants – mainly from Afghanistan, Syria, and Iraq – to enter the European Union (EU). The EU termed such a strategy “hybrid warfare” through the “instrumentalisation of migrants for political purposes.” This practice developed on the side of the on-the-ground conflict in Ukraine. Poland, at the forefront of the crisis, intercepted 30,090 attempted border crossings from Belarus in 2024, which observed a slight decrease following the creation of a buffer zone. This off-limits area stretches 60km along the 400-km-long Poland-Belarus boundary. Such measures were first taken by the previous Law & Justice (PiS) government temporarily in 2021, reintroduced by Prime Minster Donald Tusk in June 2024 and further extended in March 2025. The cordoned area is patrolled by police and barred by wired fences and electronic surveillance systems. Large-scale pushbacks of migrants trying to cross the border into Poland were reported, raising concerns about violations of human rights and the EU’s non-refoulement norm, which prohibits returning individuals to territories where they could face prosecution, torture, or inhumane treatment. International customary law forbids it even during national emergencies or war and formalises its validity also in border regions.
Implications
Responding to this hybrid warfare required the EU to mobilise financial resources. In December 2024, the European Commission (EC) granted EUR 170m (GBP 143m) to the Eastern border countries. Poland received the highest share, proportionally to its burden: EUR 52m (GBP 44m). Nonetheless, Polish government representatives repeatedly emphasised the migration pressures, as Poland also hosted thousands of Belarusian political exiles and almost 1 million Ukrainian refugees since 2022.
Tusk expressed the intention to reconsider Polish participation in the relocation obligation of the solidarity mechanism established by the new EU Pact on Migration and Asylum. On 5 March 2025, Polish Interior Minister Tomasz Siemoniak reaffirmed Poland’s inability to accept the redistribution of additional migrants entering the EU from other member states (MSs). With its implementation planned in 2026, the solidarity mechanism includes alternatives other than welcoming more asylum seekers, such as providing financial or operational support. However, the Polish officials did not consider them.
At first, in November 2024, the EU Commissioner for Internal Affairs and Migration, Magnus Brunner, indicated potential consequences against all MSs not complying with the Pact. However, in December 2024, a CE report recognised the need for derogations given the exceptional circumstances of Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia. Later, on 5 March 2025, Brunner positively acknowledged Poland’s active handling of migrants’ “weaponisation” during its current presidency of the Council of the EU. Nevertheless, the EU treaties require the EC to take legal action against the MSs that fail to implement EU laws, with the ultimate decision reached by the Court of Justice. The EU’s stance towards Polish migration management altered over time, denoting political uncertainty and instability regarding its strategy to achieve a homogenous regulatory framework within the block.
The Polish government framed the situation as a matter of national security. Accordingly, both chambers of the Polish Parliament recently passed a bill that temporarily blocks the right to claim asylum in Poland. The approval of this law amending the Act on Granting Protection to Foreigners in Poland neglects the request of the EU Commissioner for Human Rights for its rejection. If Polish President Andrzej Duda formalised this legislation, it would breach international, EU, and Polish constitutional law.
Moreover, the security implications of the ongoing instrumentalised migration shaped the top priorities of the Polish presidency semester of the Council of the EU, which include addressing hybrid threats to people and borders. Overall, emphasising the consequences for national and EU security damages the already-deteriorating EU-Belarus relations.
Kancelaria Prezesa Rady Ministrów/Wikimedia, CC BY-SA 3.0
Forecast
Short-term
Poland's migration pressure depends on the development of the Ukrainian War and Belarusian domestic politics.
The repatriation of Ukrainian refugees following the potential end of the Russian invasion will highly likely relieve migratory pressure on Poland.
The number of Belarusian dissidents exiled in Poland will likely increase following President Alexander Lukashenko’s re-election for a seventh term in January 2025.
Policy continuity on immigration is likely after the Polish general elections in May 2025, with both major parties, Civic Platform and PiS, supporting the current policy.
Poland will highly likely extend the timeframe of the buffer zone at the Polish-Belarusian border.
Duda will almost certainly sign into law the bill amending the Act on Granting Protection to Foreigners in Poland.
Medium-term
The EU Court of Justice will very likely sue Poland if its anti-asylum rights law enters into force due to non-compliance with international and EU principles, as happened with Lithuania’s indictment for limiting immigration at its border with Belarus in 2022.
Funds and support from the EU for Poland, Lithuania and Latvia will likely increase in the second half of 2025, given its official recognition of Belarus’ hybrid warfare.
Long-term
The Pact’s implementation in 2026 is unlikely to succeed should fragmented and emergency-based local responses become more widespread among the MSs, as they undermine the Pact’s aim of creating a homogeneous EU-wide framework for migration management.