2024 Georgia Elections
Ranson Lo | 7 January 2025
Summary
Following Georgian Dream (GD)’s victory in the October 2024 election, which was marred by irregularities, the GD-controlled parliament elected Mikheil Kavelashvili as the new Georgian president in a vote boycotted by the opposition.
GD’s pro-Russian stance and authoritarian tendencies, from rigged ballots, crackdown of protesters and restriction on civil groups and LGBTQ+ rights, illustrated the democratic backslide in the Caucasian state.
GD will likely continue its pro-Russian foreign policy in the long run at the expense of Georgia’s ties and prospects to join the European Union (EU).
Country Profile
Economy
GDP: USD 33.19b (2024)
GDP per capita: USD 8,880 (2024)
HDI: 0.814 (2022)
Official currency: Georgian lari (GEL)
Demography
Population: 3.74 million (2024)
Ethnic composition (2014)
86.83% Georgians, 6.27% Azeris and 4.53% Armenians
Religious composition (2014)
86.3% Orthodox, 10.7% Islam
Electoral System
Parliament
150 seats in the Parliament elected for four-year terms
Georgia adopted the proportional system in this election with a minimum threshold of 5% votes for seats, changing from the previous hybrid system of proportional and two-round majority voting in local constituencies.
President
Elected for four-year terms by 300 electors allocated to MPs and local representatives proportionately to parties’ vote shares, including the 41 seats assigned to the Abkhazia and Adjara autonomous governments.
After the constitutional changes in 2017, the new electoral college replaced the popular vote system. The new constitution transformed Georgia into a parliamentary republic, limiting presidential powers and elevating the authority of the parliament and prime minister.
Parties and Candidates
Georgian Dream (GD)
Led by Irakli Garibashvili, the former two-time Georgian Prime Minister (PM) in 2013-15 and 2021-24.
GD was founded in 2012 by Bidzina Ivanishvili, the former Georgian PM from 2012 to 2013. Ivanishvili allegedly has close ties with Russia and is perceived as the party's de facto leader.
GD, in power since 2012, has moved to adopt increasingly Euroskeptic and pro-Russia stances since the Russo-Ukraine War in 2022, while adopting a right-wing social policy and illustrating an authoritarian tendency.
Opposition coalition
Parties: Coalition for Change, Unity-National Movement, Strong Georgia and For Georgia.
Formed by multiple parties after the parliamentary elections in response to alleged rigged ballots by GD.
The coalition platformed on a pro-EU stance and plans for EU accession against GD’s foreign policy and authoritarianism.
Following the pro-Russian GD and Mikheil Kavelashvili electoral victories, domestic policy continuity is expected in Georgia.
Despite receiving around 54% of the votes, the opposition coalition rejected GD’s victory and refused to be recognised by former President Salome Zurabishivili (who was in power during the parliamentary election). International observers reported widespread voter intimidation, bribery, and multiple incidents of ballot stuffing on election day on 26 October. The results favouring the anti-EU GD have triggered large-scale nationwide protests, which have remained ongoing. GD has since failed to address the opposition and protesters’ concerns and cracked down on the protests with mass arrests and violence led by pro-government mobs, and has pushed through the boycotted presidential vote on 14 December that anti-EU and pro-Russian candidate Mikheil Kavelashvili elected as the new president. Further crackdowns and heavy-handed social control measures are expected from the government and security forces, resulting in increased security risks for bystanders.
Under the new GD government, it is highly likely democratic governance in Georgia will further deteriorate, posing significant political risks. Illustrated by the recent unrest and subsequent crackdown by the government. GD has demonstrated an increasingly authoritarian tendency in recent years, namely with the “foreign agents bill” signed into law in June 2024, which was perceived as repression of civil society by restricting external aid for non-governmental organisations and independent media outlets. The legislation has triggered large-scale protests nationwide, resulting in sanctions of high-ranking GD officials from the United States (US) and EU.
GD’s democratic backslide and pivot away from the West for Russia will also pose significant economic risks. Since the foreign agents bill's imposition, Georgia has lost over USD 225m in funding from the EU and US, with both parties citing concerns over GD’s “anti-democratic actions.” GD’s decision to suspend plans on EU accession on 28 November will likely further deteriorate Georgia’s relations with the EU, the Caucasian state’s primary trading partner, with bilateral amounting to EUR 4b (USD 4.2b) in 2023. With the EU accession process on hold and GD officials threatened with further sanctions, this will likely worsen Georgia’s economic prospect, which was granted preferential trade conditions and increased market access since 2014 within the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area.
Georgia’s increasingly close ties with Moscow will also further intensify uncertainty in the region, already destabilised by the ongoing Russo-Ukraine War and the recent Armenian-Azerbaijani conflicts over Nagorno Karabakh’s sovereignty. However, a pro-Russian government will potentially result in a unified Georgia with Moscow supporting the integration efforts of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which broke away under Russian support in two separate conflicts with Georgia in 1992 and 2008. Yet the prospects remain negative for Georgia and the region amid an increasingly assertive and expansionist Russia, as demonstrated in the invasion of Ukraine and hybrid operations conducted in Moldova to degrade their sovereignty and governance integrity.
Jelger Groeneveld/Wikimedia CC BY 2.0
Forecast
Short-term
GD will highly likely continue the crackdown on protesters after attaining full control over the presidency and the parliament, escalating political risks and possibilities of future unrest by further polarising the population and aggravating the democratic backslide.
Medium-term
Protests will likely be quelled by GD by 2nd quarter of 2025 with mass arrests and a crackdown on the press, increasing political risks for Georgia and security risks for bystanders.
Georgia’s democratic backslide will likely result in increased operational and economic risks due to anticipated sanctions, suspension of trade deals and restriction of movement of personnel and capital from and to the EU and US.
EU accession talks are almost certainly unlikely to resume under the GD government.
Long-term
Georgia will likely move closer to Russia at the expense of EU cooperation and accession, at least until the next 2028 elections or the collapse of GD’s government. This will pose increased political risks for regional security amid the Russo-Ukraine War and Armenia-Azerbaijan disputes over Nagorno-Karabakh.
Further sanctions and loss of aid from the EU and US are likely, resulting in increased social and economic risks from a potential brain drain and emigration of professionals and youths to Europe.