EU-Russian Gas Phase-Out: The State of Energy Decoupling
Andrea Stauder | 18 April 2025
Summary
The European Union (EU) still lacks a concrete plan to fully phase out Russian energy, a critical step to achieving its security, energy, and climate goals.
Ongoing EU energy ties with Russia continue to fund the Kremlin’s war machine, undermine European security, and exacerbate energy price volatility across the continent.
Price volatility, Asian competition, and delayed liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports will complicate summer gas storage for the coming winter. The EU remains vulnerable in the energy sector, and without a clear plan for energy autonomy, its goal to increase LNG import capacity by 2030 risks deepening dependence on unreliable suppliers.
The map shows only direct pipelines between Russia and Europe. Other European countries are also linked by different pipelines, operated under separate management.
The Brotherhood (Bratstvo) pipeline system consists of the Torzhok–Smolensk–Mazyr–Dolyna, Progress, Urengoy–Pomary–Uzhgorod, and Soyuz gas pipelines.
The Northern Lights pipeline system comprises the Torzhok–Minsk–Ivatsevichy, Ivatsevichy–Kobryn–Dolyna, Kobryn–Brest–Warsaw pipelines, and the Minsk–Kaliningrad interconnection.
There is no reliable data to determine whether the Belarusian sections of Torzhok-Smolensk-Mazyr-Dolyna, Yamal-Europe, and Northern Lights are still operational.
Since 2019, the Kohtla-Järve-Leningrad connection has no longer been commercially used but remains available for technical gas supply to system operators and pipeline stations.
Despite Latvia banning Russian pipeline gas imports in 2023, the Valdai-Pskov-Riga pipeline remains operational, with small recorded volumes. Latvijas Gāze holds a long-term contract with Gazprom until 2030.
The Baltic regions, notably Estonia and Latvia, are poorly connected via pipelines to the rest of the continent, with natural gas playing a lesser role in their energy mix compared to coal, oil, and renewables.
Since the war in Ukraine began in 2022, Europe’s energy independence from Russia has become a key necessity. Beyond seeking to avoid financing the Kremlin’s war machine, European states have pursued energy autonomy—or at least diversification—for security and operational reasons. Kyiv’s decision not to extend the Russian gas transit agreement on 31 December 2024 and the disconnection of the Baltic states from the BRELL electricity system on 8 February 2025 have refocused attention on the issue. Meanwhile, the European Commission’s (EC) second delay in announcing a concrete phase-out plan in early March, a rise in Russian gas imports to Europe in 2024, and the omission of Russian LNG from the 16th sanctions package calls into question the EU’s commitment to phasing out Russian fossil fuels by 2027.
Significant progress has been made in reducing the EU's energy dependence on Russian fossil fuels. In 2021, Russia accounted for 25% of the EU’s oil imports and 45% of its gas imports, including LNG and pipeline gas. In response to Russia's aggression against Ukraine, the EC launched the REPower EU Plan, which seeks to end Russian energy dependency through efficiency measures and diversification of energy sources and supply countries. EU's sanctions reduced Russian oil imports to 3%. While not directly sanctioned, gas has also been impacted. At its 2019 peak, Russian gas supply to Europe reached 179bcm. Key developments include the end of gas flow through the Yamal-Europe (33bcm) and the Kobryn–Brest–Warsaw pipelines (10bcm) in April 2022, the Nord Stream (110bcm) explosions in September 2022, and the end of Russian gas transit through Ukraine (around 100bcm) since2025. The TurkStream pipeline, limited at 15.75bcm, today remains the sole link between Russia and EU countries. Finally, banning LNG transshipments from March 2025, the EU has taken a further step toward eliminating Russian fossil fuels by 2027.
In spite of this, Russia still accounts for 17.4% of the EU’s LNG imports as of February 2025, making it the second-largest supplier of LNG, behind the United States (45.3% in 2024). Regarding petroleum, Russia continues to find ways to supply the EU despite sanctions. Exemptions for landlocked countries allow crude oil deliveries via the southern branch of the Druzhba pipeline to Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic. Furthermore, the EU imports significant quantities of refined oil products derived from Russian crude, particularly from third countries like India, China, and Türkiye. Russia also maintains strong ties with Europe in the nuclear power sector, as nearly 20% of Europe’s imported raw uranium comes from Russia, with another 23% sourced from Kazakhstan.
The EU remains an important market for Moscow, the fourth-largest buyer of Russian fossil fuels e and the largest for LNG as of February 2025. Moreover, the widespread use of LNG has made price volatility a permanent feature of European energy markets. The Title Transfer Facility (TTF), Europe’s gas price benchmark, has doubled compared to pre-crisis levels, with significant impacts on household electricity prices, which have risen by 36% from 2021 to 2025.
Alongside the REPowerEU Plan, the EU Energy Platform was launched to coordinate joint gas purchasing, optimise infrastructure use, and enhance international cooperation. To address price volatility, the Clean Industrial Deal and the Affordable Energy Action Plan are key to strengthening EU competitiveness and decarbonisation. With EU industry paying twice as much for energy as the US and China, phasing out Russian gas through a legally binding target is essential, while avoiding new dependencies, i.e. from the United States (US). Diversification and efficiency improvements across sectors will be crucial to reducing gas demand, phasing out from Russian energy, and ensuring a sustainable energy transition.
Forecast
Short-term (Now - 3 months)
The transhipment ban is unlikely to affect the volume of Russian LNG imports into Europe. However, it is likely to complicate Russia's logistics, particularly for cargoes destined for Asia.
Medium-term (3-12 months)
American LNG will likely be included in EU-US negotiations regarding US President Donald Trump’s new tariffs against the EU.
European return to Russian gas will likely be discussed during the ongoing US-Russia negotiations over Ukraine.
The EU requires gas storage to be 90% full by 1 November. Despite increasing LNG imports from the US and Qatar, most supplies won’t arrive until next year. With competition from Asian buyers, summer gas prices will almost certainly be higher than those for winter, making storage less viable.
Long-term (>1 year)
LNG import capacity in Europe is highly likely to increase by 54% by 2030, yet with gas demand unlikely to rise, a significant portion of this capacity is expected to remain underutilised.
As the EU expands LNG import capacity and signs long-term LNG contracts, while the US and other countries increase their LNG export capacity, the EU is likely to deepen its gas dependence on unreliable suppliers.
With Russian gas imports rising in 2024 and the first months of 2025, the EU's 2027 phase-out of Russian energy is unlikely to be achieved by that deadline.
