China Deepens Strategic Partnerships at the Central Asia Summit
Marina Gruzer | 11 July 2025
Summary
China’s growing economic and strategic presence in Central Asia was highlighted by President Xi Jinping’s visit to the second China-Central Asia Summit, where over USD 17b in agreements on trade and investments in transport and mining were signed.
A nuclear cooperation deal was reached between Kazakhstan and Chinese entities, positioning Kazakhstan as a key uranium supplier to China and expanding China's access to stable, diversified energy sources.
Although Russia will highly likely retain its role for security in the region in the short term, long-term competition over nuclear energy projects with China will likely intensify.
On 16 June 2025, Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Astana, Kazakhstan, for the second China-Central Asia Summit. The meeting reflects China’s growing economic and strategic interest in the region amid increasing energy supply chain risks from ongoing instability in the Middle East. China’s trade with the 5 Central Asian states increased by 10.4% over the past year, emphasising China’s market dominance. 35 memorandums with a total value of over USD 17b, have been finalised between Beijing and its Central Asian partners during the summit, as Xi pledges to invest RMB 1.5b (USD 209m) in trade, mineral and transport sectors. For Kazakhstan, the summit facilitated further agreements with the China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) and deeper bilateral cooperation on nuclear energy.
Following Astana’s recent decision to accept CNNC’s bid for one of Kazakhstan’s first nuclear power plant projects, the summit resulted in another agreement among CNNC, Xiamen Wanli Stone and the Satpayev Institute of Geological Sciences. This collaboration aims to foster bilateral ore and uranium extraction as part of Kazakhstan’s agreed role of becoming a key supplier of natural uranium and nuclear fuel to China. According to Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, there are currently 224 industrial projects implemented across the country with support from Chinese investors, which are valued at an estimated USD 66.4b in total. This significant economic development role and upcoming collaboration on nuclear energy demonstrates Beijing’s evolving role as a high-value industry partner in Kazakhstan. In exchange for uranium extraction collaboration, the CNNC is likely to emerge as a key partner for future nuclear power plant projects across Kazakhstan and Central Asia due to its low costs. Strategically, this provides China with more stable access to diversified uranium supply chains, with Kazakhstan accounting for 43% of the global supply in 2022.
Another key implication of this summit is China’s emerging focus on regional security, a sphere traditionally led by Russia in Central Asia. Xi supported greater security collaboration on countering terrorism, extremism and separatism. This reflects the shift seen in the first China-Central Asia summit in 2023 where the fields of cooperation extended into security sectors, outside the traditional economic cooperation focusing on the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). It is likely underlined by China’s concerns with regional security over increasing threats to Chinese-funded projects across Central Asia, which are crucial for China’s raw material and trade supply chains.
The recent summit also saw the adoption of agreements aimed at enhancing connectivity and supporting the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Railway project, parts of which are scheduled to begin construction in July 2025. With over 80% of land trade between China and Europe passing through Kazakhstan, the Middle Corridor is increasingly strategically important. Therefore, the growing concerns regarding Middle Corridor supply chains and Chinese-owned assets abroad have encouraged a policy shift towards security initiatives and present opportunities for trade and investment into regional connectivity. Overall, the summit reflects China’s increasing economic and strategic presence in the region and Beijing’s efforts to diversify key energy supply chains and trade infrastructure.
China News Service/Wikimedia Commons, CC BY 3.0
Forecast
Short-term (Now - 3 months)
It is highly unlikely that significant initiatives could threaten Russia’s security guarantor role, as the main security initiatives between China and Central Asian partners remain limited at a lower level, targeting cross-border crime.
Medium-term (3-12 months)
With 224 industrial projects, valued at USD 66.4b, already receiving support from Chinese investors, it is likely that more new projects will emerge in Kazakhstan’s green energy, logistics, infrastructure and industrial sectors as agreements are put in place.
Long-term (>1 year)
It is highly likely that Russia and China will increasingly compete for nuclear power plant contracts across Central Asia as regional nuclear energy demand grows and both Russia and China remain the most active countries to construct nuclear power plants abroad.
Despite the logistical advantages of a shorter trade route via the CKU railway, it is highly unlikely that the project will be able to sufficiently meet the high capacity demands in the next few years due to ongoing debt-related challenges and construction delays.
