Impact of US Tariffs on Central Asia
Marina Gruzer | 22 April 2025
Summary
The United States (U.S.) has imposed a 27% tariff on Kazakh imports—the highest in Central Asia—but Kazakhstan’s key exports like oil and uranium are largely exempt, and its limited trade dependence on the U.S. means minimal immediate economic impact.
The tariffs reflect a broader inconsistency in U.S. policy: while trade barriers rise, Washington still seeks strategic engagement through the C5+1 format; this contradiction may push Central Asian states to deepen regional cooperation and seek alternative markets.
China’s role as the dominant investor is likely to be reinforced, but the EU aims to position itself as a growing partner in Central Asia’s evolving supply chains via initiatives like the Global Gateway and the recent Samarkand Summit.
On 2 April, US President Donald Trump announced that a 27% reciprocal tariff on imports from Kazakhstan will be implemented on 9 April. Compared to other Central Asian states, facing a 10% tariff, this is the highest tariff rate in the region. However, Kazakhstan’s Trade Ministry states that the country’s exports will remain mostly unaffected as 92% of Kazakhstan’s exports, such as oil, uranium and ferroalloys, are exempt from additional tariffs. Moreover, the US accounts for a relatively small share of Kazakhstan’s export market in comparison to partners such as China and Russia. Alternatively, these tariffs may also offer market opportunities for the EU, as it seeks diversified raw material supply chains, while also strengthening regional economic cooperation.
While the tariffs themselves are unlikely to have a significant impact on Kazakhstan’s exports, Astana and the region could face challenges if Trump’s trade policy escalates into a global economic crisis in which commodity prices are impacted. However, US trade policy may incentivise affected countries to look for alternative commodity markets which would provide opportunities for large Central Asian exporters such as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Despite the tariffs, Trump’s administration has expressed an interest in continuing Biden’s C5+1 initiative and engagement in Central Asia to develop access to regional oil, gas and mineral supply chains. This inconsistent trade policy is likely to encourage continued regional infrastructural cooperation, as seen in the recent March 2025 Khujand trilateral border agreement between Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, to enhance economic and energy resilience.
However, the tariffs may impact Central Asia’s multi-vector diplomacy initiatives. Trump’s tariffs could limit the extent of growing bilateral trade with the US as an emerging partner in Central Asia, hence risking reinforcing China’s dominant role as a key regional investor, contrary to Washington’s policy aims. Alternatively, the global tariffs could encourage actors such as the EU to seek more diverse partnerships and supply chains in Central Asia, further enhancing regional multi-vector trade policy. The EU’s Global Gateway infrastructural investment projects and the April 4th Samarkand Summit, the first EU-Central Asian summit of its kind, reflect the EU’s interest in developing regional investment and supply chains that are critical for EU renewable energy and technology industries. Therefore, while Trump’s policy may create challenges in pursuing trade diversification with the US, it could incentivise other partners to engage with the region.
Garakhan Safarli/Unsplash
Forecast
Short-term (Now - 3 months)
The tariffs are unlikely to have a significant short-term impact on Central Asian exports as the majority of those exports, such as oil and uranium, are exempt from additional tariffs. Therefore, energy industries in both the US and Central Asia will remain unaffected.
Medium-term (3-12 months)
Trump’s tariffs on other partners, such as the EU, could incentivise affected states and sectors, such as steel, aluminium and automobile industries, to seek alternative markets in emerging regions such as Central Asia. Additionally, the region’s raw material supply chain opportunities are likely to further attract new partners as Central Asia aims to diverge from its traditional reliance on China and Russia.
Long-term (>1 year)
China is highly likely to maintain its long term dominant investor role due to the scale of support provided by initiatives such as the BRI and sector-wide cooperation in the automobile industry.
