2024 European Parliament Elections
Johannes Titus Jansen and Dominic F | 21 June 2024
Summary
The 2024 European Parliament elections mark a shift in the political landscape of the European Union.
The centre-right European People's Party (EPP) retains its position as the largest group.
Right-wing and nationalist parties, such as Identity and Democracy (ID) and the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), made notable gains, possibly reflecting a growing trend towards Euroscepticism.
The centre-left Socialists and Democrats (S&D), liberal Renew Europe (RE), and the Greens faced losses, which raised questions about the future direction of the EU's climate policies.
These results have implications for EU governance, impacting legislative continuity, market stability, and future policies on immigration, economic reform, and digitalisation.
The election results also hint toward a rightward shift in upcoming national elections across Europe.
European Union Profile
Economy
GDP: USD 17.91 trillion (2024)
GDP per capita: USD 58,455 (2024)
HDI: 0.922 (2022)
Official currency: Euro
Demography
Population: 448.4 million (2023)
Age distribution (2023)
Electoral System
The European Parliament comprises 720 seats, with members elected for five-year terms by universal suffrage.
As stated in Article 39 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, every citizen of the European Union has the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in elections to the European Parliament.
Elections are conducted across the European Union using a system of proportional representation.
Each member state is allocated seats based on its population.
The electoral system varies by country, including open lists, closed lists, and the single transferable vote.
Open Lists are a voting system where voters can choose individual candidates within a party list.
Closed Lists refer to a system in which voters select a party as a whole, and the party determines the order in which candidates are elected.
Single Transferable Votes (STV) allow voters to rank candidates in order of preference.
The threshold for representation is up to 5%, depending on the member state's rules.
After elections, the newly elected members meet in a Constitutive Session to begin their mandate.
The Constitutive Session is the first official meeting of the newly elected parliament, where they begin their legislative duties.
The outgoing parliament continues its duties until the new parliament transitions in, ensuring legislative continuity.
Major Political Parties & Candidates
European People's Party (EPP)
Seats:
2024 (Provisional Results): 190
2019 (Outgoing Parliament): 176
The EPP is the largest political group in the European Parliament, representing centre-right parties. It advocates for a strong and united Europe, with policies promoting economic growth, security, and stability.
Current Leader: Manfred Weber
Policies’ Focus: EU defence and security (European Security Pact), economic growth (through digital innovation), healthcare access, and climate action.
Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D)
Seats:
2024 (Provisional Results): 136
2019 (Outgoing Parliament): 139
S&D represents centre-left parties and focuses on social justice, environmental sustainability, and protecting workers' rights. The group has faced challenges in recent elections but remains a significant force in EU politics.
Current Leader: Nicolas Schmit
Policies’ Focus: Support for Ukraine, gender equality, affordable housing, climate action (Green Deal), healthcare access (European Health Union), and combating far-right extremism.
Renew Europe (RE)
Seats
2024 (Provisional Results): 80
2019 (Outgoing Parliament): 102
Renew Europe is a centrist political group that emerged from the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe. It is pro-European Union and advocates for reforms to make the EU more transparent and democratic.
Current Leader: Valérie Hayer
Policies’ Focus: EU transparency and democracy, economic growth (digital innovation), climate action, defence of the rule of law, and fair competition.
European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR)
Seats
2024 (Provisional Results): 76
2019 (Outgoing Parliament): 69
ECR represents conservative and Eurosceptic parties. It supports a looser European Union that empowers national sovereignty and opposes further EU centralisation.
Current Leader: Ryszard Legutko
Policies’ Focus: National sovereignty, economic deregulation, EU budget efficiency, border security (via information sharing), and revising climate policies (localised approach to Green Deal).
Identity and Democracy (ID)
Seats
2024 (Provisional Results): 58
2019 (Outgoing Parliament): 49
ID consists of right-wing, nationalist, and populist parties. It promotes policies that prioritise national identity and sovereignty over further European integration.
Current Leader: Marco Zanni
Policies’ Focus: National sovereignty, immigration control, decentralisation of EU powers, perceived preservation of cultural identity, and opposition to EU centralisation (e.g., a European army).
The Greens/European Free Alliance (Greens/EFA)
Seats
2024 (Provisional Results): 52
2019 (Outgoing Parliament): 71
The Greens represent green and regionalist parties. It is committed to environmental sustainability, human rights, and social justice.
