Tajikistan Between Russian Influence and Chinese Interests: Assessing India’s Strategic Role
Andrea Stauder | 31 July 2025
Summary
Tajikistan, though economically weak, holds a pivotal strategic position in Central Asia, with growing geopolitical relevance amid the influence competition between regional and non-regional powers.
While Russia remains the primary security actor and China leads economically, Dushanbe seeks to find balance through a multi-vector foreign policy, aiming to engage with multiple foreign powers and participate actively in various international organisations.
The third foreign power with a permanent military presence in Tajikistan is India, which seeks to carve out a role between Russia and China. However, limited access and resources constrain its influence, despite opportunities through Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) membership and counterterrorism cooperation.
Among the Central Asian post-Soviet countries, Tajikistan holds the most complex strategic position. 93% of its territory is mountainous and its complicated history produces cultural and security divides. With the lowest gross domestic product (GDP) and GDP per capita among the former Soviet republics in Central Asia, the smallest defence budget, and most limited military capabilities, it ranks 108th out of 145 in global military strength.
Tajikistan’s borders pose further challenges: to the west, Uzbekistan is militarily and demographically stronger; to the north, the border with Kyrgyzstan was historically marked by territorial disputes and clashes; to the east, it borders China’s Xinjiang region; and to the south lies Afghanistan, source of transnational threats including insurgency, narcotics trafficking, and extremism. The narrow Wakhan Corridor of Afghanistan also separates the Gorno-Badakhshan Region (an autonomous region covering nearly half of Tajikistan, predominantly inhabited by Pamiris, who are Shi’a Muslims in a majority-Sunni country) from Pakistan. Strategically located between Afghanistan, China, Pakistan, and Tajikistan, the Corridor offers Pakistan and China a direct route to Central Asia and Afghanistan. Pakistan’s ambition to link with Tajikistan via Wakhan—part of its broader China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)—faces resistance from the Taliban, unwilling to lose regional leverage, and from India, which seeks to isolate Pakistan and block its access to Central Asia.
Despite these limitations, Tajikistan holds key strategic advantages: its geography provides the most defensible terrain in the region; it hosts Russia’s largest foreign military base and receives financial support from China, the EU, India, Iran, and the US—mainly to strengthen border security and counterterrorism capacity. Dushanbe has long had to balance among powers and is uniquely positioned as the only country hosting Russian, Chinese, and Indian military facilities. While Russia and China remain dominant, India has an opportunity to expand its role beyond security into economic engagement.
Russia’s Lasting Presence in Central Asia
Russian-Tajik ties are deeply rooted in history: following the Russian Empire’s conquests in Central Asia in the 1860s and the Soviet period, Moscow still retains a firm grip on Dushanbe, considered part of its blizhneye zarubezhye, “near abroad”. Consequently, Russia has emerged as a key partner across Tajikistan’s security and energy sectors, in addition to contributing significantly to economic growth via its extensive labour market.
Together with Russia’s 201st Military Base, Moscow also leases a base near the Afghan border and remains Tajikistan’s largest supplier of military equipment (over 60%). Moscow’s hard power influence is further embedded through its leading role in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). And while Tajikistan is the greenest country in Central Asia—89% of its electricity comes from hydropower—Russia remains its primary supplier of petroleum products. However, the most significant factor shaping Tajikistan’s policy remains labour migration: remittances—mostly from Russia, destination for more than 90% of Tajik foreign workers —accounts for around 50% of GDP.
Despite this, Dushanbe has sought to diversify its foreign relations through a strategy of multi-vector foreign policy, the only policy that can accommodate a country’s national interests according to its constitution. The multi-vector foreign policy entails respect for the sovereignty and independence of other countries, adherence to international norms, and the freedom to join commonwealths and international organisations, while establishing relations with foreign countries such as — to cite the main examples — China, India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. Full detachment from Russia remains unrealistic, especially given tensions with Afghanistan. Yet Russia’s influence is in relative decline, due to the Ukraine war and Tajik President Emomali Rahmon’s 2022 public call for greater respect from Moscow. Moreover, the 2024 Crocus City Hall attack by Tajik nationals has fueled resentment towards Tajik immigrants in Russia, although it has not significantly threatened the political relations between the two countries. While Tajikistan remains the most closely aligned with Russia among the former Central Asian Soviet Socialist Republics (SSRs)—and the only one where Russia, not China, was still the top trading partner in 2024—Dushanbe is increasingly attracting Chinese economic and security interests.
