Lily Donahue | 8 November 2024

Summary

• Russia is set to remove the Taliban from its list of terrorist organisations, ending its 20-year terrorist designation.

• The move may be an effort to increase security cooperation between Russia and Afghanistan, especially considering the March 2024 attack on Moscow.

• It is unlikely the move will curb the Islamic State in Khorasan’s (IS-K) expansion.

An international pariah that remains globally unrecognised, the Taliban is set to be removed from Russia’s list of terrorist organisations, following Russian President Vladimir Putin's characterisation of the group as a "trusted ally." The decision, though yet to be finalised, was introduced in June 2024; once completed, the Taliban will be withdrawn from a list it has been on since 2003, when it was first added for backing separatists in the North Caucasus. This decision is not entirely unexpected: Russia has been building ties since the Taliban came to power in August 2021, and Taliban representatives are frequently seen at Russia’s St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, considered the Russian Davos (though a lesser version than its Swiss counterpart) before the Russo-Ukrainian War.

Russia's efforts to legitimise the Taliban could be aimed at enhancing security cooperation. Despite Moscow's insistence on Kyiv's culpability for the deadly Crocus City Hall attack in March 2024, the Islamic State in Khorasan (IS-K) is considered the true perpetrator. Russia is likely seeking Kabul's assistance in preventing future Islamic State attacks, given that IS-K is thought to operate from Afghanistan as one of the Taliban’s rival groups. Publicly, the Taliban has denied harbouring any terrorist groups. While it is highly unlikely that no extremist organisations operate within its borders, Russia has apparently conceded the point, maintaining that terrorist groups solely target Afghanistan “from abroad.”  While these conversations are likely more direct behind closed doors, they are not without pitfalls: many IS-K militants are thought to have been former Taliban members now disenfranchised from the group.

The Taliban's removal could also be interpreted as an effort to transform Afghanistan into a corridor for Russian natural gas exports, primarily to India. This too is not guaranteed - such a move would require building a pipeline through difficult terrain. Previous meetings between the Taliban and Russian oil oligarchs on investments did not come to pass. The decision is being applauded, though delicately, by chief Russian politicians. Through refraining from naming the Taliban explicitly, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov recently appealed to Western countries to aid Afghanistan’s post-conflict reconstruction by “lift[ing] sanctions, and return[ing] Kabul’s appropriated assets”. Lavrov also applauded Afghanistan’s efforts at “effectively confronting ISIS”. 

Still, Russia - in line with international standards - has not recognised the Taliban. Only China and the United Arab Emirates have allowed Taliban ambassadors in-country, and there are no announced plans for Russia to do the same. Lavrov has indicated that such recognition would be contingent upon addressing certain humanitarian considerations, particularly regarding women's rights and inclusive representation of diverse ethnic groups. As the Taliban has continually stripped women of fundamentals - including the absurd edict that women should not “hear other women’s voices” - this is seemingly far off. While Russia has not commented on the new rule, Vasily Nebenzya, Russia’s current UN representative, has previously been more candid:  “The Taliban and their women and girl policies which they justify by Islamic norms [...] in fact are not Islamic and many Islamic countries are trying to explain to them but they would not listen. That is the problem.” Russia explains its burgeoning relationship with the Taliban as necessary pragmatism; the relationship, considering the Taliban’s archaic attitude towards women, belies prior Russian statements regarding human rights policies. 

Russia's inconsistent stance toward the Taliban is mirrored by others, reflecting a widespread lack of coherent policy. The United Nations Security Council, which includes the United States as a member, has eased travel restrictions on Afghanistan's interior minister, Sirajuddin Haqqani and three others, permitting them to make pilgrimages to Mecca. This decision comes despite Haqqani being sought by the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for questioning.

Forecast

• Short-term

  • Russia will likely refrain from formal recognition of the Taliban in the near term, wary of becoming the first nation to take such a momentous diplomatic step. Instead, Moscow is likely to frame its growing ties with the regime as part of its broader strategy to position itself as a champion of the Global South.

• Long-term

  • Should Russia decide to establish Afghanistan as a transit corridor for exporting oil and gas to India, the development of pipeline infrastructure would be a long-term project, likely spanning several years. While any theoretical gains made through a proposed pipeline would be significant, the underlying costs - including sanction compliance risks and the potential for theft in a notoriously dangerous region - would likely outweigh benefits. The pipeline's viability would hinge on establishing robust security measures and legal frameworks, further extending any realistic timeline for its implementation.

  • It is unlikely that Russia’s increased ties with the Taliban will have significant impact on IS-K’s expansion, as the group - despite the Taliban’s false claims - is generally believed to be on the ascendence, and the Taliban’s counter-terrorism strategy remains ineffectual. The Taliban's weak - or deliberately passive - oversight of the informal financial sector, while crucial to Afghanistan's economy, provides IS-K with vital funding channels.