Beyond External Interference: Political Contestation and Governance Concerns Surrounding PAS’s Victory in Moldova
By Andrea Stauder | 7 November 2025
Figure 1: 2025 Moldovan Parliamentary Election Results by Constituency
Summary
The Action and Solidarity Party (PAS) secured re-election in Moldova, winning 50.2% of the vote despite declining popularity, with strong support from the diaspora. Alongside Russian interference, several government-linked irregularities have raised concerns over the integrity and pluralism of the democratic process in Moldova.
The PAS’s existential Europe-versus-Russia narrative, combined with contentious pre-election measures, has drawn criticism from neutral international observers, including those from the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).
Moldova is likely to remain stable but increasingly polarised, with opposition parties likely to sustain non-violent protests and mount legal challenges with little prospect of reversal. The domestic ideological divide is likely to sharpen the geopolitical narrative and reinforce PAS’s strategic yet fragile European trajectory.
Despite persistent economic stagnation, limited progress on anti-corruption reform, and unresolved tensions with Transnistria and Gagauzia—factors that drove PAS support down to roughly 25% in recent polls—PAS secured 50.2% of the vote in Moldova’s 28 September parliamentary elections. The “pro-Russian” Patriotic Electoral Bloc (BEP), which was previously forecasted to win a similar share, ultimately performed in line with expectations despite well-documented Russian interference. Far less examined, however, are the measures undertaken by the ruling PAS to boost its own support and suppress that of the opposition.
First, several opposition parties were excluded from the race. Not only was the pro-Russian Victory Bloc—already under EU sanctions—excluded on 19 July 2025 for its ties to fugitive oligarch Ilan Shor, But the Chișinău Court of Appeals restricted the Heart of Moldova party’s activities for 12 months following a request by the Ministry of Justice; its leader, Irina Vlah, had already been sanctioned by Canada, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Poland. The Central Electoral Commission (CEC) then cancelled 26 candidates from the BEP, invalidating the gender quota for the Bloc. Moreover, on 26 September, the Moldova Mare party was also removed by the CEC on similar charges of illegal financing and links to criminal networks. The fact that these decisions were taken only a few days before the vote or, in some cases, by a political body rather than an impartial court has raised serious concerns about the integrity of Moldova’s democratic process.
Figure 2: Map of Moldova and Separatist Regions in Transnistria and Gagauzia
A further flashpoint was the vote in Transnistria, the pro-Russian separatist region of Moldova. On 25 September, Moldova’s CEC relocated five of the 12 planned polling stations in the region, citing security concerns. Transnistrian authorities had requested 41 polling stations, matching the 2021 parliamentary elections; instead, only 12 were authorised, five of which were moved outside the region. Tiraspol condemned the move as a politically motivated restriction of citizens’ electoral rights. In practice, it made voting significantly more difficult—in some cases impossible—for residents. The stations were consistently shifted from opposition-leaning areas to locations seen as more favourable to the ruling PAS, with two moved as far as Chișinău. Simultaneously, roadworks began on 7 bridges in Transnistria just days before the vote, further hindering access.
In the 2025 parliamentary elections, the Moldovan diaspora again proved decisive for PAS, as in the 2024 presidential vote. Overseas voters backed the ruling party by 78.61%, with 301 polling stations opened worldwide. However, the allocation of sites sparked controversy. The Kremlin argued that hundreds of thousands of Moldovans in Russia were effectively deprived of voting access. Yet, official records show that around 78,000 Moldovans are still registered in Russia (down from almost 600,000 in 2014), compared with just over 100,000 in Italy. Despite this, only two polling stations were opened in the largest country on earth, compared with 75 in Italy. Moreover, the decision to allow postal voting in ten countries but not in Russia remains contentious.
While the recent Moldovan elections are widely hailed as a victory for democracy, fear appears to have been the real winner. The ruling PAS has positioned itself as the sole pro-European party, benefiting from a narrative framing the choice as Europe versus Russia, even though some “pro-Russian” parties did not oppose European integration at all. The last-minute exclusion of opposition candidates, the limitation of judicial recourse, and the obstacles faced by voters in Transnistria raise serious concerns. The OSCE has highlighted these issues, noting not only unprecedented Russian interference but also significant internal irregularities and restrictions that undermined pluralism and equal participation.
Sasha Pleshco/Unsplash
Forecast
Short-term (Now - 3 months)
The opposition is highly likely to maintain its protest activity, predominantly on political and social grounds, without any credible indication of a shift toward serious or disruptive violence.
The opposition parties affected by the CEC proceedings are highly likely to file legal appeals; however, it is highly unlikely that this will alter the electoral outcome.
Medium-term (3-12 months)
Polarisation is likely to intensify, with growing opposition support—especially in the north, south, and Transnistria—due to PAS’s limited progress on anti-corruption reforms and engagement with Transnistria and Gagauzia.
It is almost certain that the Moldovan government will remain committed to its European trajectory; however, limited tangible progress, combined with the ongoing war in Ukraine, are highly likely to sustain a strong Europe-versus-Russia narrative within the country.
