Territorial Claims and Subsea Cables: The Geopolitics of Invisible Lines in the South China Sea
Jeanne-Mây Desurmont | 21 May 2024
Summary
Internet penetration is constantly growing in Southeast Asia, and states must respond to the increased demand by rapidly and efficiently connecting their populations to the rest of the world.
Tech companies are responding to this urgent demand by developing and implementing subsea cables through the South China Sea (SCS). However, current geopolitical disputes in the area are hindering their operations.
The issues of subsea cables in the South China Sea are also a collateral concern in the broader U.S.-Chinese rivalry over the Indo-Pacific, further complicating the development of the digital network in the SCS.
Subsea cables are a key component of Southeast Asian digital growth as they are the main infrastructure for data, communications, and financial transactions. With approximately 125,000 new Internet users daily, the ASEAN countries are one of the fastest-growing digital markets. Experts expect the regional digital economy to grow significantly over the next decade, cumulating with an estimated $1 trillion increase in the regional GDP. A strong and resilient network is also crucial to support the fast-paced economic development of these relatively young states.
The South China Sea is the main and most efficient route to connect the ASEAN states to the rest of the world. However, the overlapping maritime and territorial claims of Brunei, China (PRC), Indonesia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam impede the peaceful and efficient development of subsea cables in the SCS. These states compete to control rocks and islands to extend their Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). As granted by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), a state can exert its sovereignty in the 200 nautical miles beyond their territorial sea. Within this zone, a coastal state has authority over living and non-living resources and can impose conditions on vessel traffic.
Over the last ten years, the disputes between the different claimants in the SCS have intensified, partly because of the growing assertiveness of the Chinese claims. Based on a historical map, the PRC is claiming sovereignty within a nine-dash line, and it has kinetically reaffirmed its authority over the Paracel and Spratly Islands within this area. Yet, this claim overlaps with the EEZ claims of the other SCS coastal states. While most of the contest happens in the realm of international law, the PRC has rejected the 2016 court’s verdict, invalidating its nine-dash claim and starting to militarise what the PRC perceives as its legitimate maritime territory. Other claimants have also occupied some island features in the contested area. This is alongside tensions also increasing due to the PRC and Vietnam deploying aggressive coastguard and maritime militias to deter foreign vessels in their claimed areas.
This maritime dispute has important repercussions on the development of subsea cables in the South China Sea, as these invisible lines, on both maps and undersea, are at the forefront of the current geopolitics in the broader Indo-Pacific region.
First, the dispute severely restricts tech companies operating in the South China Sea. As UNCLOS guarantees sovereignty over subsea cables in the EEZs, submarine cable companies must demand permits from every claimant as they have different interpretations of their legal territory. Each claimant can also request to oversee and monitor the construction and operation of prospective cables. For example, the construction of the SJC2 cable between Hong Kong, Southeast Asia and Japan has been slowed down for more than a year because of Chinese objections and strict restrictions on the permit. Additionally, the maritime dispute hinders the efficient repair of the damaged sea cables. Subsea cables need to be repaired swiftly to avoid severe internet disruptions and important economic losses. However, ships repairing cables at sea are not navigating under the regime of “innocent passage” and require permits from the different claimant states. Companies are also deterred from sending their personnel to the SCS as the growing military build-up transforms the SCS into a hostile environment.
Then, as the PRC deters foreign companies from laying down cables in its claimed territory, it facilitates the development of state-owned cable owners and builders in the SCS. Through those domestic entities such as HMN Technologies, the PRC can influence the cables’ topography. This allows Chinese companies to lay the cables in the PRC’s zones of control and create important data chokeholds within its EEZ and, therefore, within its jurisdiction. This further complicates the negotiations for the necessary permits to operate within Chinese waters. Additionally, a Chinese monopoly of subsea cables in the SCS increases the opportunity for the PRC to use the cables as tools of aggressive foreign policy. For example, the PRC could deter by denying SCS states from abandoning their claims by controlling the flow of data or by interfering with crucial repairs.
Subsequently, tech companies are deciding to avoid the South China Sea altogether to circumvent geopolitical uncertainties. The new routes of the future Echo and Apricot cables will have landing stations in the Philippines and Guam. They will pass through the Java Sea before landing in the U.S. While these routes bypass the tedious negotiations with all the claimants’ states, especially with the PRC, they are more costly in terms of time and capital and are commercially irrational.
In response to the Chinese control of the undersea bed of the SCS, the US and its allies have been encouraging ASEAN and regional states to invest in “friendlier” networks, arguing that Chinese cables are also posing a great risk of espionage and cyber-attacks. This is especially illustrated by removing Hong Kong from a route connecting the Asia-Pacific to the U.S., having implemented the PRC 2019 security law. These concerns are driving the American agenda. However, the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Act does not protect Southeast Asian stakeholders from mass surveillance, as demonstrated by the 2014 Snowden leaks.
U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class William McCann
Forecast
Short-term
The current level of tensions in the South China Sea will likely have important consequences concerning the development of the Southeast Asian digital network. SCS states are currently more focused on defending and asserting their control over their maritime claims rather than negotiating guidelines to safeguard a sustainable common digital system and the smooth operation of the subsea cables, alongside a contingency plan to prevent major disruptions in case of technical accidents.
Long-term
As the maritime dispute seems deadlocked, ASEAN and other South-East Asian states will be increasingly forced to choose between a Chinese or Western digital network and tech companies will have to consider the geopolitics of technology to operate in the SCS. This increased fragmentation will likely weaken the regional network's resilience as the data can only travel through certain cables. Subsea cables are entangled in the territorial issues in the SCS and the broader Indo-Pacific competition, and the lack of common frameworks and strong multilateral governance will likely isolate Southeast Asia in one way or the other.
