France's Space Command and the Strategic Stakes of Commercial Satellite Warfare

By Rakotoarimanga Tinah | 25 November 2025


Summary

  • Inaugurated on 12 November 2025 in Toulouse, France’s Commandement de l’Espace (CDE) marks a major step toward European space autonomy, uniting defence, deterrence and innovation under one command.

  • Commercial satellite constellations now define modern warfare. Networks such as SpaceX’s Starlink, Maxar, ICEYE, and Capella Space enable real-time battlefield coordination, intelligence collection, and precision targeting.

  • Russia’s targeted jamming, spoofing, and cyberattacks against these satellite networks during the Ukraine war have exposed critical vulnerabilities in dual-use orbital infrastructure. These actions blur the legal and operational boundaries between civilian systems and military assets, forcing NATO and EU members to reassess how this infrastructure is protected.


Context

The war in Ukraine has thrust commercial satellite networks to the forefront of modern combat. From SpaceX’s Starlink enabling drone coordination to ICEYE and Capella providing radar imagery, private constellations have become key military enablers. More importantly, Ukraine's crowdfunding access to ICEYE's SAR imaging demonstrates how non-state commercial platforms can tip the operational balance.

Yet, this reliance invites retaliation. Russia's electromagnetic and cyber countermeasures, GPS jamming into Low-Earth Orbit, GNSS spoofing to disorient drones, and the February 2022 Viasat cyberattack disrupting Ukrainian military comms illustrate the fragility of unprotected or dual-use orbital systems. The risk isn’t theoretical: a Ukrainian Tu-141 drone likely jammed by Russian EW veered off-course and crashed in Croatia.

French and European military planners took notice. As Russia signals that Western satellites supporting Ukraine are legitimate targets, the line separating peaceful use from hostile behaviour in space is now much harder to identify. In this new context, France’s Commandement de l’Espace (CDE) seeks to redefine Europe’s role in orbit.

France’s inauguration of the Commandement de l’Espace (CDE) on 12 November 2025 in Toulouse marks a strategic rupture in Europe’s defence architecture. As Macron declared in his space strategy review the day before, "space is no longer peaceful" The statement encapsulates a doctrinal revolution: orbit is now treated as a contested domain, where deterrence, industrial competitiveness, and sovereignty converge. The French Space Strategy classifies space as the « fifth operational domain », alongside land, air, sea, and cyber and It calls for « space control » via reversible, non-kinetic systems.


Implications

France’s deterrence doctrine, expressed through the CDE, is flexible, calibrated, and non-escalatory, yet firm enough to raise the cost of aggression. It anchors deterrence in control and restraint rather than confrontation, signalling that interference in orbit will meet a proportionate and credible response. This marks the rise of a European approach to space defence built on balance and predictability.

Locating the CDE in Toulouse is a strategic choice. At the heart of Europe’s aerospace industry, it links military planning to a powerful industrial network that includes Airbus Defence and Space, CNES, Thales Alenia Space, and new private actors such as Latitude and Exotrail. This alignment reflects Macron’s conviction that sovereignty depends on competitiveness. By blending public and private resources, France seeks to shape a new European space ecosystem capable of competing with the American and Chinese models, where commercial and defence sectors are tightly fused. The French approach promotes resilience supported by the state and driven by innovation.

Politically, the CDE strengthens France’s role in Europe’s emerging space architecture. In partnership with Germany’s EUR35b space defence programme, it reinforces a Franco-German axis pushing for a European Space Security Doctrine. This doctrine is expected to define rules for attribution, proportional response, and the protection of dual-use systems, paving the way for collective deterrence in orbit.

Diplomatically, the CDE positions France at the crossroads of NATO coordination and European autonomy. Through programmes such as IRIS2 and Galileo, Paris links transatlantic cooperation with the EU’s drive for sovereignty. As commercial constellations like Starlink and China’s StarNet reshape the space economy, France frames the CDE as both a defensive command and a tool to protect Europe’s competitiveness in the NewSpace race.

The militarisation of orbit exposes gaps in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, which forbids weapons but not defensive interference. France’s concept of “space control” challenges this legal grey zone, urging the EU to establish new norms of responsibility and proportionality. With IRIS2 as precedent, European space governance will increasingly reflect its broader goal of strategic autonomy through integration.

 

Still, turning this vision into practice will come with its own tension: France will need to navigate the usual frictions between NATO’s coordination, US dominance in space capabilities and Europe’s wish for autonomy, and the growing reliance on private sectors adds another layer of complexity that Europe has not fully addressed yet.

SpaceX/Unsplash


Forecast

  • Short-term (Now - 3 months)

    • Highly likely that France will expand operational links between the CDE, NATO’s Space Centre and ESA’s Space Safety Programme.

    • Airbus, Eutelsat, and ICEYE will probably be included in hybrid threat exercises to test resilience to coordinated jamming and spoofing.

    • Likely that the French Ministry of Armed Forces will initiate tabletop simulations integrating commercial satellite data into joint defence operations.

  • Long-term (>1 year)

    • Highly likely that France will begin integrating AI-based anomaly detection systems into its space monitoring network, expanding real-time response capability.

    • Highly likely that France will operationalise patrol microsatellites and ground-based jammers, while expanding its Space Situational Awareness footprint.

    • France is likely to lead the creation of a European Space Defence Industrial Corridor, combining public investment with private-sector R&D for resilient satellite design.

BISI Probability Scale
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