2024 Iranian Presidential Elections
12 July 2024
Summary
Reformist candidate Masoud Pezeshkian defeated four other candidates to be elected President in an early election announced following the death of President Raisi in a helicopter crash.
The election took place amid turmoil surrounding domestic issues such as the economy, hijab rules, Afghan refugees, and foreign policy.
Voter turnout was also at one of the lowest levels since the 1979 revolution, reflecting discontent among the Iranian people, particularly concerning recent events like the Mahsa Amini protests and high inflation.
Despite the reformist candidate Pezeshkian winning the election, significant changes are not expected, as the majority of decisions will still be made by the Supreme Leader. This is especially true given that the Guardian Council ensures all candidates remain loyal to the regime.
Country Profile
Economy
GDP: USD 386.2 billion (2023)
GDP per capita: USD 4,420 (2022)
HDI: 0.774 (2021)
Official currency: Iranian Rial
Demography
Population: 89 million (2023)
Major ethnic groups
Persian, Azeri, Kurd, Lur, Baloch and Arab
Religion
Shia Islam
Presidential Candidates
The Guardian Council allowed six candidates to run for the presidential election:
Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf: Speaker of the Islamic Consultative Assembly
Saeed Jalili: Member of the Expediency Discernment Council
Masoud Pezeshkian: Member of the Islamic Consultative Assembly
Mostafa Pourmohammadi: Minister of Justice
Amir-Hossein Hashemi: Vice President of Iran
Alireza Zakani: Mayor of Tehran
The Guardian Council does not publicly disclose reasons for rejecting candidates, though these reasons are privately explained to each individual. While women are not explicitly restricted from participating, all female candidates who have previously registered have been disqualified. On June 26, Hashemi withdrew his candidacy, urging other candidates to follow suit "to strengthen the revolutionary front." Zakani followed on June 27, citing the need to "prevent the formation of a third Rouhani administration." Subsequently, both candidates and Ghalibaf endorsed Jalili in the second round.
Furthermore, United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI), an anti-Iran lobby group in the USA, alleged that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) was manipulating the election, which the Guardian Council denied. Moreover, opposition figures including former prince Reza Pahlavi and the reformed Iran-Novin Party, dismissed the election as a charade. Amid these controversies, Iran's Internet Minister claimed that the country's fibre optic network was sabotaged on June 28 during the first round of elections. Before the second round on July 5, Pezeshkian pledged to revive a nuclear agreement with foreign powers, while Jalili called on the US to honour its commitments in line with Iran's fulfilled obligations. Pezeshkian ultimately won the popular vote in the second round.
Following his victory with a low turnout, Pezeshkian thanked Supreme Leader Khamenei for his support, and Khamenei, in turn, praised the turnout despite what he called a campaign "by the enemies of the Iranian nation to induce despair and hopelessness." However, turnout figures remain disputed, with official Iranian sources reporting 40%, while other reports cite figures as low as 30% or even 10%. However, The turnout figures are likely lower than the officially given 40% since Khamenei downplayed the low turnout, asserting that it did not indicate any opposition to the political system, but has called for an investigation anyway. Senior Khamenei advisor Kamal Kharazi stated that the election would not affect Iranian foreign policy as the Strategic Council for Foreign Relations controls it.
Forecast
Externally
While there will be some shifts in favour of a lenient approach to a new nuclear deal, this was always anticipated as the country has become increasingly reliant on sanctions relief for economic improvement. However, progress will depend on the ongoing Russia-Ukraine and Israel-Hamas conflicts that have given Iran leverage in terms of trade, security and social development. Moreover, the Supreme Leader's approval will be crucial, especially as Pezeshkian is perceived to be loyal to the current regime and will require permission for nuclear deal negotiations.
Domestically
With the reformist Pezeshkian in office, there may be attempts at moderate reforms, particularly in economic policy and possibly in addressing social issues like hijab rules. However, significant change is unlikely due to the overarching control of the Supreme Leader and the Guardian Council. Public discontent will likely persist, especially if economic conditions and hijab rules do not improve substantially. Further protests and civil unrest could occur if the administration fails to address key issues such as inflation and the aftermath of the Mahsa Amini protests.