Current Leader: Philippe Lamberts and Terry Reintke
Policies’ Focus: Climate action (Paris Climate Agreement), social equality, human rights, migration reform, and digital rights.
The Left in the European Parliament (GUE/NGL)
Seats
2024 (Provisional Results): 39
2019 (Outgoing Parliament): 37
The Left consists of socialist and communist parties advocating for radical social and economic change, focusing on workers' rights and anti-austerity measures.
Current Leader: Walter Baier
Policies’ Focus: Workers' rights, economic justice (anti-austerity), climate action, gender equality, and social justice.
The European Parliament holds significant legislative authority, including the power to amend and pass legislation, approve the EU budget with the Commission and the Council, and influence EU policy in areas like foreign affairs, trade, and environmental regulations. However, its power is limited by the Early Warning System (EWS), which allows national parliaments to challenge EU laws. Additionally, some member states may legally transpose EU legislation but fail to enforce or implement it effectively.
Whilst national policies, especially those related to healthcare, education, and local law enforcement, typically have remained at the discretion of individual member states, EU laws and regulations can influence national legislation in areas where the EU has competence (e.g., customs union, internal market competition rules, agricultural policy, carbon emission reduction goals, etc.).
Centrist Parties Hold Their Ground: The EU’s central-right parties, consisting of the EPP Group under the leadership of von der Leyen, won a majority of 190 seats (↑14). This puts von der Leyen in a favourable position for a second five-year term as the President of the European Commission. Additionally, it strengthens centrist parties’ abilities to push forward their legislative agenda and maintain continuity in EU policies. However, European centre-left parties have warned von der Leyen against seeking support from far-right parties for her second-term bid.
Rising Influence of Right-Wing Parties: In recent years, right-wing influence has grown, leading the EPP to oppose two Green Deal proposals; however, despite this opposition, the Nature Restoration Law was recently adopted by the Council. Concurrently, the Parliament has supported stricter rules for immigration detention centres. In these latest elections, ID, led by France’s Marine Le Pen, won 58 seats (↑9), whilst ECR, led by Italy’s Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, won 76 seats (↑7). These right-wing parties represent over ⅕ of Parliamentary seats and indicate continued support for nationalist and Eurosceptic agendas as voters increasingly shift towards them from the liberal RE and the Greens as voters grow dissatisfied. Furthermore, this shift is purported to be influenced by high inflation, energy price spikes, and immigration debates. The question remains whether ID and ECR, among others, could form an alliance, which would be the second largest in Parliament. However, this potential alliance faces challenges due to internal factional rivalries and differing stances on key issues, notably support for Ukraine and fiscal responsibilities. For example, although Le Pen has suggested such an alliance, domestically, National Rally (RN) has recently distanced itself from the German AfD party, which it considers too controversial. On the other hand, despite their differences, Meloni seeks to unite parties with a compatible vision, extending a hand to the ID group for a potential alliance.
Rising Right-Wing Popularity Among Youth: Young voters increasingly support right-wing parties, contributing to the considerable gains of the ECR and ID groups. For example, 25% of French voters aged 18-24 supported Marine Le Pen’s National Rally, and Germany’s AfD saw its youth vote rise from 5% in 2019 to 16%. Poland’s Confederation party received 30.1% of votes from 18-29-year-olds, while Spain’s Vox party attracted 12.4% of voters aged 18-25. This shift underscores a growing trend, in contrast to 2019, among young Europeans toward nationalist and Eurosceptic policies.
Influence of Non-Attached and Non-Allied Members: This Parliament will consist of 45 non-attached (↑8) and 44 non-allied (↓18) members, the latter of whom are poised to impact coalition building. These members, whose views are more radical across the political spectrum, often oppose key policies on Russia, the Green Deal, and EU enlargement. Their considerable presence, almost 10% of all seats, introduces unpredictability and will likely challenge consensus-building in the European Parliament. The German contingent is notably influential. Having won 15 (↑6) seats in the European Parliament, the AfD seeks to form a new 'alternative-right' group, potentially collaborating with parties from Bulgaria (Vazrazhdane, Revival Party), Hungary (Fidesz, Hungarian Civic Alliance), Slovakia (Slovenská Národná Strana, Slovak National Party), Latvia (Stabilitātei, For Stability), and Poland (Konfederacja Wolność i Niepodległość, Confederation), which share common ground on pro-Russian sympathies and anti-immigration politics. This further highlights the growing ideological gap vis-a-vis the ECR and ID groups, complicating their efforts to steer the groups toward the political centre and become widely accepted. Meanwhile, on the left, Sarah Wagenknecht's movement BSW (Germany) garners support from non-attached leftist and sovereigntist-populist factions across Europe, challenging the S&D's position.
