Kira Persson | 29 July 2024

Summary

• On July 15, Syria held its parliamentary elections amid ongoing war, substantial displacement, and a deteriorating economy. The Ba'ath Party won a majority of 169 seats.

• Since 1971, Syria has been under the de facto authoritarian rule of the Assad family, which has maintained power through their leadership of the Ba'ath Party. The current president, Bashar al-Assad, has held power since 2000. 

• The rubber stamp parliament thus holds little independent power. Rather, elections are a way for the Assad regime to manage its patronage networks and uphold an image of political legitimacy.

On Monday, July 15, Syria held its parliamentary elections. 250 members were elected to the People’s Assembly, Syria’s unicameral legislature. The Ba’ath Party won a majority of 169 seats. Few surprises were expected, with two-thirds of seats reserved for members of the National Progressive Front (NPF), a left-wing coalition dominated by the Ba’ath Party. While the core power dynamics in Syria have remained largely unchanged since 1971, elections provide an insightful example of how the Assad regime operates.

Since its outbreak in 2011, the Syrian civil war has significantly impacted the country’s political landscape by fragmenting territorial control, giving political clout to non-state actors, increasing foreign influence in Syrian affairs, and exacerbating sectarian polarisation. The Assad regime faces international sanctions and diplomatic isolation, pushing it closer to Russia and Iran — both of which considerably influence Syrian policy and seek to undermine voter autonomy and political opposition.

Elections were held in government-controlled areas, covering most of the country’s population centres. This excludes the northeast and northwest, controlled by opposition groups including the US-backed Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), and Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA). More than 6 million Syrian refugees were also unable to vote. Opposition groups, primarily in non-regime territories, have boycotted the elections, claiming they were neither free nor fair. Historic strongholds of the regime, such as Latakia, have also expressed increased discontent as the economy deteriorates. 

What purpose do parliamentary elections serve in Syria, given that their outcome appears largely predetermined? Several key factors can explain this. Firstly, this year’s election could pave the way for a constitutional amendment extending the presidency of Assad (which would otherwise end in 2028). Constitutional amendments of this sort are not unprecedented — in 2000, the Assembly lowered the required candidacy age to allow Assad to run for presidency. 

Secondly, elections play a key role in maintaining Assad’s patronage networks. Rather than endorsing political competition, elections provide a formal, visible process for loyalists to reaffirm their allegiance to the regime and be rewarded for it. Assad also uses elections to fine-tune the distribution of power among various loyalist groups, to maintain a level of competition while also minimising threats to his overall control. On the regional level, elections are a way to monitor local attitudes and influences.

Here, it is relevant to note that Syria’s parliamentary system is unique as it does not have a fixed formula for seat distribution (this contrasts with systems where parliamentary seats are allocated to regions based on relative population size). The number of seats each governorate is allocated is decided by the president — allowing for overrepresentation of regime strongholds, and compliance within the parliament. Latakia and Daraa, for instance, have roughly the same population size, but the former is allocated 7 more seats. Daraa is strongly associated with the opposition and was one of the birthplaces of the 2011 uprisings. 

Finally, while not considered free or fair by international standards, Syrian elections serve to maintain a facade of democratic legitimacy and stability. Participation in the process signals acceptance of Assad’s rule. In 2012, the constitution ended the Ba’ath Party’s power monopoly and introduced a multi-party system. While this theoretically opened the door for a more diverse and competitive political climate, power structures have largely persisted. Genuine political pluralism and opposition representation is absent. This situation reflects a common phenomenon in authoritarian systems, where superficial reforms are implemented without substantially altering the underlying power structures.  

Syrian elections thus serve less as a democratic exercise and more as a stark reminder of the regime's enduring grip on power. They are—alongside a powerful intelligence and security apparatus, militias, and business networks—a way for the Assad regime to maintain control, manage its support base, and create an illusion of legitimacy.  

Forecast

• Short-term

  • It is very likely that Assad’s rule will be extended and that key allies like Russia and Iran will seek to further cement their roles in Syrian politics. 

• Medium-Term

  • Syria's relationships with Western countries, particularly in terms of reconstruction aid and diplomatic recognition, will likely be further implicated. While the new parliament may emphasise economic recovery and reconstruction efforts, progress will be limited by sanctions and lack of international support. Nevertheless, some Arab states might use the election, as a fig leaf of democratic process, to justify continued normalisation efforts with Syria.

• Long-Term

  • The seeming political stability will likely be challenged if political and economic grievances are not properly addressed. Increased expressions of discontent in government strongholds are suggestive of this. Further, the protracted refugee crisis and disenfranchisement mean a substantial number of Syrians, especially children, will likely see a deeper disconnect from Syrian politics.