The Impact of Ukraine on Russian-North Korean Relations and Stability in the Korean Peninsula
Marina Gruzer | 28 May 2024
Summary
Since the start of the Russo-Ukrainian war in 2022, Russia’s increasingly isolated international position has resulted in closer ties with North Korea, through the alleged acquisition of North Korean military equipment and aiding Pyongyang in reconnaissance satellite technology development, which sparked security concerns in the Korean Peninsula.
The increasingly polarising global tensions resulting from the war in Ukraine and the worsening Sino-American rivalry may undermine Russia’s attempts at maintaining their balancing ‘inter-Korean equidistance policy’. The policy aims to balance Russian relations with North and South Korea to sustain North Korea’s regime while maintaining access to South Korean markets and regional stability.
Despite North Korea’s role as the buffer state between Russia and a pro-United States, South Korea, nuclear proliferation is not in Russia’s interests. The developing partnership with North Korea will likely result in continued energy and food supply provisions instead.
The Soviet Union provided North Korea with vital military and economic support during the 1950-1953 Korean War and throughout the twentieth century. However, under North Korea’s ‘Juche’ policy of self-reliance and economic independence, North Korea maintained a distance from the Soviet Union. Following the Soviet Union’s collapse, relations between Pyongyang and Moscow have since been relatively cautious, with Moscow backing the United Nations Security Council’s (UNSC) nuclear non-proliferation sanctions against North Korea while also endeavouring to limit the impacts of these sanctions on North Korea.
However, with the war in Ukraine and Russia’s increased isolation from Western partners, a closer relationship with North Korea has been developing. In March 2023, Russia vetoed the renewal of the UN panel that has been monitoring anti-North Korean sanctions since 2006. Furthermore, the International Institute for Strategic Studies suggests that, while no official agreement has been made, potential security cooperation has emerged after North Korea allegedly supplied Russia with military equipment to support the war effort in Ukraine. Additionally, North Korea has received Russian aid for the launch of a reconnaissance satellite in November of 2023. Consequently, security concerns have risen among democracies in the region.
The ongoing war may further weaken Russian economic links with other Asian partners like South Korea and Japan, both of which have provided economic and non-lethal material military aid to Ukraine. Declining Russian regional influence could push Russia closer to North Korea, and making the maintenance of Russia’s policy of ‘equidistance’ will be even more challenging due to heightened risks of destabilising the Korean Peninsula.
However, Russia has recently taken significant steps to solidify its partnership with China, more so than with North Korea, as seen in Russia and China’s joint target to increase cooperation across multilateral groups such as the UNSC and Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). For both countries, their main priority in the Korean Peninsula is stability and maintaining trade interests, especially in relation to high-value goods like South Korean semiconductor chips.
Office of the President of Russia/Wikimedia
Forecast
Short-term
The Russo-Ukrainian war is likely to worsen Russia’s trade with South Korea, following the 2023 trend in which Russia fell from South Korea’s 10th to 15th largest trade partner, which was further exacerbated by the growing Sino-US tensions that are polarising the region.
Medium-term
Despite closer ties recently, a military alliance and cooperation on nuclearisation between Russia and North Korea is unlikely.
Long-term
Russia and North Korea are likely to develop closer relations, but their partnership is more likely to include increased Russian provisions of energy and food supply to sustain the buffer regime.