Losses for the Socialist, Liberal, and Green Parties: The centre-left S&D saw a slight reduction to 135 seats (↓3), maintaining its position as the second-largest parliamentary bloc. However, the liberal RE group faced a sharper decline, securing only 80 seats (↓22). Similarly, the Greens, who had previously made significant gains, experienced a notable drop to 52 seats (↓19). This latter loss has caused concern for the future of the EU's Green Deal, the 2030 climate change targets and the phasing-out of the sale of new combustion engine cars by 2035. Greens faced their largest defeats in Belgium, France, Germany, and Italy to the benefit of far-right parties. Whilst ideologically different from another and especially to the far-right parties, it is common for parties to align themselves with others on a policy-to-policy basis, regardless of their overarching policies. However, members of the S&D have stated that support for and cooperation with the EPP will not be tolerated should it engage in negotiations with the ECR and ID and allow them to influence Parliament's direction.
National Elections: The results of these European elections immediately began to have a ripple effect at national levels. President Emmanuel Macron dissolved the French Parliament and announced ‘snap’ elections following the results in which his party lost out to Marine Le Pen’s far-right RN. By calling for new elections, Macron aims to address the heightened political instability and potentially recalibrate the French political landscape by challenging voters to put pen to paper domestically. In Germany, the disappointing performance of Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s centre-left SPD party has intensified scrutiny over his leadership and policies, particularly from the centre-right CDU party. Critics argue that his administration has failed to effectively address key issues such as economic stagnation, inflation, and immigration, which were pivotal in driving voters towards right-wing alternatives like the AfD.
Impact on Markets: Macron’s call for a snap election and the surge in support for right-wing parties across Europe naturally led to markets’ reactions, driven by investor concerns about potential policy shifts and political instability. The euro experienced its worst two-day performance against the dollar in over a year, dropping 0.6% to 1.0760 USD. Major European stock indices, including France’s CAC 40 and Germany’s DAX, saw declines, with the former down 1.7%. Whilst these have since levelled out, the impact of the Elections on these indices is hard to quantify.
Guillaume Périgois/Unsplash
Forecast
Short-term:
EU Leadership: Following the electoral success of the EPP, Macron, and therefore RE, are highly likely to support von der Leyen for a second term despite the former's losses. In Germany, Scholz, also weakened by election results, favours a swift decision on EU leadership and likely will back von der Leyen. von der Leyen will likely seek support from the Greens, whose (74) seats eluded her in 2019, although she may equally likely seek out ECR's 83 seats. A first meeting between the EU leaders and representatives resulted in a stalemate, with no agreement on the proposed appointments. The next meeting is scheduled for the end of June to continue discussions and aim for a resolution. It is likely that von der Leyen will achieve a second term in office, albeit involving careful negotiation to secure support amidst a polarised landscape.
Defence and Ukraine: The last EU funding package for Ukraine (February 2024) amounted to €50 billion in financial support until 2027. However, it is unlikely to be repeated until at least Q4 of 2024 and likely at a reduced amount or in a different structure, such as the recent $50bn loan to Ukraine from the G7, raised thanks to frozen Russian assets, rather than outright “aid”.
Russian Meddling: Given the public posturing of Emmanual Macron in the face of Russia's Western ambitions, it is highly likely that Russian state-backed actors are especially interested in disrupting and meddling in the upcoming French parliamentary elections, as they have for the Olympics or in Moldova.
Market Impact: Despite immediate knee-jerk reactions, the outcome of these elections is unlikely to impact markets in the short term. However, sectors such as banking and major companies in France and Germany experienced notable sell-offs, driven by uncertainties and potential policy shifts stemming from the gains of far-right parties.
Policy Debates: Novel and possibly stricter immigration policies are highly likely to be introduced once the new parliament is established and the European Commission is fully functional by late October, particularly depending on who leads the Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs. Similarly, the development and introduction of the Green Deal’s initiatives may be slowed in the first instance as coalition-building efforts take priority and parliamentary power dynamics settle.
