No Elections, but Tumultuous Political Upheavals in Vietnam
Jeanne-Mây Desurmont | 27 June 2024
Summary
The Vietnamese leadership has been conducting an unparalleled anti-corruption campaign since 2016, targeting members across all levels of the Communist Party. This campaign has resulted in the sacking of the President, the Chair of the National Assembly and top officials of the Politburo.
Vietnamese politics are usually opaque but this campaign has shed light on the dynamics and the fractures of the Vietnamese Communist Party as factions are competing for the most powerful positions.
Given the possible candidates to succeed the current Chief of the Party, western analysts are concerned that Vietnam will take an authoritarian turn, copying CCP’s surveillance and domestic security policies.
Since 2016, the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) Chief Nguyen Phu Trong has conducted an unprecedented anti-corruption campaign. Over the past decade, the “Blazing Furnace” campaign sacked approximately 200,000 party members across all the levels of the socialist republic. More particularly, the country’s president Vo Van Thuong, the chair of the National Assembly and four top members of the Politburo stepped down. The objectives of this anti-corruption effort are to purge the party of the technocrats driven by profit and socio-economic gains rather than the communist ideology, to prosecute them and to alter the dynamics between the CPV and the private sector. Although Vietnamese politics have always been opaque, this escalating campaign has led some analysts to think it has been used as a political weapon in a complicated power struggle between the different factions. Nevertheless, “Blazing Furnace” is revealing important fractures within the socialist government and is leading to an uncertain future.
While the VCP’s pride lies in the country’s political stability, the anti-corruption campaign is brewing some domestic challenges linked to the economy. Indeed, foreign investors are holding off their new deals, and the government is delaying important investments in job creation. The main risk for the party is that an economic slowdown may cause popular discontent, which can challenge the CPV authority.
On the political aspect, the anti-corruption campaign has launched a race for powerful seats left vacant, but more importantly, it has sparked competition for the VCP leadership succession. As the current party’s general secretary, Trong is expected to step down in 2026 due to his age and health condition, the candidates are among the most important officials of the party such as the President, the Prime Minister, or the National Assembly Chair.
The newly appointed President To Lam is likely the strongest candidate to succeed Trong. However, faction politics and competition could jeopardise his chances. Additionally, his background as Minister of Public Security is raising concerns regarding his security agenda and enforcing a “police state” in Vietnam.
These concerns are reinforced by the current political upheavals, with technocrats replaced by less qualified loyalists. Ultimately, the anti-corruption campaign strengthened the powers of the army and the police with more members at the highest decision-making: the Politburo. This shift of focus from economic liberalisation to regime survival can already be felt, with the leak of Directive 24 identifying the threat to the party, which includes foreign interference and “civil society”.
Vuong Tri Binh/Wikimedia
Forecast
Short-term
The anti-corruption campaign has revealed important fissures among the CPV, but it is very unlikely that its authority will be challenged in the short term. While former Public Security Minister and current President To Lam is likely to get chosen Chief of the VCP at the 14th Party Congress in January 2026, there is still the possibility that faction competition jeopardizes this nomination. Such a political deadlock would be a great challenge for the Vietnamese leadership as it would need to contain popular dissatisfaction to reassure the foreign investors’ confidence.
Medium-term
It is likely that the strong presence of security officials in the decision-making bodies will transform the status quo into a more repressive system against the population. By imitating the Chinese security apparatus, there is a reasonable likelihood that the new leadership will increase its surveillance and censorship capacities over human rights, political activism, journalists and minorities.
Long-term
Despite foreign policy not being impacted by the internal turmoil, there is a high likelihood Vietnam will continue to follow its “bamboo strategy”. Western analysts note that the political upheavals are creating a likely turn towards China rather than the West. Although it is very unlikely any country will downgrade its relations with Vietnam, the incoming security apparatus will make it harder for the U.S. and the E.U. to partner with Vietnam. Western partners will need to reassess their strategic partnership with Vietnam, especially regarding governance and human rights, and to mitigate political repercussions on foreign aid programs. Ultimately, Vietnam is still a key player in the broader U.S.-China competition, and the former will need to find ways to dialogue despite the authoritarian developments.
