Bloomsbury Intelligence & Security Institute (BISI)

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US-Russia Prisoner Exchange

Lily Donahue | 15 August 2024


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Summary

  • The US and Russia completed a major prisoner exchange on 1st August 2024. The youngest imprisoned was 19.

  • Several Russian opposition figures were released and will have to live outside Russia. Whether they will be targeted in Europe by pro-Russian activists or state agents remains to be seen. 

  • The Kremlin will emphasise the exchange as a major win for Russia; Putin may be emboldened to jail more Western-friendly voices.


The United States and Russia completed their largest prisoner exchange since the Cold War on 1st August 2024. The 16 imprisoned within Russia and ally Belarus were held on indictments of treason or espionage; those imprisoned in Western countries faced similar charges, though money-launderers and cyber criminals were also amongst their ranks. (The most notorious of the Russian prisoners, Vadim Krasikov, was a hit man, and has been celebrated in Russian state media.) Western governments accused Russia of imprisoning political prisoners, as indicated by the several Navalny associates released in the exchange. (Russia’s most well-known opposition figure in the West, Alexei Navalny, was allegedly meant to be part of the swap before his death in February 2024.) While the exchange has been lauded as a success and a boon for democracy, some remain wary. The move, critics stress, could spur Russia towards jailing more dual citizens or dissident voices. Ilya Yashin, one of the released prisoners, shared this view: “It will motivate Putin to take more hostages.” That Russia has regained a prolific contract killer in Krasikov has not mitigated concerns.  

The exchange cements the growing sense that the fragmented Russian opposition now exists largely outside of the country. Three opposition figures—Yashin, as well as Vladimir Kara-Murza and Ksenia Fadeeva—had requested to not be included in the swap, likely recognizing that to be a legitimate voice of the Russian opposition, they would have to remain in-country. It is probable the Kremlin itself included them, hoping to rid Russia of its dissident voices and paint opposition figures as unduly Western. The opposition’s ability to sway domestic politics—already weak—will likely dwindle to non-existent. The opposition, it seems, now exists largely for like-minded Russians living in the West. 

Yashin’s comment that Russia and Ukraine should meet to discuss negotiations–which he later walked back as out of context–have not endeared him to Ukrainian activists, who saw this as advocating for a fragmented Ukraine without its eastern oblasts. Though the Russian opposition has largely seen itself as a friend to Ukraine, many Ukrainian voices have decried a lack of solidarity and emphasise Russian collective responsibility for the war. While Russian President Vladimir Putin greeted homecoming prisoners on the tarmac, Russian media has emphasised that those released from inside Russia were insignificant prisoners or Western agents the country could dispose of. Media alleging to prove US citizens Evan Gershkovich and Paul Whelan were spies has been promoted despite the lack of reasonable evidence. 

Presidential Executive Office of Russia / Wikimedia


Forecast

  • Short-term

    • Russia will emphasise that those released were unimportant and prisoners returned were necessary. The Kremlin will promote the idea that the exchange was a major win for the country. 

    • Putin may feel incentivised to jail more opposition-minded figures. For the lesser-known opposition figures still housed in Russian jails (of which there are more than 1000), freedom remains a distant hope.

    • US Presidential candidate Donald Trump congratulated Putin on the exchange, deeming it a “great deal.” Should Trump be elected in November, the US–and Ukraine’s most ardent supporter–will pivot in a more Putin-friendly direction.