Medium-term:
National Elections Foresight: Upcoming national elections are highly likely to be influenced by the rightward shift in the European Parliament, such as in France (RN), Germany (AfD), and Italy (Fratelli d'Italia).
Legislative Challenges: The European Parliament has shifted slightly to the right, with more Eurosceptic nationalists and fewer liberals and Greens. This more polarised parliament will likely make it challenging to pass EU legislation similar to previous measures, particularly on climate change, immigration, industrial strategy, and defence.
Impact on Immigration Policies: Right-wing parties are highly likely to push for increased border and national security, as well as stricter stances on immigration and asylum rules. However, implementation may be hindered by disagreements on strategies between the parliamentary groups and northern and southern EU states. Policies similar to Italy’s agreement with Albania, where migrants are sent to Albania for asylum claim assessments, are likely to be promoted by the ECR group and gain support in the parliament. Notably, 15 EU states, led by Denmark, have issued a joint call to the EU Commission to develop an external approach to managing migration and asylum processes.
Cooperation and Divisions Amongst Right-Wing Parties: Despite potential gains, there is a realistic possibility of fractures within the ECR and ID, which could limit their ability to form a cohesive faction and effectively influence policy. Nevertheless, should an alliance between the EPP and ECR not materialise, both groups will likely form issue-based coalitions on topics such as immigration and the Green Deal to advance shared interests.
Long-term:
Climate and Environmental Policies: The Green Deal and other climate initiatives are likely to face long-term setbacks in 2027 as policies will come under review halfway through the Parliament's five-year term. The right-wing influence could lead to the watering down of legislation; this includes the potential phase-out of new combustion engine cars by 2035, revisions to the EU's Fit for 55 Package, and threats to the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, to name a few. Thereafter, there is a realistic possibility that the focus may shift from renewable energy to securing cheaper energy supplies, including possible nuclear power or gas fracking support. The Parliament will almost certainly play a key role in negotiating the 2040 emissions reduction target and guiding future climate policies.
EU Enlargement: Increased Eurosceptic seats are unlikely to delay or halt EU enlargement, as accession is a multi-year process, and the current candidates, Ukraine, Moldova, and North Macedonia, are highly unlikely to meet the relevant criteria within the next five years. However, new barriers could be pre-emptively created to reject new members.
Digital Strategy: Because the EPP, S&D, and RE groups hold a slight majority and have advocated for improving and expanding safe digitalisation in their manifestos, the EU parliament will likely continue advancing digital policies such as the Digital Services Act (2022) and the Artificial Intelligence Act (2024). The European Digital Rights and Principles are highly likely to guide the EU's digital policy, promoting data protection, privacy, cybersecurity, and digital accessibility. Therefore, the new parliament will almost certainly balance promoting digitalisation and AI use with necessary regulations. Despite extensive social media use during campaigning, the ECR and ID groups did not address digitalisation or AI at a policy level, leaving their future stance unclear.
Trade and Industrial Policy: The European Union's industrial and trade policies will likely shift towards achieving strategic autonomy, advancing the green transition, and fostering technological innovation. To do so, it is highly likely that the EU will continue to reduce its dependence on non-EU countries, such as China and Russia, for critical sectors, including semiconductors and raw materials. For example, the EU may increasingly look to regions like Lapland in Sweden and the Gardar Province in Greenland, Denmark, which are known for their rare earth deposits. However, it is highly unlikely that the EU will achieve complete autonomy in this regard. Even if it reduces reliance on China, it will depend on countries like the United States or Australia, which have deposits and the established infrastructure and processing capabilities for rare earth elements. These alternatives, however, may better align with the EU's broader objectives of mitigating geopolitical risks associated with certain non-EU suppliers.
Regarding energy policy, centrist, left-wing, and green political groups within the EU are likely to advocate for replacing dependence on non-EU countries with renewable energy sources, albeit to varying extents. They will likely encounter opposition from parties such as the ECR and ID, which are highly likely to influence trade agreements, the promotion of sustainable technologies, and climate goals.
Internationally, protectionist tendencies from right-wing parties and strict environmental standards from their counterparts, alongside factors such as the trade disruption, e.g., COVID-19, and the implementation of Carbon Border Taxes, are likely to shape the direction and method of the EU's engagement in trade. Notably, the EU-Mercosur Trade Agreement, which has already faced significant delays and protests, particularly from agricultural lobbies concerned about low-cost imports, will likely undergo further scrutiny and potential revisions.
