At What Cost? Albania’s EU Bid and the Detention of Italy’s Asylum Seekers

Mikaela DesLauriers | 21 October 2024


 

Summary

  • As of 11 October 2024, Albania’s controversial agreement to detain 36,000 asylum seekers annually as part of its Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with Italy is operational with the opening of two detention centres.

  • Seen as a strategic move to advance its European Union (EU) membership bid, the MOA raises significant human rights and legal concerns and risks of violating international asylum norms due to automatic detention protocols and limited legal protections for vulnerable asylum seekers in Albania.

  • Although Italy’s €670 million (731,730 USD) investment brings short-term economic benefits, the MOA may strain Albania’s public institutions and provoke social tensions, potentially hindering its EU accession efforts. 


Albania’s aspiration for EU membership faces a complex trade-off as it becomes a crucial player in Italy’s efforts to externalise migration control. Externalisation or border externalisation refers to the process of intercepting and preventing asylum seekers from reaching the border of a country of destination by outsourcing the border to another country through outsourcing or third-country agreements. Under Italy and Albania’s externalisation agreement or MOA, up to 36,000 asylum seekers intercepted by Italian authorities will be detained annually in two centres constructed in Albania. This agreement presents political, social, and economic challenges for the Balkan country, impacting its citizens, the public sector, and private interests.

Albania has been pursuing EU membership since 2009, and while its candidate status was granted in 2014, the accession process has been slow, with reforms required in areas such as the judiciary, public administration, and human rights. The deal with Italy is seen by some as a political move to expedite its negotiation process. In exchange for detaining Italy-bound asylum seekers, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni has pledged to endorse Albania’s EU membership bid. This agreement aligns with broader European strategies of externalising migration controls, but its implications raise questions and concerns about creating a domino effect that incentivises other EU countries to do the same. 

For Albanian citizens, the arrangement could become a source of tension. While some see the agreement as a diplomatic success, a form of gratitude for Italy’s historical support post-communism, there are fears that Albania may bear the long-term social and political consequences of housing thousands of detained individuals, particularly as human rights concerns mount. The potential for protests or backlash within Albania remains a risk, especially as public awareness of the centres grows.

For the private sector, the economic impact is mixed. The centers’ construction and operation funded by Italy for €670 million (731,730 USD) over five years, create short-term economic benefits, such as jobs in construction, security, and services. However, these are temporary gains, with salaries for asylum processing going to Italian immigration officers staffing the detention centres. There are also concerns that the centres’ presence might deter tourism or other investments in the Shengjin and Gjader regions. Furthermore, concerns about corruption and mismanagement within the private firms contracted to operate the centres could exacerbate Albania’s struggle to reform its public administration as Tirana attempts to present itself as a stable and EU-aligned country. 

Albania’s decision to externalise and detain Italy’s asylum seekers highlights the difficult balance between immediate political and economic gains and long-term societal and humanitarian costs. While the MOA may accelerate its EU membership bid, the detention of 36,000 asylum seekers annually could strain its public institutions, raise legal challenges from human rights organisations, and provoke social tension. These factors underscore the complexity of Albania’s EU accession process and the broader implications of externalising EU migration to non-member states.

Alexey Larinov/Unsplash


Forecast

  • Short-term:  

    • Human rights groups and non-government organisations such as Amnesty International will likely challenge the legality of the Italy-Albania agreement, potentially leading to court cases or protests in Albania or Italy. These legal challenges risk an outcry of public backlash and reputational damage for both Rome and Tirana.

    • Legal and operational challenges may cause further delays in the arrival of the first deferred asylum-seekers to Albania, leading to logistical and political challenges for both MOA countries. Further delays pose a risk of political embarrassment and minor public discontent from supporters of the agreement.

  • Medium-long term: 

    • The presence of detention centres housing thousands of asylum seekers could fuel public unrest or political tension, particularly if human rights violations occur. The mistreatment of vulnerable migrants on Albanian soil poses a high risk of political instability and damage to Albania’s EU reputation and relations.

  • Long-term: 

    • Continued operation of the Italian detention centres could strain Albania’s public institutions, particularly in managing security and potential human rights issues, potentially jeopardizing the implementation of EU reforms. Under increased scrutiny, the delay in reforms could slow Albania’s EU accession, fostering social unrest.

    • Albania’s role in hosting the centres may also set a precedent for future EU-non-EU migration deals, influencing relations between other Balkan countries and EU countries. This risk increased pressure on other EU-bid countries for similar externalisation agreements.

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