Navigating Neutrality: Ireland’s Evolving Security Landscape
Tom Hayward | 21 April 2025
TeleGeography, CC-BY SA 4.0
Summary
Ireland’s current military capabilities are underdeveloped and insufficient to independently secure its own airspace and exclusive economic zone (EEZ).
Recent steps towards increased defence spending and enhanced cooperation with NATO, while positive, face challenges including a retention crisis within the Irish Defence Forces (IDF) and domestic political sensitivities surrounding neutrality.
Ireland is increasingly vulnerable to hybrid threats, particularly targeting undersea cables and airspace, but lacks adequate surveillance and deterrence capabilities.
Ireland’s security situation has become increasingly complex in recent years. The emergence of hybrid threats, particularly in the cyber, maritime and air spaces, have exposed Ireland’s vulnerabilities. The Commission on the Defence Forces (CoDF) report in 2021 concluded that the IDF could not defend the state. While the government has responded by increasing the defence budget to EUR 1.5b (USD 1.14b) by 2028, doubts remain whether this increase will be sufficient to address the IDF’s capability gaps.
Troop numbers have fallen below the target capacity of 9,500, with under 8,000 personnel in February 2023. While the government plans to increase personnel numbers to 11,500 by 2028, this is hindered by recruitment and retention crises. A recent report into abuse within the IDF found that “neither men nor women in the Defence Forces are working in a safe working environment”, compounding public perceptions of an unattractive career and working environment. This retention crisis is affecting all branches, with the Naval Service suffering in particular, where a lack of personnel is limiting vessel deployment capabilities.
Beyond personnel numbers, Ireland lacks sufficient military equipment both in terms of quality and quantity. In 2024, its Naval Service had just one ship capable of patrolling the Atlantic, while a patrol vessel recently went to sea without a working main weapons system. The Naval Service is unable to effectively patrol and monitor Ireland’s EEZ and is not equipped with sonar systems onboard. Ireland also does not possess fighter jets for policing its airspace, relying instead on an unofficial agreement with the Royal Air Force (RAF) for interceptions. In terms of land forces, the Army assesses that it is “not equipped, postured or realistically prepared to conduct a meaningful defence of the State against a full spectrum force for any sustained period of time” - emblematic of a disconnect between stated policy and actual capabilities.
Ireland’s policy of military neutrality, including its non-membership of military alliances or mutual defence arrangements, remains central to its defence policy and is supported by public opinion. However, this neutrality has come under increasing strain in recent years from the evolving security situation in Europe. Ireland is not a NATO member but joined its Individual Tailored Partnership Programme (ITPP), enabling increased cooperation and sharing of intelligence with NATO nations. Ireland has a strong history and inclination towards humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping missions - Taoiseach Michaél Martin recently affirmed that his government would be willing to send Irish troops to Ukraine as part of a monitoring or peacekeeping mission. Yet the IDF’s continued decline threatens Ireland’s capacity to contribute to peacekeeping operations, as the IDF ended its peacekeeping mission in Syria in 2024 due to a lack of available personnel.
Ireland faces a growing threat from hybrid warfare, which involves a coordinated mix of coercive and subversive activities below the threshold of warfare. Ireland is a major transnational data hub hosting many corporations, and 75% of transatlantic telecommunications cables pass through or near its EEZ - part of a system which carries USD 13.3t per day in global financial transactions. Even brief disruption to submarine cables could cause immediate transatlantic market volatility and economic damage. This makes Ireland an attractive target for Russian subversion as part of a broader hybrid campaign against Europe. The risk posed by Russia to subsea cables has come sharply into focus in recent months; Russian-registered vessels have been observed close to this infrastructure and the intelligence ship Yantar was escorted out of Irish waters in late 2024. Damage to Ireland’s reputation as a reliable digital hub could threaten the estimated 71% of total Gross Value Added (GVA) to its business economy generated by foreign-owned multinational enterprises (MNEs).
William Murphy/Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA 2.0
Forecast
Short-term (Now - 3 months)
Continued strain on the Defence Forces due to understaffing will highly likely persist, impacting operational capacity and Ireland’s ability to protect its EEZ and airspace.
Engagement with NATO, such as under the ITPP framework, will likely intensify amid increased pressure on Dublin from EU nations to prioritise defence.
Long-term (>1 year)
The planned increase in the defence budget to EUR 1.5b by 2028, if realised, will likely combat some equipment deficits in the IDF but remain highly dependent on effective personnel recruitment and retainment.
The debate around Ireland’s neutrality and its role in European security is highly likely to intensify, driven by persisting hybrid threats from Russia and the deteriorating geopolitical landscape.
Deeper defence cooperation with EU and NATO partners is possible, but would be constrained by strong public adherence to neutrality and Sinn Féin’s anti-NATO position.