China’s Expanding Footprint in Central Asia
In 2013, China unveiled its Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB)—the land-based pillar of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)—in Kazakhstan. By 2024, China had become the largest trading partner of every Central Asian country except Tajikistan. With Moscow preoccupied with Ukraine and constrained by Western sanctions, Beijing has seized the opportunity to deepen its engagement. Despite China’s economic role expanding, Russian influence remains significant via the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) even though Tajikistan is not a member. While Moscow maintains close security ties through the CSTO, China has extended its influence beyond economics, developing security cooperation and maintaining a growing military presence. However, China’s military footprint remains relatively quiet: a formal base could strain relations with Tajikistan’s public, undermine BRI ambitions in a region where anti-Chinese sentiment is already widespread, and provoke concerns in Moscow and the West. Yet satellite imagery suggests Beijing has been constructing a “secret military base” since 2024, in addition to controlling a radio monitoring site and a facility as a counter-Taliban measure. Furthermore, China is also the country’s second-largest arms supplier (nearly 40%). But growing dependence on China carries risks of over-reliance, potentially compromising Dushanbe’s strategic autonomy. Public scepticism is rising, fuelled by imported Chinese labour, limited local benefits, and debt concerns. In fact, China is Tajikistan’s primary creditor. The country’s external public and publicly guaranteed (PPG) debt stands at approximately USD 3.1b in 2024, accounting for nearly 90 percent of its total debt. Of this external debt, almost 30 percent is owed to China. While recognising the importance of Russia’s role and Chinese investments, Dushanbe is seeking to diversify its partnerships to avoid asymmetric dependencies. India stands out as a key example.
India’s Strategic Interests in Tajikistan
India and Tajikistan share deep historical, cultural, and linguistic ties. Diplomatic relations were established in 1991, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.
Tajikistan holds strategic importance, as it shares borders with Afghanistan and China and lies close to northern Pakistan. For New Delhi, it is a vital node within its “extended neighbourhood”, with engagement structured through the 2012 “Connect Central Asia” policy. This includes cooperation in political, economic, cultural, and security domains, notably in counterterrorism, military training, and coordination of Afghan policy.
India refurbished Tajikistan’s Ayni airbase in 2002—its second overseas facility after the Farkhor Air Base. However, two enduring challenges hinder India’s influence in the region, especially vis-à-vis China: limited state capacity in terms of investments and economic power (compared to China) as well as geographic constraints. Unlike China, India lacks direct access to Central Asia due to Afghanistan and Pakistan. Indian investment in Central Asia remains minimal compared to China’s. While China, with USD 216.7m invested in 2024, is the principal investor in Tajikistan, India does not even feature among the 21 countries that have invested in the country during the same year, according to data from the National Bank of Tajikistan. In spite of successful wider Central Asian connectivity initiatives such as the Chabahar port in Iran (2017), the Ashgabat Agreement (2018), and the eastern route of the International North-South Transport Corridor (2022), India remains a marginal economic player for Tajikistan, without pragmatic cooperation with Moscow or Beijing, and amid growing Turkish, Iranian, as well as Western interests, especially regarding the Critical Raw Material (CRM) supply chains, New Delhi’s strategic room for manoeuvre risks limitations.
Arms imports Percentage into Central Asia 1994-2023
Source: Clingendael Report January 2025
Tajikistan’s Strategic Interests Moving Forward
Tajikistan’s geographical peculiarities, historical ties, economic constraints, and infrastructural needs compel Dushanbe to navigate a complex web of diverse and sometimes competing interests, requiring careful and strategic diplomatic manoeuvring among regional powers.
Tajikistan needs a multifaceted strategy that prioritises economic diversification and regional cooperation while cautiously advancing military reform to avoid exacerbating internal instability. Cooperation with China and Russia remains important due to security and economic reasons. However, to avoid relying too heavily on just these two countries, Tajikistan should also collaborate with other regional partners, such as India, Türkiye, and Iran, as well as Western countries. This balanced approach would give Tajikistan more strategic options and flexibility.
Although strategically crucial, Tajikistan holds less political and ideological weight than Georgia or Ukraine. This could serve as a platform for selective Russian-Western cooperation, as seen between Moscow and Washington during the US war against terror in the early 2000s. Moscow’s primary concern is to prevent Western-led political developments in the region. At the same time, Russia remains open to cooperating with China on Central Asian security issues, particularly in combating what they call “the three evils”: terrorism, extremism, and separatism. This cooperation could take place within the framework of the SCO. India, as a member of the SCO, also plays a significant role. It contributes to regional security efforts by sharing intelligence, participating in joint military exercises, and supporting initiatives aimed at countering terrorism and extremism. India’s involvement in regional security structures, such as the SCO, enables it to gradually assert a more prominent strategic role in Central Asia — positioning itself not merely as a balancer vis-à-vis China and Pakistan, but as a viable third partner for Tajikistan in navigating between Chinese and Russian spheres of influence.
Central Asia—long seen as a disputed periphery—now has the potential to become a space for pragmatic cooperation, with Tajikistan uniquely reflecting how the region’s intersecting interests can find common ground.