DRC-Rwanda Peace Deal Seeks to End Decades of Conflict

Aryana Ris-Luamháin | 1 July 2025


Summary

  • The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Rwanda are in talks to sign a peace deal after decades of conflict.

  • There is a significant risk that the deal will fall through as similar attempts have failed to bring lasting peace.

  • The deal is likely to bring a temporary reduction in large-scale hostilities and, if successful in the long term, will likely lead to significant Western investment in the mineral-rich regions of the DRC.


Following 3 days of "constructive dialogue regarding political, security, and economic interests” and mediation from both the United States (US) and Qatar, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Rwanda are set to sign a peace deal on 27 June that seeks to end the conflict between the 2 nations.

The deal makes provisions to uphold territorial integrity, implement a ban on hostilities and facilitate the disarmament and “conditional integration” of armed groups. This comes in addition to further measures on refugee returns, humanitarian access and a regional economic framework. The primary reason behind US support in the deal is believed to stem from its desire to tap into the DRC's mineral wealth: talks for a separate US-DRC minerals deal worth USD 2t  are underway, suggesting that US involvement in the conflict may be part of a long-term economic strategy.

The long-standing conflict between the DRC and Rwanda began following the 1994 Rwandan genocide against the Tutsi after Hutu militias fled into eastern DRC and launched attacks back into Rwanda. Long-held ethnic tensions continue to drive the conflict. The most recent armed conflict since March 2022, however, is largely perpetuated by the activities of the M23 in the DRC, a rebel group composed of ethnic Tutsis who argue they need to take up arms to protect their rights. The situation has worsened significantly in recent months, with M23 capturing several key cities and towns in the eastern DRC, including Goma and Bukavu, the capitals of the North and South Kivu. Rwanda has denied supporting the group, insisting its military presence in the region is a defensive reaction against threats posed by Congolese armed groups such as the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR). Conversely, the United Nations (UN) maintains the position that Rwanda backs M23 and the Rwandan army is in de facto operational control.

The conflict is detrimental to both nations. It has placed immense strain on the DRC’s already-fragile political landscape. The Congolese government’s inability to prevent M23’s territorial gains triggered widespread protests earlier this year, with demonstrators vandalising embassies in the country’s capital, Kinshasa, to denounce the ‘international inaction’ surrounding the situation. Concurrently, Rwanda’s perceived complicitly in M23’s activities has diplomatic and economic repurcussions, with international scrutiny heightening in recent months. This comes at a time when Rwanda is striving to solidify itself as a business-friendly region, with Kigali Innovation City currently under development to host universities and tech companies. 

Peace deals and ceasefires between the DRC and Rwanda are known for unravelling historically - M23 itself is the product of a failed deal. This calls into question whether this latest attempt at peace has the potential to succeed. 2022’s Luanda Process, for example, achieved some initial confidence-building and facilitated meetings between Congolese and Rwandan foreign ministers but the process ultimately collapsed in December 2024 - largely due to a perceived lack of genuine political will and commitment from both sides.

A key risk facing the deal stems from the top-down approach that has been taken at the cost of input from both M23 and civilians. M23, despite being the primary target of the agreement's disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration provisions, was not a direct signatory to the accord. This exclusion raises immediate questions as to whether they will adhere to its terms and withdraw from the areas they have occupied. Further, if civilians and marginalised communities perceive the deal to be superficial and lacking in legitimacy, sustainable peace will be difficult to achieve. It remains to be seen whether the root causes of the conflict, such as unresolved land disputes, ethnic marginalisation and governance failure, are adequately addressed to allay this risk.

If the peace deal does collapse, there is a profound risk that the conflict will spill over into neighbouring countries and escalate into a regional war. This is especially pertinent to Burundi as it shares a border with South Kivu and it hosts a Tutsi minority. Burundian President Évariste Ndayishimiye has described the situation as a ‘powder keg’, and emphasised that peace is only possible if all parties cooperate.

President Tshisekedi of DR Congo working visit to Rwanda | Rubavu, 25 June 2021

Paul Kagame, CC BY-NC-ND 2.0


Forecast

  • Short-term (Now - 3 months)

    • The deal is likely to bring a temporary reduction in large-scale hostilities. This will provide immediate relief to the civilian population, who have borne the brunt of the violence.

  • Medium-term (3-12 months)

    • Unless M23 perceives a benefit in adhering to the terms, or is subject to significant pressure and consequences for non-compliance, the deal is likely to ultimately collapse.

  • Long-term (>1 year)

    • If successful, the deal is likely to pave the way for significant Western investment in the mineral-rich regions of the DRC.

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