The Tug of War Tightens: New Developments in the Myanmar Civil War
Jeanne-Mây Desurmont | 25 November 2024
Summary
As of late October, the rebel army has gained a few kilometres in Mandalay, the country’s second-largest city. This represents an important shift in the conflict from guerilla warfare in the jungle and the forests to warfare in an urban setting, where the strengths and weaknesses of each actor are reshuffled.
Simultaneously, the Kachin Independence Army captured a military stronghold in Phimaw, at the Chinese border. Apart from being an important win for the rebel force, there is also an important rare earth mineral mining site supplying China.
This latest development highlights the role of China in the conflict, as Myanmar military leader Min Aung Hlaing was invited last week to China for a meeting concerning the Mekong sub-region. As Western diplomacy is negligible , China has room to exercise its diplomatic power.
Since October 2023, the major ethnic armies from the different provinces of Myanmar have joined together to fight the military after the 2021 coup. By using guerrilla warfare in the jungle, the ethnic armies have recaptured large areas of the countryside and confined the Tatmadaw’s control to major urban centres. However, the government has an important air superiority and is successfully waging drone warfare by following Russian advice from the Russia-Ukraine war.
Yet, as of last month, the pro-democracy fighters have progressively advanced within Mandalay, the country’s largest city and the economic centre of upper Myanmar. This strategic development represents a shift in the conflict from a jungle to an urban setting, alongside prompting an insurgency which has important implications for the future of the civil war. Notably, the military forces are far more accustomed to urban terrain holding significantly greater experience in repressing crowds in cities. Additionally, the government has strengthened its conscription laws over the last year, progressively boosting its ranks. However, the rebels’ advance demonstrates a strong determination to push toward the country’s economic and political centres, despite the considerable risks posed by their limited experience in urban guerrilla warfare.
Simultaneously, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) took control of the Phimaw located 145 kilometres from the Kachin state capital and at the border with China. Phimaw is also a hub for Myanmar’s rare earth mining. The KIA seized the military outpost after troops abandoned it and took control of the mining site. This mining hub is notably a major supplier of rare earth oxides to China as Phimaw is adjacent to China’s Yunnan province. Before the KIA took over the Phimaw, it was controlled by a militia group linked to the junta and who accepted payments from Chinese companies. It is highly plausible that the rebel control will disrupt the shipments of minerals to China and obstruct the Chinese supply chains.
The takeover of Phimaw by the pro-democratic forces is adding to the list of Chinese projects and investments interrupted by the civil war in Myanmar. To mitigate the Chinese costs, China has welcomed the Myanmar military leader, Min Aung Hlaing for the first time since the coup. Although it was not a state visit, it still suggests that Beijing perceives the Myanmar military chief as a part of a solution for a more stable Myanmar. As Western diplomacy is absent, China is the only major actor with the interests, commitment and influence, who can plausibly attempt to end the civil war. While this visit is crucial for the junta as China is an important ally and Myanmar’s largest trading partner, the PRC also has an agenda; to protect its investment plans in the country, and its trade routes. Therefore, Beijing is also reportedly pushing the junta leader to implement a timetable for elections to curtail military rule. It is also important to note that China likely has communication channels with some insurgent groups.
Forecast
Short-term
Numerous variables make it impossible to predict the future of the war with certainty. On one hand, the junta receives technical and financial support from external actors and has bolstered its forces through conscription laws. On the other hand, the insurgents are highly motivated and have the upper hand concerning popular support in the cities. The shift from rural to urban settings will either balance the forces and prolong the civil war or escalate the conflict rapidly.
Long-term
China’s involvement remains a key strategic actor in the conflict. As the PRC can communicate with both parties, it will likely favour the party that can stabilise the country and protect Chinese investments.