Increasing Indiscriminate Civilian Violence by the Myanmar Military Junta
Harry Glover | 15 May 2024
Summary
The Myanmar military junta, formed by the Tatmadaw army, have engaged in increasing indiscriminate civilian violence in order to suppress pro-democracy resistance movements.
Despite the implementation of conscription service to bolster the Tatmadaw’s operational capacity, over 14,000 soldiers have defected from the regime to resistance movements, disillusioned with the brutality of the regime.
The recent loss of control of the strategic trade town of Myawaddy to the Karen National Union resistance movement demonstrates the operational capacity of the pro-democracy movements. The military junta have subsequently carried out massacres on civilian villages in an attempt to consolidate power through fear.
The conflict's development depends on the Tatmadaw's ability to recover lost territory and prevent internal dissent and defection. Similarly, as the resistance movements continue to grow, their operational capacity depends on the amount of financial support they can acquire through unconventional and volatile means, such as trading cryptocurrency.
Recent events in Myanmar have shifted the focus of the international community, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), toward the potentiality of even greater civilian violence. The current leadership, led by the Myanmar military (the Tatmadaw), established itself as a military junta in February 2021 after ousting the democratically elected National League for Democracy (NLD) and arresting their leader Aung San Suu Kyi. Since the February 2021 coup however, the Tatmadaw have engaged in brutal civilian violence, detaining, torturing, and executing over 8,000 civilians and arresting a further 25,000. Nevertheless, despite the indiscriminate brutality of the Tatmadaw, , civilian resistance movements have fought relentlessly in opposition to the junta. This has fostered doubt and dissatisfaction among leadership within the junta as to the capacity of the regime to suppress opposition. For example, on 11th April 2024, the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), the armed wing of the Karen National Union (KNU) (an opposition and resistance movement) launched an offensive operation against the Tatmadaw in the strategic trade town of Myawaddy situated on the border with Thailand. As a result, approximately 200 Tatmadaw soldiers abandoned their posts, leaving the town under KNU control.
The surrendering and loss of the major trading hub of Myawaddy is indicative of the military junta’s diminishing influence and control both internally and amongst the civilian population. Consequently, the disaffected generals are not convinced the current Tatmadaw Senior General and the incumbent, self-appointed, Prime Minister Min Aung Hlaing is able to suppress dissent and resistance movements effectively. One measure that Min Aung Hlaing has taken is conscripting males aged between 18 and 35 to serve and to cover both the casualties and the estimated 14,000 soldiers who have defected to resistance movements since the 2021 coup. The implication present here is the distinct reduction in operational and organisational capacity of the military junta, and the Tatmadaw more generally. As such, the recent surrendering of Myawaddy is demonstrative of the wider political challenges that the military junta have struggled to combat, namely the resilient pro-democracy resistance groups, such as the KNLA.
Given the delicate situation of the civil war since 2021, there are two plausible developments of the conflict. The first, and of less likeliness, is that resistance groups and liberation movements may strive to overthrow the military junta and restore democracy. This evolution is less likely insofar as the resistance movements do not have consistent and stable financial support and rely heavily on crowdfunding and crypto as sources of income. Both income sources are not guaranteed and face challenges in the transfer of money, with international financial regulations often restricting the flow of money due to concerns of money laundering and financing of terrorism. However, the second, and of graver significance, is the increase in indiscriminate civilian violence as a means for the junta to consolidate power. For example, in early May 2024 it is reported that the military junta carried out massacres in over 30 villages across the country. Similarly, in February 2024 the military junta launched air strikes on a church, killing 17 civilians. The precedent that is being set by the military junta suggests that indiscriminate violence is and will continue to be used as a form of counterinsurgency and as a means to consolidate control over resistance movements. An important implication of this is the worsening of the humanitarian crisis of which the United Nations (UN) estimates that 18.6 million individuals now require humanitarian assistance. Nevertheless, it is clear that the military junta are increasing their use of indiscriminate violence as a means to regain control over the pro-democracy movements.
Forecast
Short-term
It is likely that the military junta will continue to indiscriminately target civilians whilst simultaneously attempting to bolster their organisational and operational capacity through conscription service.
Long-term
The resistance movements currently pose a legitimate threat to the regime, despite the conscription service drafting new recruits. However, the long-term implications rest in the ability of the regime to prevent the defection of its soldiers to the resistant movements. It is likely that resistance and popular liberation movements will continue to challenge the regime in the long term due to the strength of such movements, but equally, their operational capacity depends on both the ability to acquire financial resources and the strength of the military junta.