Mali Under Siege: JNIM’s Campaign and the Future of Regional Stability
Aryana Ris-Luamháin | 23 July 2025
Summary
Jama‘at Nusrat al‑Islam wa al‑Muslimin (JNIM) has launched a wave of assaults against Mali, resulting in the deaths of hundreds of Malian soldiers and the seizure of a military base at Boulikessi.
These offensives reflect a coordinated campaign to diminish public confidence in the Malian junta and recruit marginalised populations.
The frequency and lethality of attacks will likely increase, with likely expansion into coastal countries in the medium-term. In the long-term, there is a realistic possibility that JNIM could evolve into a semi-sovereign actor.
More than a decade into its struggle against jihadist insurgencies, Mali is at the epicentre of another security crisis. Jama‘at Nusrat al‑Islam wa al‑Muslimin (JNIM) has escalated its attacks against the country, with a string of deadly offensives taking place in recent months. The group seeks to establish an Islamic Emirate in West Africa and is currently the most prolific jihadist group in Africa's Sahel.
Most recently, on 1 June, JNIM launched a large-scale assault on the Malian military base at Boulikessi in central Mali against Malian and Russian forces. The attack resulted in the deaths of 100 Malian soldiers, and JNIM successfully seized control of the military base. The following day, on 2 June, JNIM launched several assaults on a military base and 3 checkpoints in Timbuktu, causing the deaths of at least 69 Malian Armed Forces personnel. Evidently, JNIM’s strategy is not one of attrition or sporadic violence. It has demonstrated tactical coordination and an ability to exploit the political and security gaps created by the junta-led government and its fractured regional alliances.
The Malian junta is struggling to contend with the situation. The exit of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger from ECOWAS and the formation of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) has resulted in weaker intelligence-sharing and fragmented responses to insurgencies. Under these circumstances, JNIM could transform into a hybrid insurgent-administration, resembling Syria’s Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), especially given it has already asserted significant territorial control across parts of central and southern Mali.
The group’s actions reflect a deliberate campaign to diminish public confidence in the Malian junta’s ability to maintain order. The junta, which seized power in a 2020 coup, justified its rule by promising to restore stability and prevent the country from slipping into chaos and anarchy. This, however, has not materialised. Mali’s relations with French troops deteriorated in the wake of the coup and France ended its nine-year deployment, marking the end of counter-insurgency initiative Operation Barkhane. In France’s place arrived Russian Wagner Group mercenaries who have since assisted with regime security efforts - but have concurrently been accused of leading a ‘campaign of terror’ in Mali. JNIM’s actions further contradict the narrative that the junta has everything in hand.
This drop in public trust towards the junta entails the risk of driving recruitment - particularly among marginalised populations who face ethnic persecution from government forces and state-backed militias. Another powerful driver of jihadist recruitment in the Sahel is the cycle of retaliatory violence by state forces. After jihadist groups such JNIM launch attacks and disappear into remote areas, government troops often arrive too late to confront the actual perpetrators. Frustrated and under-resourced, they frequently target nearby civilian populations instead, prompting further resentment and perpetuating a vicious cycle. Mali’s counter-terrorism efforts have been ineffective as of yet, with the junta tending to rely on repression and decapitation of JNIM members rather than providing governance to allay the root cause of the insurgency.
The implications of JNIM’s recent offensives are not confined to the Sahel. JNIM is poised to expand into coastal West African states, including Ghana, Benin and Côte d’Ivoire. This expansion would open new logistical corridors for smuggling and arms trafficking. The United States (US) Africa Command (AFRICOM) Commander Gen. Michael Langley has warned that JNIM’s activity could ultimately extend beyond Africa’s borders, towards US and European shores. This marks a turning point in the conflict: JNIM is not simply a rural threat. On the contrary, it now constitutes a profound challenge to regional - and potentially international - security.
AMISOM Public Information, CC0 1.0
Forecast
Short-term (Now - 3 months)
The frequency of JNIM attacks in Mali will likely increase, targeting military bases and symbolic state infrastructure. Major urban centres, such as Timbuktu, Mopti, and Gao, are likely to face more frequent disruptions, particularly if military defences are further thinned or demoralised.
Public confidence in the junta is likely to continue eroding, particularly in northern and central Mali.
Medium-term (3-12 months)
JNIM will likely make efforts to infiltrate coastal West African countries, including Ghana, Benin and Côte d’Ivoire.
Long-term (>1 year)
If unchecked, there is a realistic possibility that JNIM could evolve into a semi-sovereign actor and control swathes of territory in Mali.
